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ABSTRACT 
 
Research science intellectual property law has undergone 
tremendous change within the past two decades.1 In particular, 
 
  * Joan Jackson has a J.D. from the University of Massachusetts-
Dartmouth School of Law; B.S. and M.S. in Biology from Tulane University; 
and Ph.D. in Zoology from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. She spent 
twenty-seven years as a senior research scientist/laboratory director/program 
manager/inventor, identifying new drugs and diagnostics for orphan diseases, 
and designing- and conducting preclinical new drug efficacy studies; twenty 
years as Deputy Tropical Medicine Course Director/Adjunct faculty, teaching 
M.D., and medical students. Acknowledgments: This Article would not exist 
but for years of kind mentorship and patient correction of numerous drafts by 
Ralph D. Clifford, Esq., Professor of Law and Former Associate Dean, 
University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth School of Law; and Frances Howell 
Rudko, Esq., Professor of Law, University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth 
School of Law. Any mistakes or errors are to be solely attributed to the 
Author. Contact: Joan E. Jackson, email: researchsciencelaw@aol.com; cell: 
301-661-9002; or joanjacksonlaw.com. The phrase, “Beyond the Scope of 
Ordinary Training and Knowledge,” borrowed from 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006), 
refers herein to novel research science achievement, arguably qualifying its 
natural creator for moral rights under international standards. 
1. “Research science” and “scientific research” are used interchangeably. 
“Science” is defined herein broadly to include traditional laboratory sciences 
and social sciences. “Research” has been defined by the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) as: 
 
A systematic, intensive study intended to increase 
knowledge or understanding of the subject studied, a 
systematic study specifically directed toward applying new 
knowledge to meet a recognized need, or a systematic 
application of knowledge to the production of useful 
materials, devices, and systems or methods, including 
design, development, and improvement of prototypes and 
new processes to meet specific requirements. 
 
Glossary & Acronym List, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/glossary.htm#S (last visited July 14, 2012). 
David L. Faigman et al. distinguished “applied research” from “basic 
research” as follows: 
 
“Basic research” is performed in order to provide a 
theoretical understanding of a phenomenon of interest. . . . 
[I]n science [a theory] means an explanation for a set of 
observed facts. Theory is not contrary to fact, it is the 
abstract or conceptual account [composed of hypotheses] for 
why the observed facts exist as they do. These [conceptual 
explanations] may or may not lead to a practical 
application. The steps in the process of theory development 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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research science procedure and focus has shifted dramatically 
 
and testing – hypothetico-deductive research [include] . . . . 
1. Observations of some phenomenon are made. . . . 
2. Possible explanations [theories] are proposed for what is 
observed. . . . 
3. Hypotheses [conceptual propositions] are logically derived 
from the theories. 
4. Studies are designed to test [the validity] of the 
hypotheses. In essence, the [research] study makes news 
observations that might disconfirm the hypothesis and 
thereby falsify the theory. 
5. The results of such empirical tests lead to the revision or 
abandonment of older theories or the creation of still newer 
and hopefully better [more accurate] theories. 
6. The process repeats itself as more empirical tests are 
conducted and theories undergo continued re-evaluation. 
 
DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS AND 
RESEARCH ISSUES 120-21 (2002). “‘Applied research’ is aimed at answering 
immediate, practical questions. . . . Some [applied] research [e.g., a research 
survey] is conducted to provide a thorough description of something,” to “try 
to explain patterns or similarity and variation that had been found.” Id. at 
120. To be disclosed or published, most research science must be subject to 
peer review. The NIH defines “peer review” as: 
 
The process that involves the consistent application of 
standards and procedures that produce fair, equitable, and 
objective examinations of [research funding] applications 
[and research findings submitted for publication or 
disclosure] based on an evaluation of scientific or technical 
merit or other relevant aspects of the application [or 
research manuscript submitted for publication]. The review 
is performed by experts (Peer Reviewers) in the field of 
endeavor for which support [or professional journal 
publication] is requested. Peer review is intended to provide 
guidance and recommendations [e.g. commentary on 
research to prospective research scientist authors] . . . . 
 
NIH Grants Policy Statement, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps_2011/nihgps_ch1.htm#definitions_o
f_terms (last visited July 14, 2012); see also Peter W. B. Phillips & Camille D. 
Ryan, The Role of Clusters in Driving Innovation, in 1 INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST 
PRACTICES 281, 281-94 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds., 2006). See generally AM. 
LAW INST., Introduction to PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN 
TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES 3-7, §§ 101-103 (2008) [hereinafter ALI] (ALI’s 
model principles regarding current global intellectual property law and law 
practice). 
5
JACKSONMACRO 99 PAGES 11/13/2012  9:03 AM 
2012] “BEYOND THE SCOPE” 681 
from local to global.2 Historically, prior to Internet 
communication, science generally focused on solutions to 
problems impacting local, regional, or national populations.3 
The scientific research (and, hence, the law governing 
intellectual property) similarly was largely circumscribed 
within the nation-state: professional research societies (science 
quality and ethics), state law (contractual and licensing 
agreements enforcement), and federal law governing copyright 
and patent.4 
With the twenty-first century reliance on Internet 
communications, there was a marked shift in focus from local 
research science to global research science.5 The Internet 
opportunities to draw from worldwide scientific talent and 
diverse expertise in real-time became an irresistible siren’s 
song for research scientists to address global problems that 
only a few years ago were deemed unsolvable.6 Today, the 
typical modern research laboratory is virtual, via the Internet, 
and composed of all existing international scientific expertise 
considered necessary to tackle major problems facing world 
populations.7 Both undergraduate science education8 and 
 
2. Phillips & Ryan, supra note 1, at 281-94; see also COMM. ON NEW 
GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP FOR SCI. AND SEC., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND 
SECURITY IN A POST 9/11 WORLD: A REPORT BASED ON REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS 
BETWEEN SCIENCE AND SECURITY COMMUNITIES 61 (2007) [hereinafter NEW 
GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP] (“[L]ife sciences research is now nearly borderless and is 
a global collaborative activity.”); ALI, supra note 1, at 6 (“The internationalist 
perspective also requires the Principles to envision a future in which 
coordination among [nation states’] courts evolves from the exceptional to the 
expected.”). 
3. See generally Phillips & Ryan, supra note 1, at 281-94. 
4. See ALI, supra note 1, at 3-7, §§ 101-103. 
5. Teri Melese, Building and Managing Corporate Alliances in an 
Academic Medical Center, 15 RES. MGMT. REV., Winter/Spring 2006, at 17, 
available at http://www.ncura.edu/content/news/rmr/docs/v15n1.pdf 
(“Moreover, there is an increased desire for companies to engage in strategic 
research partnerships reflecting a general trend for companies to move away 
from licensing arrangements and toward building partnerships.”). 
6. See ALI, supra note 1, at 3-7, §§ 101-103. 
7. See Phillips & Ryan, supra note 1, at 281-94; Melese, supra note 5, at 
14: 
 
The practice of biomedical research is changing. It is 
evolving towards a bigger enterprise involving multiple 
investigators from multiple institutions, both academic and 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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university education are also embracing the virtual 
international laboratory research model.9 The result is that 
research science intellectual property law is struggling to keep 
 
corporate. No single investigator can assemble all the 
required technologies and expertise to understand complex 
disease mechanisms and to translate that scientific 
knowledge into disease treatment. To move discoveries 
effectively between bench and bedside requires close ties 
among the basic [academic fundamental 
biological/biochemical processes], clinical [patient 
management], and corporate research enterprises. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). See generally ALI, supra note 1, at 3-7 (illustrating 
that ALI recognized that modern global commerce strains existing global 
intellectual property (IP) regulation because existing IP regulation lacks fully 
harmonized international legal standards). 
8. Stephen K. Ritter, Reengineering the Undergraduate Laboratory, 
CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, Sept. 19, 2011, at 34-35. Students at 
Boston-based Simmons College conduct hands-on basic polymer research in 
collaboration with other institutions, including one university in Argentina. 
Id. 
9. See generally UK/US STUDY GROUP, HIGHER EDUCATION AND 
COLLABORATION IN GLOBAL CONTEXT, BUILDING A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, A 
PRIVATE REPORT TO PRIME MINISTER GORDON BROWN 15, 20 (2009), available 
at www.aau.edu/WorkArea/showcontent.aspx?id=9222. This Study Group 
stated: 
 
Political systems – which remain resolutely national – have a 
notoriously hard time effectively addressing the world’s 
greatest problems, which are transnational and global in 
nature. . . . [University-to-University] [t]ransnational HE 
[higher education] collaboration can elude the roadblocks that 
make it difficult to effectively address big global problems. . . 
. [O]ne possible vehicle is multilateral and multi-member 
collaborations. Universities must leverage their longevity and 
stability, and their ability to forge international bonds to create 
entities that have as their explicit mandate to take on the long-
term, multilateral study of the most threatening global issues. . 
. . Increasingly, universities are relied upon for a huge range of 
research activities that used to be shared or shouldered by the 
private sector. “Blue sky” research – research undertaken for 
knowledge’s sake, to probe theoretical boundaries but without 
immediate applied value – is the driver of innovation. . . . 
[W]hile we may know what today’s “marketable areas” are, 
we don’t know those of tomorrow – and only open ended 
research leads there. Now the locus of innovative research is, 
and will increasingly be, the university. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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abreast of the intertwined research science global network 
relationships.10 National intellectual property law is being 
rapidly subsumed within global intellectual property law, 
simply because the research science parties involved even in 
unitary research projects span the globe.11 
Global research proceeds logically into global commerce 
and both exert tremendous leverage on nations to conform to 
international intellectual property norms.12 Absent the United 
States’ consensus to be bound by majority global intellectual 
property agreements and regulatory authority, U.S. scientists 
face material disadvantages in modern global scientific 
research.13 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Moral rights’ significance may perhaps be summed from an 
ancient truism: writers write, composers compose, painters 
paint, inventors invent, and so on, so that more often than not 
what one considers important in life is reflected in how one 
spends his life.14 Moral rights evolved over centuries to grant 
recognition under law of the intangible essence of one’s person 
inexorably reflected in one’s creative tangible work product(s).15 
This Article focuses on research scientists’ moral rights: 
first, what these are and why formal recognition is essential to 
scientists’ production of research benefiting the public, to the 
integrity of the scientific endeavor, and to sustain the research 
 
10. See Phillips & Ryan, supra note 1, at 281-94; Melese, supra note 5, at 
13, 14. See generally ALI, supra note 1, at 3-7, §§ 101-103. 
11. See generally ALI, supra note 1, at 3-7, §§ 101-103. 
12. Id. at 4-7. 
13. Id. at 3-7, §§ 101-103; see also Jason Koebler, Demand, Pay for 
STEM Skills Skyrocket, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 20, 2011, 
http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/stem-education/2011/10/20/stem-
competency-a-foundational-skill-jobs-expert-says. “[T]here’s a problem with 
‘attracting homegrown American talent to science and engineering in the face 
of increasing supplies of highly qualified students and workers from lower-
wage countries.’” Id. “For every 100 students who graduates with a bachelor’s 
degree, 19 graduate with a degree in STEM, but only eight are working in a 
STEM occupation 10 years down the line . . . .” Id. 
14. GOD’S LITTLE DEVOTIONAL BIBLE 1111 (1997). 
15. See generally GILLIAN DAVIES & KEVIN GARNETT, MORAL RIGHTS 3-64 
(2010). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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science profession in the United States. Specifically germane to 
intellectual rights control and government rights in research 
science are the impact of post-9/11 federal security measures,16 
the 2011 Supreme Court decision in Stanford University v. 
Roche Molecular Systems, Inc.17 regarding the Bayh-Dole and 
Stevenson-Wydler Acts,18 and federal action to curb “science 
misconduct.”19 Second, the Article will address the current 
status of moral rights recognition in law in the United States; 
in other words, why the lack of U.S. moral rights for research 
scientists presages material disadvantage to U.S. scientists 
conducting research in modern global virtual laboratories. 
Third, United States moral rights legal recognition for research 
science is proposed, i.e., recognition and enforcement in federal 
law by non-waivable assignment to scientists of non-economic 
moral rights: attribution, integrity, retraction and disclosure. 
The latter moral rights are essential to research scientists’ 
careers, to research science quality, and to ensure public 
disclosure. Moral rights are distinct from potentially alienable 
economic rights, allegedly important to research scientists’ 
employers and government. 
 
 
 
 
16. See also Research Compliance: A Faculty Handbook, Research 
Security in the Post-9/11 Environment, UC BERKLEY, 
http://rac.berkeley.edu/compliancebook/post911.html (last visited June 10, 
2012); Allison Chamberlain, Science and Security in the Post-9/11 
Environment, Export Controls: Grants, Contracts, and Publishing, AM. ASS’N 
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., available at 
http://www.aaas.org/spp/post911/grants/ (last visited June 10, 2012). See 
generally NEW GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP, supra note 2. 
17. Bd. of Trs. Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 
Inc., 583 F.3d 832 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011). 
18. University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980 (Bayh-
Doyle Act of 1980), Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 
200-212 (2006)) (controls allocation of rights to inventions made by employees 
of small business firms and domestic nonprofit organizations, including 
universities, in federally assisted programs); Stevenson-Wydler Technology 
Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3714 (2006)) (“[T]he Federal Government shall 
strive where appropriate to transfer owned and originated technology to 
State and local governments and to the private sector.”). 
19. See generally DHHS Policies on Research Misconduct, 42 C.F.R. pts. 
50, 93 (2011) (effective June 16, 2005). 
9
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II. Problem: Ostensibly to Promote Economic Enterprise, U.S. 
Law Is Failing to Preserve the Link Between the 
Scientist and His/Her Investigative Findings and 
Discoveries 
 
A. Why Research Scientists’ Professional Activities Directly
 Depend on Recognition of Moral Rights 
 
A scientist’s professional activities directly depend on the 
recognition of moral rights because these rights are essential to 
ensure science validity20 (including transition into the 
marketplace for public benefit); to the integrity of the research 
process and profession; to prompt public research disclosure; 
and, to sustain the individual research scientist’s career.21 
Research paternity (or right of attribution of the actual creator 
to be identified with his own work, contra plagiarism),22 
 
20. Valid science is considered synonymous with reproducible results, 
using the exact materials and methods initially reported. Results 
reproduction requires precise, complete disclosure to research peers 
(scientific peer review), capable of replicating the innovative discovery to 
evaluate scientific validity in fact. 
21. Sean B. Seymour, How Does My Work Become Our Work? Dilution of 
Authorship in Scientific Papers, and the Need for the Academy to Obey 
Copyright Law, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. (ISSUE 3, ARTICLE 11) 1, 2-3 (2006); see 
also Mark L. Meyer, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The 
Protection of and Rights in Scientific Research, 39 IDEA J.L. & TECH. 1, 33-34 
(1998). See generally COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, AND PUB. POLICY, RISING ABOVE 
THE GATHERING STORM: ENERGIZING AND EMPLOYING AMERICA FOR A BRIGHTER 
ECONOMIC FUTURE 70, 83-84, 104-105, 186-192 (2007) [hereinafter GATHERING 
STORM]; MEMBERS OF THE 2005 “RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM” COMM., 
RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM, REVISITED: RAPIDLY APPROACHING 
CATEGORY 5 (2010) [hereinafter STORM REVISITED]. 
22. David Nimmer, The Moral Imperative Against Plagiarism (Without A 
Moral Right Against Reverse Passing Off), 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 67 (2004) 
(quoting the Modern Language Association’s four-prong definition of 
plagiarism). The definition is as follows: 
 
Plagiarism is the use of another person’s ideas or 
expressions in your writing without acknowledging the 
source. 
Simply put, plagiarism is using another person’s words or 
ideas without appropriate acknowledgement. 
In short, to plagiarize is to give the impression that you 
have written or thought something that you have in fact 
borrowed from someone else. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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research integrity (or right of respect, right to object to 
distortion, mutilation or unauthorized modification of his 
work), right of retraction (right to withdraw the work from 
circulation and public use based on, for example, later specific 
contrary findings),23 and right of disclosure (right to control 
first publication of the work) control research science in fact.24 
The right to divulge and retract allows the author to decide 
 
IV.[P]lagiarism is: 
a. reproducing someone else’s sentences more or less 
verbatim, and presenting them as your own; 
b. repeating another’s particularly apt phrase; 
c. paraphrasing someone else’s argument; 
d. introducing another’s line of thinking; 
e. failing to cite the source for a borrowed thesis. 
 
Id.; see also K. R. ST. ONGE, THE MELANCHOLY ANATOMY OF PLAGIARISM 39, 54 
(1988) (“academic plagiarism is a capital offense, punishable by academic 
death for student or faculty. With or without warnings.”); Lisa G. Lerman, 
Misattribution in Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism, Ghostwriting, and 
Authorship, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 467, 475 (2001); Jaime S. Dursht, Judicial 
Plagiarism: It May Be Fair But Is It Ethical?, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1253, 1260 
(1996). 
23. See, e.g., Steve Ritter, Metal-Oxo Papers Retracted, CHEMICAL AND 
ENGINEERING NEWS, June 18, 2012, at 9 (Although the data published were 
correct, the authors retracted because later experiments proved their earlier 
interpretation of the data was wrong); Robert H. Silverman, et al., Letter: 
Partial Retraction, 334 SCI. 176, 176 (2011) (published Oct. 14, 2011). 
24. DAVIES & GARNETT, supra note 15, at 5-6. Moral rights are: 
 
[G]enerally understood as the rights accorded the author of 
a work and related to the personality of the author, and the 
integrity of the author and the work, as opposed to the 
economic rights; the main moral rights are those of 
divulgation (right to disclose the work), paternity (right to 
be identified as the author of the work), integrity (right to 
maintain the integrity of the author in relation to the work, 
and the integrity of the work itself), and right of retraction 
(right to retract the work from circulation when the author 
changes views). Only the paternity and integrity rights are 
recognized in the Berne Convention: civil law jurisdictions 
may recognize the four rights, but common law jurisdictions 
[e.g. U.K. and U.S.A.] tend to limit recognition to the rights 
of paternity and integrity, as required by the Convention. 
 
Id. (emphasis in original); see also SIGMA XI, THE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH SOC’Y, 
HONOR IN SCIENCE 39 (2000); SIGMA XI, THE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH SOC’Y, THE 
RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER: PATHS AND PITFALLS 22 (1999). 
11
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when, where, and in what form the work will be disclosed (this 
is often equated with right of first publication).25 Moral rights 
are distinct from and legally distinguishable from economic 
rights in the intellectual products of research science.26 
Albeit an over-simplification, it has been said that the 
common law countries (e.g. U.S. and U.K.) are more concerned 
with protection of economic rights, whereas civil law countries 
concentrate on the moral rights of the creators, authors, and 
artists.27 Also, it was argued that moral rights in common law 
countries were superfluous, being protected by federal, state, or 
common law (e.g. unfair competition, contract, defamation, and 
privacy).28 The United States currently restricts moral rights 
 
25. GRAHAM DUTFIELD & UMA SUTHERSANEN, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 90-91 (2008). 
26. “Economic rights” is a 
 
term generally used to describe rights related to the 
economic exploitation of protected material, as distinct from 
moral rights. The main economic rights are those of 
reproduction (copying), adaptation, communication and 
distribution. In French law, the economic rights are referred 
to as “patrimonial rights”. [sic] Economic rights are usually 
established separately from moral rights in those laws 
which recognise both species of protection. 
 
J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW, PROTECTION OF AUTHORS’ WORKS, 
PERFORMANCES, PHONOGRAMS, FILMS, VIDEO, BROADCASTS AND PUBLISHED 
EDITIONS IN NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL LAW 1225 (3d ed. 2008) 
(emphasis in original). 
27. 1 DAVID T. KEELING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EU LAW, 
FREE MOVEMENT AND COMPETITION LAW 263 (2003); see also Gilliam v. Am. 
Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (“American copyright law, as 
presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action 
for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than 
the personal, rights of authors.”). 
28. STERLING, supra note 26, at 408; see also Nimmer, supra note 22, at 
16-24 (citing MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 1.12[A] (2004)): 
 
The Berne Implementation Act of 1988 expressly states that 
U.S. law then in existence sufficed to comport with all the 
requirements of the Berne Convention. Article 6bis [moral 
rights] was foremost on Congress’s mind in that regard-fully 
a third of the enactments thirteen sections are designed to 
forestall a claim that Berne adherence creates a direct cause 
of action under U.S. law for the enforcement of moral rights. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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recognition and enforcement to visual arts, performance and 
broadcasting professionals, and certain software creators.29 In 
the U.S., research scientists’ discoveries and disclosures are 
currently accorded no moral rights legal protection comparable 
to artistic creations.30 
 
 
Id. 
29. GILLIAN DAVIES, COPYRIGHT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 88-89 (2d ed. 
2002): 
 
The Berne Convention implementation Act of 1988 paved 
the way for U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention on 
March 1, 1989, an “epochal event” bringing the United 
States of America into the major multilateral copyright 
Convention. Moral rights, which had never gained statutory 
recognition in the United States of America but which 
Member States of the Berne Convention are bound to 
respect, were stated to be provided for “under the 
confirmation of a great many common law precedents, 
several state statutes, and federal laws.” In 1990, however, 
Congress enacted the Visual Artists’ Rights Act, which 
affords limited rights of attribution and integrity to a 
narrowly defined class of visual artists with respect to 
certain artistic works and photographs. In the same year, 
the Computer Software Rental Agreements Act was 
adopted, granting authors or producers of software the right 
to authorize or prohibit rental of copies, even after sale. 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
30. ROBERTA R. KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY, FORGING A MORAL 
RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 37 (2010). 
 
As the close of the First decade of the twenty-first century, 
the United States appears to be rather isolated in its failure 
to recognize explicitly adequate moral rights. The existence 
of more substantive moral rights protections in both civil 
and common law jurisdictions not only creates a disparity 
between law in the United States and many other countries, 
but also results in the situation in which American authors 
find substantially more protection for violations of their 
moral rights abroad than at home. 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Cyrill P. Rigamonte, Deconstructing 
Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 353, 354 (2006) (“the adoption of civil-law-
style moral rights legislation is a major shift in terms of copyright theory, 
because it eliminates the key features that distinguished common law from 
civil law copyright systems”); Nimmer, supra note 22, at 19-20 (raising the 
question whether countries like England “have augmented their moral rights 
13
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David Nimmer, copyright authority, recognized that the 
right of attribution, with preclusion of its negative (plagiarism 
or reverse passing off), is essential to academic research: 
 
[T]here remains one locale where the prohibition 
on reverse passing off [in research science: 
plagiarism, fraud, and misrepresentation] serves 
an essential role, which could legitimately arise to 
affect the legal rights of those caught within its 
net. That legal domain is academe, with 
particular emphasis on the customs of higher 
education. . . . “Ideas, research, and writing are 
the currency of academe. Originality of written 
work is essential to the integrity of the academic 
system. A professor who claims the work or 
another as his own-even if it is part of an article-
is engaged in academic fraud.”31 
 
In the U.S., research science intellectual property 
ownership may affect both attribution and control, to include 
what is disclosed (integrity) and whether research findings are 
disclosed to the public or not.32 Employers, including certain 
federal agencies, want monopoly control over the products of 
their employees’ intellectual property, and a variety of legal 
doctrines, agencies’ policies and practices allow them to get it.33 
 
protection” since the United States joined the Berne Convention in 1988 “in a 
way that leaves the United States isolated.”) 
31. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 66, 74 n.437 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
32. See Seymour, supra note 21, at 11 (“Publication is the key to 
recognition, success, and advancement in science. Thus, every publication 
decision is necessarily decisive.”). See generally Roberta R. Kwall, The 
Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between 
Copyright and Section 43(a), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 985 (2002). The 
underlying theme of this article is that because the United States’ copyright 
law and section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
1125(a)) are grounded in objectives other than the personality and non-
monetary interests with which the right of attribution is concerned, the 
federal enactment of a right of attribution applicable to a broad category of 
copyrightable works is vital. See id. 
33. Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’ from the ‘Fire of 
Genius’: Law and the Employee-Inventor 1830-1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 
1128 (1998). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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In particular, the law governing ownership or control of 
copyright and patents often results in employer intellectual 
property ownership (and thus control).34 Fisk aptly 
summarized: 
 
The modern law was forged in the crucible where 
patent law’s egalitarianism collided with the 
hierarchical premises of the law of master and 
servant. The law of employee inventions is an 
unstable mixture of the two bodies of law, the 
former honoring the rights of the inventor as 
employee and the latter being skeptical of the 
rights of the employee as inventor. . . . As 
Abraham Lincoln famously observed, “In 
anciently inhabited countries, the dust of the 
ages—a real downright old-foggyism—seems to 
settle upon, and smother intellects and energies 
of man.” But in America, he asserted, we had 
broken the “shackles” of the “slavery of mind” 
and had established “a habit of freedom of 
thought” that was necessary to the “discovery 
and production of new and useful things.” The 
patent law nourished this habit of free thought 
by allowing the ingenious to profit; it added “the 
fuel of interest to the fire of genius.”35 
 
The current United States deference to “hierarchical 
premises of the law of master and servant,” coupled with denial 
of recognition for mere non-economic moral rights to 
attribution, integrity, retraction, and disclosure, essential to 
research scientists’ careers and necessary to ensure research 
science quality, places U.S. research science in jeopardy in the 
modern global laboratories.36 
 
34. Id. at 1128; see Allison Chamberlain, Science and Security in the 
Post-9/11 Environment Export Controls: Grants, Contracts and Publishing, 
AAAS, http://www.aaas.org/spp/post911/grants/ (last visited July 14, 2012). 
35. Fisk, supra note 33, at 1128-29. 
36. Id. at 1128; see, e.g., GATHERING STORM, supra note 21, at 104-05: 
 
[S]ome measures put in place in the wake of September 11, 
15
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B. Public Benefit Flowed from Personal Ownership of
 Intellectual Property 
 
 1.     Why Does It Matter Who Owns and Controls 
ScientificResearch? 
 
In Weinstein v. University of Illinois, Judge Easterbrook 
summarized historic intellectual property ownership and 
control for research scientists: 
 
The University concedes in this court that a 
professor of mathematics who proves a new 
theorem in the course of his employment will 
own the copyright to his article containing that 
proof. This has been the academic tradition since 
copyright law began . . . a tradition the 
 
2001, seeking to increase homeland security, will be 
ineffective at best and could in fact hamper US economic 
competitiveness and prosperity. . . . Of principal concern 
now are other forms of disincentive: expansion of the 
restrictions on “deemed exports,” . . . . Expanded or new 
categories of “sensitive but unclassified” information [both] 
could restrict publication or other forms of dissemination. . . 
. Both approaches could undermine the protections for 
fundamental research established in National Security 
Decision Directive 189 (NSDD-189), the Reagan 
Administration’s 1985 executive order declaring that 
publicly funded research . . . be unrestricted. . . . The NSDD-
189 policy remains in force and has been reaffirmed by 
senior officials of the [then] current [George W. Bush] 
administration, but it appears to be at odds with other 
policy developments and some recent practices. 
 
Id.; see, e.g., Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for 
Nat’l Sec. Affairs, to Dr. Harold Brown, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Studies 
(Nov. 1, 2001), in COMM’N ON SCI. AND SEC., SCIENCE AND SECURITY IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 111 (2002) 111 (reaffirming the NSDD-189); John Marburger, Dir., 
Office of Sci. and Tech. Policy, Remarks at the Roundtable on Scientific 
Communication and National Security (June 19, 2003), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2003/06/ostp061903.html. See also Philip H. 
Hulme, Biosecurity and the Politics of Fear, 334 SCI. 176, 177 (Oct. 14, 2011) 
(“Since the 2011 anthrax mailings shocked the public, the United States has 
substantially increased its funding for research and development of 
biodefense countermeasures. . . . These funds could be better spent. 
Biodefense research focuses on pathogens of high biodefense value but low 
public health significance.”). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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University’s policy purports to retain. The 
tradition covers scholarly articles and other 
intellectual property . . . .37 
 
As Judge Easterbrook aptly noted, historically there exist 
numerous examples of United States scientists who built 
successful professional research careers making monumental 
health and economic contributions as envisioned by the 
constitutional framers. More often than not, scientists are 
professionally enabled because of unchallenged ownership and 
control of their own creative research intellectual property. 
Scientists’ careers, including mobility and the freedom to 
change employment,38 are established on research science 
disclosure. There is no logical incentive for any scientist to 
refuse to disclose his research discoveries. Ownership by 
scientist creators historically fulfilled the constitutional 
purpose of Art. I, Sec. 8: “To promote the progress of science 
and the useful arts.” Representative examples of countless 
similar scientist creators include: from industry, Thomas A. 
Edison; from academia, George Washington Carver; and from 
medicine, Thomas E. Starzl, each promoting “progress of 
science.” 
An early industrial research scientist, Thomas Alva 
Edison, held over 1093 patents as actual inventor-creator.39 
Edison was born February 11, 1847 and died October 18, 
1931.40 Edison sold his initial patents, which he created as a 
 
37. Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987); see 
also Seymour, supra note 21, at 5 (“[I]t has been the prevailing academic 
practice to treat the faculty member as the copyright owner of the works that 
are created independently and at the faculty members own initiative for 
traditional academic purposes.”) (quoting AAUP, STATEMENT ON COPYRIGHT 
(1999)); Seymour, supra note 21, at 5 (“Because professors choose the subject 
matter, intellectual approach, and direction of their scholarship, the 
university exerts little to no control and thus is not entitled to ownership.”) 
(citing Sunil R. Kulkarni, All Professors Create Equally: Why Faculty Should 
Have Complete Control Over the Intellectual Property Rights in Their 
Creations, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 240 (1995)). 
38. NEW GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP, supra note 2, at 3 (“The global scientific 
enterprise thrives on the movement of students and scholars across borders 
and among institutions.”). 
39. Edison’s Patents, RUTGERS U., http://edison.rutgers.edu/patents.htm 
(last updated Feb. 20, 2012). 
40. Detailed Biography, RUTGERS U., http://edison.rutgers.edu/bio-
17
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telegrapher, using money from the sales to eventually set up 
his own research and development laboratory in Menlo Park, 
New Jersey.41 In Menlo Park, Edison led a team of inventors, 
numbering over 10,000 during the first World War, credited 
with hundreds of inventions associated with bringing 
electricity to the U.S. public via his company, General 
Electric.42 Edison’s modest goals still mirror those of a majority 
of today’s research scientists: “Having one’s own shop 
[laboratory], working on projects of one’s own choosing, making 
enough money today so one could do the same tomorrow . . . .”43 
George Washington Carver was an academic, inventor, 
botanist, and fast friend of Thomas Edison.44 Professor Carver 
was born on July 12, 1864 and died on January 5, 1943. 45 The 
son of a Missouri slave, Carver attended Iowa State University, 
earning a bachelor’s degree in 1894 and a master’s degree in 
1896. 46 He then joined the faculty of Booker T. Washington 
University’s Tuskegee Institute.47 
Carver viewed the scientist as a person who “unlocked the 
mysteries of the universe in order to improve the quality of life 
for everyone, particularly the poor and underprivileged.”48 
Through the years, Professor Carver gained international 
stature, working with scientists from China, Japan, Russia, 
India, Europe, and South America. In 1916, he was elected a 
member of the Royal Society for the Encouragement of the Arts 
in England.49 Carver also consulted with the U.S. War 
 
long.htm (last updated Feb. 20, 2012). 
41. RANDALL STROSS, THE WIZARD OF MENLO PARK: HOW THOMAS ALVA 
EDISON INVENTED THE MODERN WORLD 20-21 (2007). 
42. The Making of Modern America: The Wizard of Menlo Park, DIGITAL 
HIST., 
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/database/article_display.cfm?HHID=339 
(last updated July 14, 2012); HOWARD B. ROCKMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW FOR ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS 129-134 (2004). 
43. STROSS, supra note 41, at 13. 
44. GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER, IN HIS OWN WORDS xiii-xiv, 7, 11 
(Gary R. Kremer ed. 1987). 
45. Id. at xiii-xiv. 
46. Id. at xiii, 6, 24, 45, 46, 50, 84, 112, 129. 
47. Id. at 47. 
48. Id. at 102. 
49. See Dr. Carver is Dead; Negro Scientist, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1943, 
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0712.html. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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Department.50 Having developed about 100 commercial 
products from the sweet potato and over 145 products from the 
peanut, Professor Carver argued southern U.S. poverty could 
be eliminated by agricultural products diversification: peanuts, 
pecans, and sweet potatoes as cash crop replacements for 
cotton.51 Professor Carver published his science research in a 
series of 50 bulletins. Upon his death, he established the 
George Washington Carver Foundation at Tuskegee Institute 
to perpetuate research in agriculture and chemistry.52 
Thomas Starzl, the medical father of liver transplant 
surgery, was born in 1926.53 Dr. Starzl, spent his life from 
1947-1959 in college, medical school, surgical residencies and 
surgical fellowship programs.54 He began his research career by 
developing a method to track and record deep brain responses 
to sensory stimuli, earning a Ph.D. in neurophysiology at the 
same time he received his medical degree with distinction in 
1952.55 Starzl continued surgical training at Johns Hopkins 
University Hospital in Baltimore for four years. Thereafter, 
Starzl continued surgical training in open-heart surgery and 
blood vessel surgery at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami, 
work that later proved critical to liver transplantation. While 
in Miami, he set up a research laboratory in his garage and 
experimented with transplanting the livers of dogs.56 
In 1958, Dr. Starzl moved to Northwestern University, 
passed the thoracic surgery boards (1959), and was awarded 
two research grants, one from the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) and one, a Markle Scholarship, which together allowed 
him to resume research on liver transplants for four years.57 
Starzl subsequently relocated to the Colorado School of 
Medicine, where he performed more than 1,000 kidney 
transplants and improved post-operative therapies to control 
non-twin organ rejection, using combinations of irradiation, 
 
50. CARVER, supra note 44, at 102. 
51. Id. at 114. 
52. Id. at 102-126, 148-170. 
53. THOMAS E. STARZL, THE PUZZLE PEOPLE: MEMOIRS OF A TRANSPLANT 
SURGEON 6 (1992). 
54. Id. at 25-69. 
55. Id. at 37-46. 
56. Id. at 47. 
57. Id. at 62-69. 
19
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immunosuppressant drugs, and the synthetic corticosteroid 
suppressant, prednisone.58 
Starzl’s primary interest was liver transplantation, which 
due to the dual problems of uncontrolled bleeding and organ 
rejection, presented more difficult surgical problems than 
kidney transplantation. He returned to liver transplantation 
surgery in March and May of 1963, and both patients died.59 
Over the years, Starzl was able to gradually increase post-
operative survival of his liver transplant patients, patients who 
were already terminal due to their own liver’s failure.60 
Although Starzl tried alternative approaches to counter post-
operative rejection, his ultimate success would lie in his 
identification of new anti-rejection therapies, anti-lymphocyte 
globulin and the immunosuppressants, cyclosporine and 
tacrolimus, the solutions making liver transplantation a 
“standard procedure” today.61 Starzl summed up his career by 
stating, “[p]eople who have an intellectual objective dream large 
and build castles.”62 “[O]ur mutual goal, and especially mine, 
was to bring liver transplantation to clinical use.”63 
Furthermore, “[d]uring those years. . .the [transplant] surgeons 
and physicians also changed-not so rapidly because their lives 
were not at stake, but inexorably, because the lives of others 
were in their hands. Some were corroded or destroyed by the 
experience, some were sublimated, and none remained the 
same.”64 Starzl continues to speak throughout the world and 
has published four books, 2130 scientific articles, and 292 book 
chapters.65 
The key takeaway from these representative research 
scientists is that the overwhelming majority did not elect 
research science as a profession having any reasonable vision 
 
58. Id. at 83-95. 
59. Id. at 96-117. 
60. See id. at 243-333. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 86 (emphasis added). 
63. Id. at 87. 
64. Id. at 4. 
65. See Alum Thomas Starzl to Receive National Medal of Science, NW. 
U. FEINBERG SCH. MED., 
http://www.feinberg.northwestern.edu/news/2005/2005A-
December/starzl.html (last visited July 10, 2012). 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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of tremendous wealth. Scientists do elect scientific research 
because of elusive scientific answers or heretofore “unsolvable” 
problems that often become personal professional quests, 
personal passion and require personal dedication unrelated to 
and beyond any economic return but subsistence to continue 
the work. Best practices of scientific research reflect these 
latter principles.66 
 
66. COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY, COMM. ON SCIENTIFIC COMMC’N 
AND NAT’L SEC. DEV., SEC., & COOPERATION POLICY & GLOBAL AFFAIRS, BEYOND 
“FORTRESS AMERICA”: NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLS ON SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 47-48 (2009): 
 
Best Practices that Enable Success in Fundamental 
Research [include:] . . . 
Freedom in inquiry. . . . [S]cientists are generally free to 
pursue any question that is of interest. It is often visionary 
scientific teams that discover paradigm-shifting advances 
leading to whole new fields of inquiry. 
Freedom to pursue knowledge at the scientist’s own 
discretion. Many scientists are interested in unraveling the 
mysteries of the natural and physical worlds without regard 
to practical application. Others pursue opportunities driven 
by technological shifts, but without a defined end goal. Yet 
others choose to tackle and solve problems that confront 
mankind . . . opportunity driven research, often leads to 
products and processes of great significance . . . in ways that 
were never anticipated by those conducting the initial 
research. . . . 
Freedom to collaborate without limitation. Open 
communication among scientists can provide insights into 
problems and their solutions . . . . Rapid advances often 
occur at the interface between fields or from the application 
of advances in one field to a related field. . . . 
Pluralistic and meritocratic support of science. . . . Science . . 
. not guided by a master plan that constrains scientific 
activity to defined avenues. . . . Similarly, most scientific 
research funding is administered under a meritocratic 
review system designed to support the best researchers who 
propose the best ideas. 
Freedom to publish. Science is a cumulative subject in which 
each scientist builds on the work of others. The fundamental 
error-correction mechanism of science arises from the 
replication of work that has been conducted by others, thus 
enabling mistakes to be exposed. This approach depends on 
the wide dissemination and open communication of 
scientific results and methods. 
 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
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However, as illustrated in the three examples, each 
scientist at every stage of the research required intellectual 
property ownership and control for his research continuation to 
the next improvement and, finally, to successful achievement. 
Had the telegraph companies claimed Edison’s initial patents; 
had the University claimed Carver’s publications’ copyrights or 
censored or denied publication disclosure by him; had the 
various hospitals and university medical facilities claimed 
Starzl’s preliminary surgical advances denying basic moral 
right, respectively, would the U.S. electricity network, 
Southern poverty alleviation by crop rotation and new product 
derivatives marketing, or the surgical procedure and drug-
protocols essential to liver transplantation survival exist? The 
answer is obvious, and Judge Easterbrook’s decision in 
Weinstein v. University of Illinois upholds U.S. science 
tradition, that is, that a research scientist who does the work 
at a minimum retains the moral rights of attribution, integrity, 
retraction, and disclosure. These four moral rights are essential 
to research scientists’ careers and are essential to ensure 
research science quality if scientific research is to survive as a 
profession in the United States.67 
 
 2.     Who Owns and Controls Scientific Research in the
United States? 
 
The answer to who owns or controls scientific research 
depends on a complex body of national and international 
(treaties) law, governmental regulatory policy regarding the 
administration of federal research funding awards, research 
science professional ethical standards, and individual academic 
institutions’ or commercial firm’s administrative policies.68 
 
67. 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987). 
68. See Seymour, supra note 21, at 12-20; see also Meyer, supra note 21; 
DAVIES & GARNETT, supra note 15, at 3-67, 857-954, 1012, 1128-33. 42 C.F.R. 
§ 93.103 provides: 
 
Research misconduct means the fabrication, falsification, or 
plagiarism in proposing, performing or reviewing research 
or reporting research results. (a) Fabrication is making up 
data or results and recording or reporting them. (b) 
Falsification is manipulating research materials, 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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equipment, or processes, or changing or omitting data or 
results such that research is not accurately represented in 
the research record. (c) Plagiarism is the appropriation of 
another’s ideas, processes, results, or words without giving 
proper credit [attribution]. (d) Research misconduct does not 
include honest error or difference of opinion. 
 
42 C.F.R. § 93.103 (2011); see also SIGMA XI, HONOR IN SCIENCE, supra note 
24, at 39 (“Truthfulness may or may not be the cement that holds together 
society as a whole, but certainly it is essential to science.”) (emphasis added); 
SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 22 (“Experimental 
results are property that someone owns. The ownership of ideas is important; 
it has a bearing on promotion, and ideas [copyrights, patents] sometimes can 
be sold for profit. Conflicts of interest exist.”). Regarding institutional 
policies, see, for example, Seymour, supra note 21, at 8 n.40 (quoting 
professors’ publications policy, i.e., whether the academic investigator-author 
or university owns intellectual property created by professors) (emphasis 
added) (internal citations omitted), stating that at Brown University: 
 
It is the policy of Brown University that ownership of the 
copyright in a work shall belong to the author or authors of 
the work, with certain stated exceptions. The exceptions to 
this policy that shall vest ownership of the copyright in a 
work with Brown University, rather than with the author or 
authors of the work are: (1) if the work is a work-made-for-
hire as defined in the U.S. copyright law; (2) if the work is 
defined as an “Institutional work” under Section 2.4 below . 
. . Copyrightable works of scholarly research, course 
materials or artistic works made by faculty members would 
not be considered works-made-for-hire and are property of 
the author and authors. 
 
Id. But see Seymour, supra note 21, at 8 n.41 (emphasis added) (regarding 
Cornell University’s policy): 
 
This default position [that copyright ownership initially 
vests with the author] is based largely on the practices at 
peer institutions. This is a policy determination and not one 
based on legal precedent. Under U.S. copyright law, 
employers own the copyright to works created by their 
employees. Faculty are legally employees of the University. 
Despite a widely held belief among academics that there is a 
“faculty exception” to the work-for-hire-doctrine, the reality 
is there are very few cases (none in our jurisdiction) 
recognizing an exception and then only with respect to 
scholarly publications (and all pre-date the latest (1976) 
revision to the copyright statute). There are, therefore, no 
legal constraints on the University in formulating this 
policy position. 
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An apparent modern legal fiction is to effectively develop 
intellectual property for commercial use and public benefit; the 
intellectual property rights of the individual scientist must be 
transferred to the employer, entrepreneur or government.69 
One may legitimately ask: under what precedent or authority 
did this modern “legal fiction” evolve and persist? 
For federally funded research, there is no basis in law or 
statute for the answer that by default an employer owns 
research he did not personally conceive, direct or create, but 
rather this “policy” evolved as a solution to a Congressional 
mandate to the Public Health Service (PHS) to address science 
misconduct related to federally funded research.70 This latter 
 
Id.(quoting Comm. on Intellectual Prop., Cornell Univ., Draft Report from 
Intellectual Property Committee 3 n.1 (Mar. 27, 2003) (unpublished draft), 
available at 
http://theuniversityfaculty.cornell.edu/forums/pdfs/CopyrightReportRev.pdf); 
Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982): 
 
[T]he heart of the system consists in the right of the 
individual faculty members to teach, carry on research, and 
publish without interference from the government, 
community, the university administration, or his fellow 
faculty members. . . . [W]e think it clear that whatever 
constitutional protection is afforded by the First 
Amendment extends as readily to the scholar in the 
laboratory as to the teacher in the classroom. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
69. Fisk, supra note 33, at 1127-29. 
70. Howard Waldeman, Ownership, Access, Retention, and Sharing of 
Research Data Produced by PHS Grants or Contracts and CRADAS, in DATA 
MANAGEMENT IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: REPORT OF A WORKSHOP APRIL 1990, 
at 86-89 (1990). Mr. Waldeman states: 
 
III. Grants: (1) Ownership: 
When PHS awards a research grant, the data developed by 
the grantee institution is owned by the grantee institution 
unless there is a specific condition to the contrary inserted 
in the grant award statement. This legal principle is a 
matter of PHS practice and policy; there are no regulations 
which explicitly prescribe it. 
 
Id. at 86 (emphasis added); see also Appendix A: Summary of Breakout 
Session, in DATA MANAGEMENT IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: REPORT OF A 
WORKSHOP APRIL 1990, at 96(1990): 
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PHS “policy” is directly contrary to research science practice in 
fact.71 The Public Health Service (PHS) offices involved in 
“research integrity,” solely as a function of a PHS policy of 
convenience,72 appear to have conflated legitimate regulatory 
 
The group also dealt with the question of data ownership, 
namely whether the university or the investigator should 
retain the data. There was strong consensus that the 
investigator has the primary responsibility for data 
retention, maintenance, and appropriate sharing 
[disclosure]. The university shares responsibility for 
maintaining the data, but custody should reside with the 
investigator. 
 
Id. (emphasis added); NIH Grants Policy Statement, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH AND 
HUM. SERVICES, 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps_2010/nihgps_ch8.html#_Availabilit
y_of_Research (last updated Oct. 20, 2011). 
71. Michael Jackson & Felix Khin-Maung-Gyi, The George Washington 
Med. Ctr., Perspective of an Academic Institution, in DATA MANAGEMENT IN 
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: REPORT OF A WORKSHOP APRIL 1990, at 23 (1990). 
Jackson and Khin-Maung-Gyi state: “[T]he view that investigators’ interest in 
their data are primary is a widely accepted principle of the biomedical 
research culture, and one that is subscribed to by the editors of scientific 
journals who solicit copyright transfer from individual authors without 
requirement of institutional approval.” Id. 
72. See also Waldeman, supra note 70, at 91: 
 
The following issues related to the Federal government were 
noted: 
The PHS requirement that institutions must retain grant 
records for three years was evidently written to apply 
principally to financial records. Recently, and not in accord 
with common institutional practices, PHS has interpreted 
this regulation to apply also to all data and materials 
relevant to a research project. This extrapolation is viewed as 
inappropriate and unwarranted, and should be corrected. 
 
Id. (emphasis added); cf. 45 C.F.R. § 74.53 (2011): 
 
(a) This section sets forth requirements for record retention 
and access to records for awards to recipients. 
(b) Financial records, supporting documents, statistical 
records, and all other records pertinent to an award shall be 
retained for a period of three years from the date of 
submission of the final expenditure report or, for awards 
that are renewed quarterly or annually, from the date of the 
submission of the quarterly or annual financial report . . . . 
(g) Paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of this section apply to the 
following types of documents, and their supporting records: 
25
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financial responsibility of the grantee organization to account 
for federal grant awards expenditure with actual scientific 
research data records generated by the research scientist.73 
This latter arguably aberrant PHS “policy and practice”74 
seems to have evolved coincidently with several political 
events: the Congressional “Science Misconduct” hearings led by 
Congressional Representative John D. Dingell and the Bayh-
Dole Act, University and Small Business Patent Procedures 
Act of 198075 for private institutions, and its counterpart for 
government agencies, the Stevenson-Wydler Technology 
Innovation Act.76 Third, U.S. security concerns exacerbated by 
9/11 have resulted in science community concern of federal 
government restriction of even “unclassified but sensitive 
[UBS]” scientific research as an express condition of receipt of 
federal grant or contract support or simply via unspecified peer 
journal editorial decision.77 The first delegated to institutions 
receiving federal research funds a new responsibility to “police” 
science misconduct allegations pertaining to their research 
science staff.78 The second, Bayh-Dole, encouraged institutions 
 
Indirect cost rate computations or proposals, cost allocation 
plans, and any similar accounting computations of the rate 
at which a particular group of costs is chargeable (such as 
computer usage chargeback rates or composite fringe 
benefit rates) . . . . (2) . . . the 3-year retention period for the 
proposal, plan, or other computation and its supporting 
records starts at the end of the fiscal year (or other 
accounting period) covered by the proposal, plan, or other 
computation. 
 
Id. 
73. 45 C.F.R. § 74.53. 
74. Id. 
75. University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980 (Bayh-
Dole Act of 1980), Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 
200-212 (2006)). Bayh-Dole controls allocation of rights to inventions made by 
employees of small business firms and domestic nonprofit organizations, 
including universities, in federally assisted programs. Id. 
76. Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3714 (2006)) 
(“[T]he Federal Government shall strive where appropriate to transfer owned 
and originated technology to state and local governments and to the private 
sector.”). 
77. See generally NEW GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP, supra note 2. 
78. See Waldeman, supra note 70, at 91; 45 C.F.R. § 74.53 (2011); Public 
Health Services Policies on Research Misconduct, 42 C.F.R. pts. 50, 93 (2011) 
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receiving federal funds to acquire intellectual property 
ownership in their research staff’s work ostensibly to facilitate 
technology transfer of federally funded research discovery to 
commercial benefit of the public and also share license and 
royalties with both the academic institution and research 
scientist inventors.79 Stevenson-Wydler was amended by the 
Federal Technology Transfer Act in 1986.80 This amendment 
“attempted to institutionalize technology transfer in 
government [research] laboratories, by among other things, 
making technology transfer a component of employee 
evaluation.”81 “Homeland security” legislation, Executive 
Orders of the George W. Bush Administration and policies 
promulgated by executive agencies post-9/11, have had an 
arguably “chilling,” if not in fact research censorship impact on 
scientific research in the U.S. supported by federal funding.82 
The latter United States Executive post-9/11 security action is 
a broad complex topic. Discussion of post-9/11 executive action 
 
(effective June 16, 2005). 
79. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006). 
80. Federal Technology Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 
(1986). 
81. Dov Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An 
Alternative to the Bayh-Dole System for Both Developed and Developing 
Nations, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 353 (2008). 
82. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act) § 
1016, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2006)); 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, §§ 301-313, Pub. L. 107-296, (codified at 6 
U.S.C. § 185 (2006)); Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness 
and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-188, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 201); 
Homeland Security Presidential [George W. Bush] Directives/HSPD 1-14 
[unclassified versions], in NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES IN SCIENCE, LAW, AND 
TECHNOLOGY 543-634 (Thomas A. Johnson ed. 2007); see Julie E. Fischer, 
STEWARDSHIP OR CENSORSHIP, BALANCING BIOSECURITY, THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, 
AND THE BENEFITS OF SCIENTIFIC OPENNESS (2006), available at 
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Stewardship.pdf; see 
also Steven E. Miller, After the 9/11 Disaster: Washington’s Struggle to 
Improve Homeland Security, AXESS STOCKHOLM, Mar. 2003, at 8-11, available 
at 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/254/after_the_911_disaster.ht
ml; TANIA SIMONCELLI & JAY STANLEY, SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE: THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION’S ASSAULT ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY, 
THE AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (2005); Donald Kennedy, Science and Secrecy, 
289 SCI. 724, 724 (Aug. 4, 2000). See generally Harold C. Relyea, Presidential 
Directives: Background and Overview, CONG. RES. SERV. (Nov. 26, 2008), 
available at http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/wysiwyg/544/CRS-98-611.pdf. 
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is limited herein to its impact on intellectual property rights of 
research scientists to claim creative authorship and to freely 
divulge the results of “unclassified” scientific investigative 
findings and discoveries; the scientists’ copyright first 
publication; and, related First Amendment free speech rights 
such as patent inventorship and patent “secrecy” classification. 
 
a.    Public Health Service (PHS) Research Science 
Misconduct Policy Provides for Research 
Ownership to the Grantee Institution, Removing 
from the Research Scientist Author-Creator-
Inventor 
 
 Scientists, unlike their professional counterparts in 
medicine and law, do not answer to any formal scientific 
professional regulatory body for violations of ethical and moral 
professional standards.83 There is no regulatory counterpart, 
“American Scientific Research Association,” for practice of 
scientific research, to the American Medical Association (AMA) 
for license and practice of medicine, or the American Bar 
Association (ABA) for license and practice of law. Rather, by 
neglecting to formally organize and regulate themselves, 
research scientists arguably have fostered default federal 
executive agency regulation.84 
Historically, professional research scientists (PhD and 
M.D.-researchers) have been assumed to be “self-regulated” by 
their employer-institution and via prepublication peer review 
 
83. See, e.g., COMM. ON RESEARCH STANDARDS AND PRACTICES TO PREVENT 
DESTRUCTIVE APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 63 (2004) [hereinafter 
FINK REPORT], available at 
https://download.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309089778 (“There is a deep 
and long-standing foundation of scientific self-regulation, voluntary 
standards, and associated accreditation. Given the fundamentally 
international character of research in the life sciences, any serious attempt to 
prevent the misuse of research must include efforts at improving and 
harmonizing standards and practices internationally.”) (emphasis added); 
COMM. ON NEW GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP, supra note 2, at 63. 
84. FINK REPORT, supra note 83, at 63 (“There is a deep and long-
standing foundation of scientific self-regulation, voluntary standards, and 
associational accreditation.”). 
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of their research work-product.85 Peer review regulates science 
publication but lacks investigative or enforcement authority to 
address fraud, plagiarism, or misappropriation.86 Society 
membership is for all practical purposes pro forma.87 While 
ostensibly promoting personal and institutional responsibility, 
such laissez-faire ethics by research scientists prompted 
government action; where research scientists’ professed 
“professional self-regulation” failed to create standards, proper 
investigative procedures, and disciplinary enforcement. 
Prior to the early 1980s Congressional involvement, 
professional societies, government research grant (funding) 
agencies, and nongovernmental review agencies, while 
promoting education in ethical behavior, had no legal authority 
or power to regulate research scientists’ professional acts, even 
those in transparent violation of written ethical behavior 
standards (e.g. plagiarism, misappropriation of another’s 
ideas/work product, fraud, or retaliation for reporting of 
unethical behavior).88 The result has been that, absent formal 
ethics adjudication standards, investigative processes, and 
disciplinary enforcement processes, the scientists are now 
facing piecemeal standards drafted by government officials in 
fourteen executive agencies.89 Research scientists have, via 
inaction, largely forfeited authority to self-regulate as a unified 
body of professionals.90 
 
b.    Political Considerations Fostering Government 
and Institution “Oversight Ownership” of U.S. 
Research Science 
 
Science misconduct came into the political spotlight when 
“Albert Gore, Jr., Chairman of the Investigations and 
 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 116. 
87. Id. at 62-64. 
88. Public Health Services Policies on Research Misconduct, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 28,370 (May 17, 2005) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 50, 93). 
89. FRANCIS L. MACRINA, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY: TEXT AND CASES IN 
RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH 14 (3d ed. 2005). 
90. Public Health Services Policies on Research Misconduct, 70 Fed. 
Reg. at 28,370. 
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Oversight Subcommittee of the House Science and Technology 
Committee, held the first hearing on the emerging problem. 
The hearing was prompted by the public disclosure of research 
misconduct cases at four major research centers in 1980.”91 
Prior to 1986, reports of scientific misconduct had been 
reported directly to the PHS agencies funding the research in 
question. In 1986, NIH directed the reporting of science 
misconduct be done through the NIH Institutional Liaison 
Office.92 In 1985, Congress passed the Health Research 
Extension Act.93 This Act required the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to issue a regulation requiring applicant of 
awardee institutions of federal research grant funds to 
establish “an administrative process to review reports of 
scientific fraud”94 and “to report to the Secretary any 
investigation of alleged scientific fraud which appears 
substantial.”95 
In the 1980s, U.S. Congressional oversight of scientific 
fraud in federally funded biomedical research was under 
intense legislative and public scrutiny primarily due to 
Representative John D. Dingell, Chairman of the House 
Energy and Commerce Committee.96 Representative Dingell’s 
House Committee funded the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), one, if not the largest, of several sources of federal 
research grant support.97 Federal funding for science research 
 
91. Historical Background, OFF. OF RES. INTEGRITY (Nov. 9, 2011, 3:17 
pm), https://ori.hhs.gov/historical-background. 
92. Id. 
93. Health Research Extension Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-158, 99 Stat. 
820 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
94. Health Research Extension Act § 493, 42 U.S.C. § 289(b) (2012). 
95. Id.; see NIKOLAS KONTARATOS, DISSECTING A DISCOVERY, THE REAL 
STORY OF HOW THE RACE TO UNCOVER THE CAUSE OF AIDS TURNED SCIENTISTS 
AGAINST DISEASE, POLITICS AGAINST SCIENCE, NATION AGAINST NATION 158-
162(2006). 
96. JUDY SARASOHN, THE DAVID BALTIMORE AFFAIR, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: 
THE WHISTLEBLOWER, THE ACCUSED, AND THE NOBEL LAUREATE 60 (1993). 
97. Id. at 60-61 (On April 12, 1988, Representative John D. Dingell 
convened a hearing entitled “Scientific Fraud and Misconduct and the 
Federal Response” before the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations. Dingell noted he was shocked that National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) relied on institutions to investigate allegations of 
science misconduct among their own staff. Dingell went on to liken this 
process to a “fox actively investigating the chicken coup.” This hearing began 
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was increasing and Dingell considered NIH and university 
mechanisms for dealing with science fraud inadequate.98 In 
particular, several cases, including the Robert Gallo and the 
David Baltimore cases, of alleged scientific misconduct by 
prominent U.S. senior research scientists, had attracted 
negative international attention to U.S. federally funded 
scientific research.99 
In March 1989, the PHS created the Office of Scientific 
Integrity (OSI) in the Office of the Director, National Institutes 
of Health (NIH), and the Office of Science Integrity Review 
(OSIR) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health 
(OASH).100 In 1992, OSI and OSIR were consolidated into the 
Office of Research Integrity (ORI) in OASH; and HHS 
established a Research Integrity Adjudications Panel of the 
Departmental Appeals (DAB).101 
 
Dingell’s own formal investigation of the Baltimore case of alleged scientific 
misconduct.); see also OFFICE OF RESEARCH INTEGRITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 32 (2010), available at 
http://ori.hhs.gov/images/ddblock/ori_annual_report_2009.pdf (Research 
misconduct activity has increased from 159 allegations, inquiries or 
investigations in 1993, to 230 in 2008.); LAWRENCE J. RHOADES, OFFICE OF 
RESEARCH INTEGRITY, NEW INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH MISCONDUCT ACTIVITY: 
1992-2001, at 11 (2004), available at 
http://ori.dhhs.gov/documents/NewInstitutionalResearchMisconductActivity.p
df (“The number of institutions responding to allegations of research 
misconduct has grown steadily from 1992-2001 and is expected to continue to 
do so.”); Sarah Glazer, Combating Science Misconduct, Are Government 
Investigations Unfair?, CQ RESEARCHER, Jan. 10, 1997, at 5, 6, 11, available 
at 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre199701100
0#Sidebar1REF[1] (“Science fraud became an even bigger issue in April 1988, 
when Rep. Dingell launched hearings on the [David] Baltimore case before 
his Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.”). 
98. DANIEL J. KEVLES, THE BALTIMORE CASE: A TRIAL OF POLITICS, 
SCIENCE, AND CHARACTER 136 (1998); see also JOHN CREWDSON, SCIENCE 
FICTIONS: A SCIENTIFIC MYSTERY, A MASSIVE COVER-UP, AND THE DARK LEGACY 
OF ROBERT GALLO 13 (2002); Lawrence B. Altman, Discoverers of AIDS and 
Cancer Win Nobel, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/07/health/07nobel.html. 
99. KONTARATOS, supra note 95, at 155-157; see also CREWDSON, supra 
note 98, at 13; SHANE CROTTY, AHEAD OF THE CURVE, DAVID BALTIMORE’S LIFE 
IN SCIENCE (2001); KEVLES, supra note 98; SARASOHN supra note 96; Altman, 
supra note 98. 
100. Historical Background, OFF. OF RES. INTEGRITY, 
http://ori.dhhs.gov/about/history.shtml (last updated Nov. 9, 2011). 
101. Id. 
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Although having different outcomes, these two cases, 
David Baltimore and Robert Gallo, are of particular import 
because both illustrate the intrinsic conflict of interest of 
institution or agency self-investigation PHS mandated process: 
absence of “due process,” politically motivated 
misrepresentation, economic self-interest of the investigative 
executive agency trumping established U.S. patent law, 
government mandated retraction of scientific findings 
subsequently found valid, and irreparable harm, irrespective of 
innocence or guilt, resulting to accused and plaintiff research 
scientists.102 The Baltimore case is egregious: ruined careers, 
financially devastating legal costs for defense against the U.S. 
government’s “abuse of process,” a process devoid of any 
pretense of due process or merit, before total vindication of two 
innocent scientists ten years later.103 
The David Baltimore Case is summarized as follows: 
David Baltimore (born March 7, 1938), PhD,104 1975 
Nobelist for reverse transcriptase discovery: RNA-
transcription-into-DNA, refuting the DNA Dogma, DNA-to-
RNA-to-protein-never the reverse;105 age 52 in 1990 when 
formal allegations (informal, made in 1986)106 were made that 
he and Dr. Thereza Imanishi-Kari had committed science 
misconduct. 
 
102. SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 7: 
 
Over the next few years, [Margot] O’Toole [Baltimore and 
Imanisishi-Kari’s accuser] would find her scientific career in 
shreds; Imanishi-Kari’s reputation would be in ruins; even 
the president of Rockefeller University, Nobel-prize winner 
David Baltimore, who put his personal stamp of approval on 
the publication of the study, would be dragged into the 
controversy and eventually forced to resign. 
 
Id. 
103. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 205 (quoting Bernadine Healy, the former 
Director of NIH). 
104. SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 77-78; Autobiography, 
NOBELPRIZE.ORG, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1975/baltimore-
autobio.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2012). 
105. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 114-15; KEVLES, supra note 98, at 9; 
SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 78-80. 
106. KEVLES, supra note 98, at 67, 138. 
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Affliation: President, Rockefeller University, faculty forced 
Dr. Baltimore’s resignation Dec. 2, 1991.107 
Current: Robert A. Millikan, Professor of Biology, 
Calfornia Institute of Technology (Caltech).108 
Charge: Data fabrication, scientific misconduct, by Thereza 
Imanishi-Kari, a David Baltimore mentee and coauthor 
collaborator of the research in question; accuser was Margot 
O’Toole, a postdoctoral fellow in Imanishi-Kari’s laboratory.109 
Initially, he tried to explain the results, but under continued 
intense legal pressure, Dr. Baltimore retracted the paper in 
question.110 Note: A retraction is a complete repudiation of the 
content of a scientific publication. A retraction is the legal 
equivalent of a “no contest” admission the science misconduct 
allegation is valid. 
Law: After the University had investigated and cleared 
Baltimore and Imanishi-Kari,111 this case was “pursued” by 
various federal agencies, including: repeated investigations by 
various National Institutes of Health (NIH) agencies, a 
Congressional investigation headed by Representative John D. 
Dingell, a self-appointed Congressional science “fraud-buster” 
who recruited Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Secret 
Service forensics in his “investigation.”112 It was noted that 
Baltimore used the resources of the Whitehead Institute, the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) affiliate, he 
directed to hire a team of high-powered attorneys, from two 
firms, one in Boston, one in Washington, D.C., to represent 
himself. Thereza Imanishi-Kari’s defense was handled 
primarily pro bono by Bruce Singal, a former federal prosecutor 
and partner in the firm of Ferriter, Scobbo, Sikora, Caruso & 
Rodophele, Holyoke, Massachusetts.113 Shane Crotty indicated 
 
107. Id. at 10, 287; SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 248-249. 
108. KEVLES, supra note 98, at 12. 
109. KEVLES, supra note 98, at 67-95, 208, 216; SARASOHN, supra note 
96, at 269. 
110. SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 107, 217-220, 265. 
111. Id. at 217. 
112. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 158; KEVLES, supra note 98, at 223; 
SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 86-87. 
113. SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 82-83, 95; Handling Misconduct – 
Inquiry Issues, OFF. OF RES. INTEGRITY, http://ori.hhs.gov/ori-responses-issues 
(last updated Apr. 19, 2011). 
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Dr. Baltimore contributed more than $100,000 for an attorney 
to defend Thereza Imanishi-Kari, a Brazilian scientist he had 
mentored.114 Dr. Imanishi-Kari was investigated by a grand 
jury in Baltimore for the science misconduct charges. However, 
on July 13, 1992, the U.S. Attorney Richard D. Bennet declined 
to prosecute because he did not believe he could persuade a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.115 Both Dr. David Baltimore, a 
Nobel Laureate, and Dr. Thereza Imanishi-Kari were finally 
cleared of wrong-doing 10 years after the first accusations were 
brought against them.116 [T]he public damage to these two 
scientists’ personal lives and science careers fills several books 
 
 
ORI permits, but neither requires nor provides counsel for 
respondents, complainants, and other participants in 
misconduct proceedings. An institution must decide to 
whom it should provide counsel, and if counsel should be 
provided. . . . [W]hile parties may arrange for their own 
counsel, reimbursement is not available from the Federal 
government under the Equal Access to Justice Act in 
hearings before the Departmental Appeals Board [DAB]. 
 
Id. See also KEVLES, supra note 98, at 330. Imanishi-Kari was defended on 
appeal by Joseph Onek, of the Washington D.C. firm of Crowell & Moring. 
Onek concluded: 
 
This case has been a nightmare for Dr. Imanishi-Kari for 
almost a decade. During this same decade, a number of other 
scientists have been falsely accused of misconduct. This 
panel’s decision will not only vindicate Dr. Imanshi-Kari, 
but will bring to an end an ignoble chapter in the history of 
American science. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
114. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 148, 150, 201. 
115. SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 264 (This burden of proof for finding of 
science misconduct has since been reduced by DHHS to mere “preponderance 
of the evidence.”); Stanley G. Korenman, 8: Malfeasance and Misconduct, 
OFF. OF RES. INTEGRITY, 
http://ori.dhhs.gov/education/products/ucla/chapter8/Chapter8.pdf (last 
visited July 16, 2012) (“A finding of research misconduct requires that – (a) 
There be a significant departure from accepted practices of the relevant 
research community; and (b) The misconduct be committed intentionally, or 
knowingly, or recklessly; and (c) The allegation be proved by a preponderance 
of the evidence.”). 
116. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 205; see also Imanishi-Kari, No. 1582, 
1996 WL 399931, at *1 (D.A.B. June 21, 1996). 
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and reams of published scientific professional journal 
commentary.117 
Consequences: One point upon which everyone involved 
agrees is that all of the preliminary investigations, including 
the one by Congress, were sorely mishandled in that the 
scientific issues at the heart of the controversy were never 
properly investigated by unbiased, scientifically competent 
personnel until almost 10 years after initial charges were 
brought.118 The question of possible science misconduct and or 
fraud early became “politically charged” both by the stature of 
Dr. Baltimore and the sums of public health service funding 
that had supported these two scientists’ research. The several 
initial NIH oversight agencies tasked with “research integrity 
oversight” were admittedly tainted by overt bias going to lack 
of objectivity in their investigations and the fraud 
investigators’ findings were eventually discounted.119 
Finally, in 1996 the NIH Appeals Board held “a trial-like 
hearing,” amassing “over 6500 pages of hearing transcript, 
[seventy] laboratory notebooks, the entire collection of Secret 
Service evidence, Imanishi-Kari’s supporting documents, and 
the ORI’s [Office of Research Integrity’s] obsessive list of 
thousands of ‘findings of fact and conclusions of law.’”120 The 
Departmental Appeals Board (DAB) is available to scientists 
accused and found guilty of misconduct by their employer-
institutes and ORI. It is composed of one to three judges. 
 
The appeals panel demolished the Office of 
Research Integrity, ORI’s findings. “The panel 
cleared Imanishi-Kari’s name in their opening 
comments: ‘Because the history of this case 
involved a direct attack on Dr. Imanishi-Kari’s 
honesty, we evaluated her statements carefully, 
and relied primarily on evidence in the record 
other than her testimony. . . The credibility of 
her testimony before us was bolstered, however, 
 
117. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 139-220; see also Glazer, supra note 97. 
118. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 201-20; KELVES, supra note 98, at 11-12. 
119. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 201; see also Imanishi-Kari, 1996 WL 
399931, at *110. 
120. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 201. 
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when much of the evidence in the record, and in 
particular, some of the document examination 
evidence, corroborated her statements and 
directly contradicted representations made by 
ORI.’ They continued, ‘ORI’s description of the 
forensics findings were not always dependable. 
For example, as described by ORI, one type of 
Secret Service analysis seemed to provide 
support (albeit limited) for ORI’s position on two 
important issues. . . . The actual results, 
however, were not as described and were 
consistent with (indeed, arguably substantiated) 
Dr. Imanishi-Kari’s version of events (which was 
also corroborated by other evidence.)’ . . . The 
Secret Service and the ORI could ascribe no 
motive for Imanishi-Kari to fabricate such 
useless [unpublished] data, and most of their 
examples of ‘fraud’ centered on unpublished 
data, falsification of which made no sense. The 
ORI’s logic baffled the appeals panel. . . . In 
particular, the panel found that the infamous 
seventeen pages of data that obsessed O’Toole 
[Imanishi-Kari’s accuser], Feder and Stewart 
contained nothing fraudulent or unseemly. . . But 
the appeals panel concluded that the Secret 
Service techniques didn’t work even on 
laboratory notebooks whose veracity was 
unchallenged, including Margot O’Toole’s. . . The 
appeals panel became even more skeptical of the 
Secret Service work when it became clear that 
Dingell’s aides had met with them and told them 
what data were ‘good’ and what were suspicious. 
. . Ironically, the panel also noted that the ORI’s 
statistician, Dr. Dahlberg, who accused 
Imanishi-Kari of data selection, engaged in data 
selection and interpretation of his own. Under 
intensive investigation, Imanishi-Kari’s data 
selection technique was corroborated by other 
immunologists who analyzed the data. 
Dahlberg’s [PHS-ORI] own data selection 
technique held up less well; he had strayed from 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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what other statisticians noted were ‘more 
accurate’ techniques. . . [Re: Margot O’Toole, the 
accuser’s, partisan stand] Such involvement can 
compromise both the ability of the investigators 
to maintain objectivity and the ability of the 
whistleblower to avoid becoming too vested in 
the outcome. We [the appeal panel] think that 
happened here.”121 
 
Bernadine Healy, the former Director of NIH, summed up 
the Imanishi-Kari & Baltimore case as follows: “‘There was a 
lot of cruelty and abusive behavior tolerated in the name of 
rooting out fraud,’ when actually, ‘the fraud, the abuse, the 
dishonesty, was in the [federal government’s] process.’”122 
The Robert Gallo case resulted in tremendous economic 
gain for the U.S. government by defending Robert Gallo, a NIH 
research scientist’s, contested claim of first discovery and, 
thereby, means to detect and screen patients for HIV/AIDS 
infection. The Gallo case illustrates well PHS agency self-
investigation conflict-of-interest given high economic 
intellectual property right’s stakes. 
The Robert Gallo case is summarized as follows: 
Robert Charles Gallo, M.D. (born 1937)123 initial 
 
121. Id. at 201-04 (emphasis added). 
122. Id. at 205 (emphasis added); see also KEVLES, supra note 98, at 11-
12, stating: 
 
This book is also about the civil rights of scientists, 
particularly Thereza Imanishi-Kari. Once I [Kelves] started 
studying the record of this case, several points became 
quickly evident: 
Imanishi-Kari had not had a fair trial. 
She had been convicted in the court of public opinion 
and nowhere else. 
Those who condemned Baltimore for defending his 
colleague over-looked or were indifferent to crucial 
aspects of the case, among others. 
. . . In June 1996 [a decade after allegations were made] 
Thereza Imanishi-Kari was officially exonerated on all the 
counts that had been brought against her. 
123. Gallo, Robert Charles, ACADEMIC DICTIONARIES AND ENCYCLOPEDIAS, 
http://scientists.enacademic.com/539/Gallo_,_Robert_Charles (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2012). 
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allegations surfaced about 1985.124 
Affiliation: National Cancer Institute (NCI), National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) when allegations made,125 now 
(2012) Professor of Medicine, Director, Institute of Human 
Virology, an institution affiliated with the University of 
Maryland Biotechnology Institute;126 also, cofounder of 
Profectus BioScience, Inc., Baltimore, MD; and member of its 
Scientific Advisory Board.127 
Allegation: Misappropriated virus, claiming he made first 
isolation of HIV/AIDS viral agent, from samples obtained from 
Dr. Luc Montagnier, a collaborator at the Pasteur Institute, 
Paris, France. U.S. and foreign patent issues regarding 
HIV/AIDS blood test developed from isolated virus were 
consequently in question.128 
Issue 1: Not discussed, herein: whether Gallo 
misappropriated Montagnier’s HIV/AIDS virus sent to him as a 
professional courtesy, claiming the French virus as his own 
discovery? 
Issue 2: Whether Gallo et al. submitted to the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark office as a novel “invention” an HIV/AIDS 
diagnostic test patent application, ignoring the Montagnier, et 
al.- prior filed two patent applications? Neither Gallo nor any 
of Gallo’s laboratory research team were named co-inventors on 
the two prior 1983 patent applications filed by filed Montagnier 
et al..129 
 
124. KONTARATOS, supra note 95, at 135. 
125. KONTARATOS, supra note 95, at 46. 
126. About Dr. Gallo, INST. OF HUMAN VIROLOGY, 
http://www.ihv.org/about/robert_gallo.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2012); 
Robert C Gallo M.D., UNIV. OF MD. SCH. OF MED., 
http://medschool.umaryland.edu/facultyresearchprofile/viewprofile.aspx?id=4
901 (last visited Aug. 24, 2012). 
127. Scientific Advisory Board, PROFECTUS BIOSCIENCES, INC., 
http://profectusbiosciences.com/about_scientific.html (last visited Aug. 21, 
2012). 
128. KONTARATOS, supra note 95, at 135-36, 351-52, 354-55. 
129. The French team filed two patent applications (Great Britain 
provisional Sept. 15, 1983; U.S. provisional Dec. 5, 1983) cited within a 
European Application (filed Sept. 9, 1984), claiming the Great Britain Sept. 
15, 1983 priority date, 4 and 7 months, respectively, before Gallo filed his 
first application on April 23, 1984 in the United States. See KONTARATOS, 
supra note 95, at 350-352. 
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Law: Gallo’s and his US co-inventors or the patent 
counsels representing Gallo et al. in failing to acknowledge Dr. 
Luc Montagnier’s et al. prior patent applications, GB 8324800 
filed over 7 months (September 15, 1983) and U.S. 06/558,109 
(provisional, filed Dec. 5, 1983) filed over 4 months, prior to 
Gallo’s et al. (4,520,113, filed April 23, 1984) appear to have 
violated Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) 
Chapter 2000-Duty of Disclosure, 2001 Duty of Disclosure, 
Candor and Good Faith (codified at 37 CFR § 1.56). In 
particular MPEP 2001.06(a) Prior Art Cited in Related Foreign 
Applications [R-2]. MPEP 2121 Prior Art: General Level of 
Operability/Enabling: “When the reference relied on clearly 
anticipates or makes obvious all the elements of the claimed 
invention, the reference is presumed to be operable.” (The right 
of foreign priority is codified at 35 U.S.C. § 119 and the right of 
U.S. priority is codified at § 120).130 
 
130. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 (a), (f), (g)(1) (2010): 
 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless- 
The invention was known or used by others in this country, 
or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a 
foreign country, before the invention thereof by the 
applicant for the patent, or… 
(f)he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be 
patented, or 
(g)(1) during the course of any interference conducted under 
section 135 or section 291, another inventor establishes, to 
the extent permitted in section 104, that before such 
person’s invention thereof the invention was made by such 
other inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed 
. . . 
 
Id.; PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW BASICS § 15.10 (2002). Rosenberg 
explains the violation Gallo is alleged to have committed: 
Because the grant of a patent is affected with a public 
interest, an applicant owes uncompromising duty to report 
to the Patent & Trademark Office all facts concerning 
possible fraud or inequity underlying the applications in 
issue [Interlego A.G. v. F.A.O. Schwartz, Inc., 191 U.S.P.Q. 
129, 136-37 (N.D. Ga. 1976)]. The defense of fraud is 
generally made in two formulations. The first is in terms of 
equivalent to common-law fraud. The second formulation is 
in terms of the equity doctrine of unclean hands. The latter 
is used when not all the elements of the common-law fraud 
are available [Coal Processing Equip., Inc. v. Campbell, 211 
39
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Given the facts of this case, Gallo et al. attorneys knew or 
should have known of the prior Montagnier, et al. patent 
applications filed September 1983 in Great Britain and related 
U.S. application filed Dec. 5, 1983, and clearly failed to disclose 
the prior patent applications’ existence to the U.S. PTO, a 
required material fact, as probable “prior art.”131 
 
– “Both the [NIH] attorneys and the PTO 
examiner told the [Representative John D. 
Dingell] subcommittee staff that numerous 
aspects of the IP [French-Institute Pasteur, Luc 
Montagnier, et al. foreign and US prior filed 
patent applications] and LTCB work [with the 
Institute Pasteur virus] were material to the 
claims of Gallo et al. and should have been 
disclosed. . . .”132 
 
– “The Gallo et al. patent was issued in record 
time . . . At the time the Gallo et al. patent 
issued, the IP [Institute Pasteur] patent 
application, submitted over four months prior to 
the submission of the Gallo et al. patent 
invention application, had not been touched. . . 
The different handling of two applications for the 
same invention has never been satisfactorily 
explained. . . .”133 
 
 
U.S.P.Q. 986, 1000 (S.D. Oh. 1981)]. . . . There is a two-
prong test for establishing inequitable conduct before the 
Patent & Trademark Office: 
     (1)     The information withheld must be material; and 
     (2)     The misrepresentation must have been intentional. 
 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
131. See U.S. Patent No. 4,520,113 (filed Apr. 23, 1984) (issued May 28, 
1985); Investigation of the Institutional Response to the HIV Blood Test Patent 
Dispute and Related Matters: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, §§ III-IV (1988) 
(statement of Rep. Dingell, Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce), 
available at http://www.virusmyth.com/aids/hiv/gallo/ExeSum.html. 
132. Id. at § IV. 
133. Id. at § III. 
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– According to the [U.S.] examiner, when she 
first saw the IP [Institute Pasteur] application, 
within two weeks of issuing Gallo et al., she 
recognized immediately that PTO had “screwed 
up” in issuing the Gallo et al. patent.134 
 
– “The HHS response to the IP [Institute 
Pasteur] challenge . . . was immediate and 
reflexive. The response was to defend—at all 
costs and irrespective of the evidence—the claims 
of Gallo et al. The Subcommittee investigation 
showed that HHS officials and attorneys 
conducted a parody of an investigation; they did 
not seek the truth, but rather sought to create an 
official record to support the claims of Gallo et 
al.”135 
 
– HHS officials accepted uncritically everything 
they were told by Dr. Gallo and his colleagues, 
incorporating the LTCB scientists’ information 
unqualifiedly and without confirmation into 
official reports of the Department. When these 
officials encountered hard evidence that 
contradicted the NCI [National Cancer Institute-
Gallo’s employer]/HHS claims, the evidence was 
ignored, discarded, and/or suppressed.136 
 
Factual dated evidence in the patent applications on public 
record in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and 
European Patent Office (EP) today support the Congressional 
Subcommittee’s (reconstructive) analysis for the second issue of 
the conflicting patents filed.137 
 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Antigenes, moyens et method pour le diagnostic de 
lymphadenopathie et du syndrome d’immuno-depression acquise, European 
Patent No. 0,138,667 A2 (filed Sept. 14, 1984) (citing as priority patent 
application, GB 8,324,800, filed Sept. 15, 1983) (issued April 24, 1985) 
(inventive entity listed as Luc Montagnier, Francoise Barre-Sinoussi, 
Francoise V[e]zinet-Brun, Christine Rouzioux, Willy Rosenbaum, Charles 
41
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Consequences: Without including Gallo or any of Gallo’s 
colleagues, Luc Montagnier filed his patent application first, 
twelve (12) claims total, “GB [Great Britain] 8,324,800, filed 
Sep. 15, 1983.”138 Without including Montagnier or any of 
 
Dauguet, Jacqueline Gruest, Marie-Therese Nugeyre, Francoise Ray, 
Claudine Axler-Blin, Solange Chamaret); Human Immunodeficiency Viruses 
Associated with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), a Diagnostic 
Method for AIDS and Pre-AIDS, and a Kit Therefore, U.S. Patent No. 
4,708,818 (filed Oct. 8, 1985) (citing as priority Gr. Brit. Patent Application 
No. 8,324,800, filed Sept. 15, 1983) (issued Nov. 24, 1987) (attributing 
invention to Luc Montagnier, Jean-Claude Chermann, Francoise Barre-
Sinoussi, Francoise Brun-Vezinet, Christine Rouzioux, Willy Rozenbaum, 
Charles Dauguet, Jacqueline Gruest, Marie-Therese Nugeyre, Francoise Rey, 
Claudine Axler-Blin, Solange Chamaret, (and purportedly added in 1987 
interference settlement) Robert C. Gallo, Mikulas Popovic, and Mangalasseril 
G. Sarngadharan) (specifically listing Great Britain Patent Application No. 
8,324,800 under the “Foreign Application Priority Data” heading). 
138. Absent inclusion of Gallo or any member of Gallo’s research team, 
Montagnier and his French co-inventors’ team filed in Great Britain (GB), 
patent application GB 8,324,800, on Sept. 15, 1983, which is cited as foreign 
priority on all subsequent patent applications this research team filed in 
1983 through 1984. Montagnier’s team filed a second U.S. patent application, 
06/558,109 on Dec. 5, 1983, so that Montagnier et al. in fact filed two 
(provisional?) patent applications before Gallo, et al. filed on April 23, 1984. 
The U.S. PTO website, 
http://www.pto.gov/patents/resources/types/provapp.jsp, states: 
 
A provisional application for patent is a U.S. national 
application for patent filed in the USPTO under 35 U.S.C. § 
111(b). It allows filing without a formal patent claim, oath 
or declaration, or any information disclosure (prior art) 
statement. It provides the means to establish an early 
effective filing date in a later filed non-provisional patent 
application filed under 35 U.S.C. § 111(a). It also allows the 
term “Patent Pending” to be applied in connection with the 
description of the invention . . . . In accordance with 35 
U.S.C. § 119(e), the corresponding non-provisional 
application must contain or be amended to contain a specific 
reference to the provisional application. 
 
Id. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedure (MPEP) 2138.05 "Reduction to Practice," states: 
 
Reduction to practice may be an actual reduction [e.g. 
laboratory data proof] or a constructive reduction to practice 
which occurs when a patent application on the claimed 
invention is filed. The filing of a patent application serves as 
conception and constructive reduction to practice of the 
subject matter described in the application. Thus the 
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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Montagnier’s research team, Gallo filed on Apr. 23, 1984, after 
Montagnier’s filing dates, Gallo’s patent being essentially a 
duplicate of Montagnier’s 1983 application minus two claims, 
ten (10) claims total.139 According to U.S. and international 
patent law, first filed becomes “prior art,” which precludes 
“novelty” of later essentially similar inventions.140 Gallo’s 1984 
patent application should never have been issued since it 
apparently violates U.S. patent law.141 
 
Section 102(e) is a codification of a Supreme 
Court case [Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-
Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390 (1926)] which 
held that a United States patent is effective as a 
reference against a subsequently filed United 
States patent application of another as of its 
filing date, and not as of the date it issued as a 
patent. Thus, the date as of which the 
specifications of United States patents become 
prior art relates back to their filing dates – a 
date on which their disclosures were not actually 
available to the public.142 
 
A 1987 settlement of the patent interference claims by the 
French inventors ongoing two years purportedly was as follows: 
 
inventor need not provide evidence of either conception or 
actual reduction to practice when relying on the content of 
the patent application. Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352, 
47 USPQ2d 1128, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1998). A reduction to 
practice can be done by another on behalf of the inventor. De 
Solms v. Schoenwald, 15 USPQ2d 1507, 1510 (Bd. Pat. App. 
& Inter. 1990). "While the filing of the original application 
theoretically constituted a constructive reduction to practice 
at the time, the subsequent abandonment of that 
application also resulted in an abandonment of the benefit 
of that filing as a constructive reduction to practice. The 
filing of the original application is, however, evidence of 
conception of the invention." 
 
Id. 
139. ’113 Patent (emphasis added). 
140. ROSENBERG, supra note 130, at § 7.11 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)). 
141. See id. 
142. Id. 
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The names of Luc Montagnier, Franciose Barre-
Sinousse, Jean-Claude Chermann, Francoise 
Brun, and the rest of the Pasteur [Institute] 
group would be added as inventors on Gallo’s 
patent, and the names of Gallo, Popovic and 
Sarngadharan to the Pasteur still-pending 
application, which the [U.S.] patent office, 
hopefully, would agree to issue. Rather than the 
two competing but co-existing patents envisioned 
by Salk [Jonas Salk polio vaccine inventor, a 
mediator between Gallo and Montagnier], there 
would be two shared patents. The deal depended 
on the PTO’s [U.S. Patent and Trademark Office] 
willingness to overlook the existence of two 
patents for the same invention, which might be 
made easier by the fact that both would be 
owned jointly by HHS [U.S. Health and Human 
Services] and the Pasteur [Institute, Paris, FR]. 
Because the Red Cross had been using the Gallo 
test almost exclusively, the $4 million in annual 
royalties being collected by the HHS was several 
times the $500,000 earned by the French. After 
redistribution imposed by the settlement, HHS 
would end up with some $2 million a year, and 
the Pasteur with about $1.5 million. The French 
would hold the short end of the money stick.143 
 
143. CREWDSON, supra note 98, at 294-95 (emphasis added); Human 
Immunodeficiency Viruses Associated with Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS), a Diagnostic Method for AIDS and Pre-AIDS, and a Kit 
Therefore, U.S. Patent No. 4,708,818 (filed Oct. 8, 1985) (Gr. Brit. Patent 
Application No. 8,324,800 (filed Sept. 15, 1983)) (issued Nov. 24, 1987) 
(attributing revised post-1987 settlement invention to Luc Montagnier, Jean-
Claude Chermann, Francoise Barre-Sinoussi, Francoise Brun-Vezinet, 
Christine Rouzioux, Willy Rozenbaum, Charles Dauguet, Jacqueline Gruest, 
Marie-Therese Nugeyre, Francoise Rey, Claudine Axler-Blin, Solange 
Chamaret, Robert C. Gallo, Mikulas Popovic, and Mangalasseril G. 
Sarngadharan). The Great Britain Patent No. 8,324,800 that is cited as 
priority was filed absent any of Gallo’s team. Id. But see Serologic Detection 
of Antibodies to HTLV-II in Sera of Patients with AIDS and Pre-AIDS 
Conditions, U.S. Patent No. 4,520,113 (filed Apr. 23, 1984) (issued May 28, 
1985) (attributing invention to Robert C. Gallo, Mikulas Popovic, and 
Mangalasseril G. Sangadharan) (an indication that the 1987 settlement did 
not in fact reciprocally co-attribute Gallo’s April 23, 1984-filed patent 
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 Besides the evidence in the two disputed patents, an 
advanced search of the PTO website shows Luc Montagnier has 
been named lead inventor on almost twice as many issued U.S. 
patents as Robert Gallo.144 
In 2008, Drs. Luc Montaignier and Franciose Barre-
Sinousse received the Nobel Prize for discovery of the virus 
causing AIDS; Dr. Robert Gallo was not mentioned.145 
The late 1980’s-2001 was a time period when Congress 
increased science research money, in particular to fund 
HIV/AIDS and cancer research, but most research programs 
also benefited.146 Then, abruptly after 9/11 in 2001, the 
research budget devoted to life science research funding was 
 
application to include the French team of Montagnier et al.). 
144. Results of Search in U.S. Patent Collection Database for Luc 
Montagnier, USPTO PATENT FULL-TEXT AND IMAGE DATABASE, 
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm (submit “in/montagnier-
luc” in Query field and then follow “Search” link) (last visited Aug. 1, 2012) 
(returning 106 patents total); Results of Search in U.S. Patent Collection 
Database for Robert C. Gallo, USPTO PATENT FULL-TEXT AND IMAGE 
DATABASE, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm (submit 
“in/gallo-robert-c” in Query field and then follow “Search” link) (returning 54 
patents total) (last visited Aug. 1, 2012). 
145. Altman, supra note 98. 
146. Eugenie Samuel Reich, Science After 9/11: How Research Was 
Changed by the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, SCI. AM., Sep. 1, 2011, 
available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-research-
was-changed-by-september-11-terrorist-attacks&page=2: 
 
A major conduit for the shifts is the availability of money: 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), created 
by consolidating 22 federal services and agencies in 2002 in 
direct response to September 11, had a science budget that 
peaked at $1.3 billion in 2006 before falling again to about 
$700 million in 2011. Key science-funding agencies 
including the National Science Foundation, the National 
Institutes of Health and the U.S. Department of Energy, 
also put money into research motivated by security concerns 
(amounting to a total homeland security (this number does 
not refer to DHS but to homeland security funding across all 
agencies) research budget of $7.3 billion in 2011) and a 
small amount of the U.S. Department of Defense money 
associated with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq ended up in 
the hands of researchers as well-for example, by funding 
work on explosives detection and weaponry. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
45
JACKSONMACRO 99 PAGES 11/13/2012  9:03 AM 
2012] “BEYOND THE SCOPE” 721 
proportionately reduced due to the billions of U.S. dollars spent 
to fund military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and the 
new “Homeland Security.”147 Both political situations, 
Representative Dingell’s scrutiny and proportionately reduced 
federal expenditure for life sciences research after 9/11, 
stimulated more investigation of possible fraud by U.S. 
scientists.148 
In the late 1980’s, the PHS-NIH-ORI,149 accused a 
university research scientist funded by NIH, professor of 
neurology at the University of Wisconsin, James H. Abbs, of 
 
147. NEW GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP, supra note 2, at 71-72: 
 
Gregory J. Pottie, UCLA School of Engineering and Applied 
Science, commented at the September 2006 regional 
meeting that in the context of national security sensor 
networks, he has already witnessed examples of research 
domains [biochemical sensors] where short-term thinking 
on security has “directly damaged long-term research of 
direct benefit to our national security.” . . . Several 
university officials expressed concern about the direction 
research funding in the life sciences has taken. Over the 
past five years, there has been a remarkable increase of 
funding for bioterrorism-related research, while long-
standing research budgets in the life sciences have been cut 
or have remained stagnant. 
 
Id. (emphasis added) (citing R&D Funding Update on R&D in NIH FY 2007 
House Appropriations, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., 
http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd (last visited Aug. 18, 2012); Gregory J. Pottie, 
Remarks Made at the Committee on a New Government-University 
Partnership for Science and Security Western Regional Meeting at Stanford 
University (Sept. 27, 2006)), available at 
www7.nationalacademies.org/stl/202006.pdf. 
148. Investigation of the Institutional Response to the HIV Blood Test 
Patent Dispute and Related Matters, by the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations, pt. VI, Committee on Energy and Commerce (Representative 
John D. Dingell, Chairman, April 1988); see also Glazer, supra note 97, at 11 
(“Science fraud became an even bigger issue in April 1988, when Rep. Dingell 
launched hearings on the [David] Baltimore case before his Energy and 
Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.”); RHOADES, supra 
note 97, at 11 (“The number of institutions responding to allegations of 
research misconduct has grown steadily from 1992-2001 and is expected to 
continue to do so.”); OFFICE OF RESEARCH INTEGRITY, supra note 97, at 32. See 
generally SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 56, 60-61. 
149. These abbreviations stand for, respectively, Public Health Service-
National Institutes of Health-Office of Research Integrity. See KEVLES, 
supra note 98, at 290. 
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scientific misconduct.150 Professor Abbs’ laboratory was the 
only one of its kind studying human speech using x-ray 
microbeam analysis. The court noted that scientific fraud is 
much “in the news these days; and this case, the government 
advises us in its brief, ‘is of far-reaching national 
significance.’”151 The charge was that a recent article co-
authored by Abbs contained graphs that had been traced from 
graphs in a previous publication rather than generated by data 
from the NIH grant research, as the article claimed.152 The 
University of Wisconsin self-investigated the matter, clearing 
Abbs.153 
 
150. Abbs v. Sullivan, 963 F.2d 918, 927, 928 (7th Cir. 1992), vacating 
756 F. Supp. 1172 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (The appellate court held that while the 
government had violated the Administrative Procedure Act, Abbs may not 
appeal an executive agency’s violation of administrative procedure absent 
showing of personal injury, specifically under Administrative Procedure Act § 
10(c) “irreparable harm, the judicial remedy therefore [being] inadequate.”). 
151. Abbs, 963 F.2d, at 928 (citing Patricia K. Woolf, Deception in 
Scientific Research, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 67 (1988)). 
152. Id. at 921. 
153. Abbs v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 1172, 1176-1177 (W.D. Wis. 1990). 
The trial court found the following undisputed facts: 
 
In 1987, a committee of the University of Wisconsin-
Madison conducted an inquiry into allegations that plaintiff 
Abbs had engaged in scientific misconduct, specifically, that 
he had published certain curves in the Journal Neurology 
that were traced from curves he had published previously, 
rather than being from two different patients as plaintiff 
represented. The university committee determined that 
there was no need for formal investigation into the 
allegations of scientific misconduct against Abbs and so 
advised NIH’s Office of Extramural Research, in June 1987 . 
. . [None-the-less t]he Office of Extramural Research of NIH 
conducted additional inquiries into the Abbs matter and 
obtained a report from a panel of experts questioning the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison’s prior determination that 
the allegations against Abbs did not warrant a formal 
investigation. On January 12, 1990, the Acting Director of 
the Office of Scientific Inquiry advised plaintiff Abbs that 
his name and the fact that he was the subject of an 
investigation had been entered into the Public Health 
ALERT system, which serves to communicate information 
about investigations and final determinations of [science] 
misconduct to all Public Health Service agencies. 
 
Id. 
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Nonetheless, prior to beginning its own investigation, the 
Office of Scientific Integrity (OSI-NIH-PHS) placed “in the 
Public Health Service’s ‘ALERT’ system a notice that Dr. 
James Abbs of the University of Wisconsin was being 
investigated for scientific misconduct.154 The ALERT system 
distributes such notices to all agencies of the Public Health 
Service that make research grants.”155 Under the OSI-PHS 
investigative procedure, Dr. Abbs: (1) would not have complete 
access to the investigative file; (2) would not be allowed to 
attend interviews with other witnesses; and (3) would not be 
entitled to full evidentiary hearing before a finding of 
misconduct was made.156 
The issue before the Abbs court was: “whether the policies 
and procedures governing such investigations comply with the 
Administrative Procedure Act and the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the Fifth Amendment[?]”157 The 
University was a co-plaintiff with Abbs, citing its economic 
stake in Abbs’ NIH million-dollar-grant’s overhead, and both 
sides moved for summary judgment.158 “In an accompanying 
opinion the [district court] judge explained that while the 
procedures employed by the Office of Scientific Integrity were 
indeed invalid because adopted in violation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act . . . Abbs has no liberty or 
property interest in continued funding by NIH, so even if the 
proceedings were inadequate he had no constitutional claim.”159 
 
154. Id. 
155. Abbs, 756 F. Supp., at 1177-78. 
156. Id. at 1176. 
157. Id. at 1176. 
158. Id. at 1176. 
159. Abbs, 963 F.2d at 922 (emphasis added); Abbs, 756 F. Supp. at 
1182-1183. The trial court stated: 
 
Plaintiff Abbs contends that he has a constitutionally 
protected property interest that derives from the 
interrelationship of federal funding with his career 
advancement and income. . . . As important as such funding 
is to plaintiff Abbs, however, it does not constitute a 
constitutionally protected property interest unless his claim 
to it is legally enforceable by contract or under state or 
federal law. . . . As to future federal funding, plaintiff Abbs 
has no enforceable right to receive grants or awards, 
whatever his status as researcher. . . . As to current grants, 
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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Abbs challenged the lack of a constitutional claim on appeal.160 
The U.S. Seventh Circuit dismissed Abbs’ appeal.161 The 
court reasoned that: 
 
Section 493(b) of the Public Health Service Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 289b(b), directs NIH to establish a 
“process” for responding to complaints of 
scientific fraud. Pursuant to this directive, but 
without notice or opportunity for public 
comment, the predecessor of the Office of 
Scientific Integrity had announced “Policies and 
Procedures for Dealing with Possible Misconduct 
in Science” in the July 18, 1986, issue of an NIH 
publication called NIH Guide for Grants and 
Contracts.162 
 
The Appeals court in its conclusion noted: 
 
Of course no one likes to be accused of 
misconduct. The district court judge remarked 
that “the fact that Abbs might ultimately be 
cleared of the accusations against him . . . is as 
unconvincing as arguing that persons charged 
with felonies have no cognizable interest in the 
trial procedures afforded them because they 
might be acquitted.” But a criminal defendant 
cannot bring a suit to enjoin the procedures 
under which he is to be tried. No more can Dr. 
Abbs.163 
 
 
he is not the grantee [see page 1176, University of Wisconsin-
Madison, his employer, the legal grantee] and [Abbs, 
therefore,] can claim no property rights in the funding for 
these grants. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
160. Abbs, 963 F.2d at 921. 
161. Id. at 928. 
162. Id. at 921. 
163. Id. at 928 (citing Abbs, 756 F. Supp. at 1181.) 
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The verdict in Abbs aptly illustrates both the need for 
moral rights non-waivable assignment to research scientists 
(not the grantee institution) as well as the need for a research 
scientists regulatory body (an impartial body equivalent to the 
ABA for lawyers), and not PHS, to promulgate, adjudicate, and 
enforce scientific research ethical standards. The Abbs courts 
noted that the existing PHS policy violated the Administrative 
Procedure Act, but held Abbs had no liberty or property 
interest in his own scientific research, so Abbs lacked a 
constitutional claim.164 
Further, as the Abbs court noted, a default PHS policy that 
the grantee institution owns the research data165 further places 
the research scientist at disadvantage in court regarding 
standing, because the scientist is simply deemed under PHS 
policy (arguable, as discussed below in conflict with federal 
intellectual property law) to have no intellectual property 
ownership or control of his own creative research 
accomplishments.166 
In short, U.S. scientists have lost, via (allegedly) 
unchallenged executive agency abuse of authority, the “fuel of 
interest” from their own “fire of genius” that Abraham Lincoln 
had celebrated.167 Absent U.S. adoption of inalienable moral 
attribution (paternity), integrity, retraction, and disclosure 
 
164. Abbs, 963 F.2d at 921 (“[T]he district judge never entered an 
injunction against its [Office of Scientific Integrity] conducting the 
investigation [science misconduct alleged against Dr. Abbs] by the procedures 
she had held invalid.”); Abbs, 756 F. Supp. at 1182-1183 (“As to current 
grants, he [Dr. Abbs] is not the grantee [University of Wisconsin-Madison, 
Abb’s employer, the legal grantee] and [Dr. Abbs, therefore,] can claim no 
property rights in the funding for these [Abbs’ personally conceived and 
personally authored research grants]”) (emphasis added). 
165. Abbs, 756 F. Supp. at 1176 ( “[T]he University of Wisconsin-
Madison . . . is the legal entity that applies for research grants.); see 
Waldeman, supra note 69. 
166. Abbs, 963 F.2d at 922 (emphasis added); Abbs, 756 F. Supp. at 
1182-1183 (“As to current grants, he [Dr. Abbs] is not the grantee [University 
of Wisconsin-Madison, Abb’s employer, the legal grantee] and [Dr. Abbs, 
therefore,] can claim no property rights in the funding for these [Abbs’ 
personally conceived and personally authored research] grants”) (emphasis 
added). 
167. Fisk, supra note 33, at 1128-29 (citing Abraham Lincoln, Second 
Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions (Feb. 11, 1859), in 3 COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 356, 363 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953)). 
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(divulgation) rights, American research scientists often lack 
standing to sue for non-economic intellectual rights in their 
own research discoveries. 
In the U.S., the percentage of independent inventors (those 
who have not assigned their patent rights to an employer or 
the government) is relatively low (about 25%); such 
independent individuals are typically viewed negatively by 
corporations, creating material pressure for a research scientist 
to comply to gain or to retain employment.168 Consequently, 
even in the 1980s, the majority of patents issued (84%) go to 
corporations.169 This latter fact, presumed true, largely vitiates 
the federal government’s rationale for technology transfer 
legislation in 1980, Bayh-Dole, Stevenson-Wydler, in 1986 for 
The Federal Technology Transfer Act, and PHS policy 
mandating control by federal scientific research grantee 
organizations.170 
Like the U.S. in 1916,171 independent inventors tend to be 
much higher in developing countries, about 66% in Brazil and 
25-50% in European countries.172 In the U.S., then, the 
majority, three-quarters (75%), of research scientist inventors 
assign their ownership of their creative inventions to their 
employers, usually as a mandate of their employment. This 
situation results in business managers’ practical control of 
scientific research, both science direction toward marketable 
products as well as research disclosure, via peer-reviewed 
 
168. MICHAEL GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
STRATEGIES FOR A DYNAMIC WORLD 99 (2008) (citing WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. ORG. & INT’L FED’N OF INVENTORS’ ASS’NS, HOW CAN PATENT OFFICES 
ENCOURAGE INVENTIVE AND INNOVATIVE ACTIVITIES? (2000), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/innovation/en/wipo_ifia_bue.00/wipo_ifia_bu
e.11.doc; Farag Moussa, The Role of Innovation, INT’L FED’N OF INVENTORS’ 
ASS’N, http://www.invention-ifia.ch/role_of_innovation.htm (last visited July 
17, 2012)). 
169. Fisk, supra note 33, at 1129 n.9 (citing Rights of Employed 
Inventors: Hearing on H.R. 4732 and H.R. 6635 Before the H. Subcomm. On 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, 97th Cong. 1 (1982) 
(remarks of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier)) (stating that “[eighty-four] 84% 
percent of U.S. patents go to corporate assignees, ‘usually the employer of the 
actual inventor.’ As recently as 1916, three-quarters [75%] of the patents in 
the United States were issued to individuals.”) (internal citations omitted). 
170. See supra Part II.B.2. 
171. Fisk, supra note 33, at 1129 n.9. 
172. GOLLIN, supra note 168, at 99. 
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scientific publications, upon which the scientists’ careers 
depend (matters for which business managers are generally not 
competent).173 Research scientists’ creativity is the foundation 
 
173. Melese, supra note 5, at 17: 
 
Moreover, there is an increased desire for companies to 
engage in strategic research partnerships reflecting a 
general trend for companies to move away from licensing 
arrangements and toward building partnerships. . . . [M]ost 
contract officers . . . that negotiate research and 
collaborative agreements for acquiring technology resources 
are commonly not trained to make science or business 
decisions and are not experts in intellectual property. 
Consequently, they lack the skills required to balance 
science and intellectual property risk against the potential 
benefits of a business opportunity. 
 
Id. (citation omitted); see also id. at 14: 
 
The practice of biomedical research is changing. It is 
evolving towards a bigger enterprise involving multiple 
investigators from multiple institutions, both academic and 
corporate. No single investigator can assemble all the 
required technologies and expertise to understand complex 
disease mechanisms and to translate that scientific 
knowledge into disease treatment. To move discoveries 
effectively between bench and bedside requires close ties 
among the basic [academic fundamental 
biological/biochemical processes], clinical [patient 
management], and corporate research enterprises. 
 
Id. (citations omitted); Thomas J. Roberts & Jess House, Profile of a Research 
Administrator, 15 RES. MGMT. REV., Winter/Spring 2006, at 41 (“The general 
profile of a research administrator is: . . .bachelor’s degree . . . 6-10 years 
[experience as research administrator].”); GOLLIN, supra note 168, at 120-21: 
 
I [Gollin, Esq., IP Partner, Venable, LLP] have never met 
anyone who is an expert in all three areas-creativity 
(technology or art), (2) intellectual property law, and (3) 
business. . . . Engineers and scientists engage in basic 
research and product development, and operate in a 
situation of high technical complexity[,] . . . high 
information intensity[,] . . . [and] high aesthetic 
sophistication. . . . They [research scientists] understand the 
innovation and its relation to the state of the art. . . . 
Unfortunately, senior managers in some organizations are 
not proactive and [specifically scientifically] knowledgeable, 
and may make unwise decisions about intellectual property 
or otherwise thwart good work by [research scientists] staff-
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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for the quality and quantity of marketable products; such U.S. 
policies and statutes arguably remove control and exploitation 
of scientific researchers’ intellectual endeavors and 
accomplishments to business administrators least likely to 
have the scientific acumen to further develop U.S. intellectual 
property.174 In 1968 the executive branch commissioned a 
report from Harbridge House, which reported commercial 
utilization of government funded research was low.175 The 
Harbridge report also found that “the evidence does not 
indicate that either title or nonexclusive licensing [to the 
employer] is uniformly the best way to promote utilization” of 
academic research.176 The PHS policies of ownership by 
grantees are inextricably intertwined by the dual justifications 
of “policing” science misconduct and facilitating “technology 
transfer,” both justifications having highly questionable merit 
and questionable effectiveness in fact and in practice.177 
 
investing unnecessarily to protect worthless projects, failing 
to take measures necessary to protect valuable projects, or 
structuring unworkable relationships with collaborators. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
174. Greenbaum, supra note 81, at 359: 
 
More often than not, technology transfer offices drain 
university resources, promising the sky but delivering little. 
Further, they drain the resources and time of the 
researchers who must cooperate with the TTOs [technology 
transfer offices] to draft and license patents. With their 
monopolistic hold on all licensing efforts in the university, 
technology transfer offices may also inhibit many 
entrepreneurial efforts by the researchers themselves-
stunting the growth of a patent-friendly environment in 
academia and hampering independent academia-industry 
collaboration. 
 
Id. 
175. Id. at 338-39 nn.86, 90, 91 (citing ANDREW Z. MICHAELSON, THE LAW 
OF THE LAB: USING ZERIT TO INFORM TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 21, 22 (2002), 
available at http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/512/michaelson.pdf). 
176. Id. at 339. 
177. See, e.g., Dov Greenbaum, Research Fraud: Methods For Dealing 
With An Issue That Negatively Impacts Society’s View of Science, 10 COLUM. 
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 75 (2009) (“Has the prevalence of fraud in science 
risen to problematic level? . . . [T]here is little in the way of hard empirical 
data one way or the other.”). 
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c.     The Courts’ Disagreement with Agencies’ 
Policies and Practice: Stanford v. Roche and 
Bayh-Dole 
 
Nonetheless, the PHS “default intellectual property 
employer ownership policy” has neither been generally 
embraced by the courts nor accepted in practice by the research 
science community.178 In Forsham v. Harris, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that data developed under a federal grant did not 
constitute an “agency record.”179 As previously noted, editors of 
scientific journals solicit copyright transfer from individual 
authors without requirement of institutional approval, an 
indication that journal editors, as well as prior noted scientist 
researchers, deem research scientist authors own copyright in 
their own research, not their employers.180 In its June 6, 2011, 
7:2 decision, Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford 
University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., the U.S. Supreme 
Court affirmed that “[t]he Bayh-Dole Act does not 
automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in 
federal contractors or authorize contractors to unilaterally take 
title to such inventions.”181 Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the 
 
178. Id. at 74; see Bd. of Trs. Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche 
Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2188 
(2011); see also Waldeman, supra note 70; Jackson & Khin-Maung-Gyi, supra 
note 71. 
179. 445 U.S. 169, 186-187 (1980) (internal citations omitted); see also 
Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987); 23 AM. JUR. 
PROOF OF FACTS 2D, 203 § 18 (Westlaw 2010) (“the mere fact that an 
invention was conceived and developed while the inventor was employed 
entitles the employer to no right or title to the invention”) (emphasis in 
original). However, once employer contribution has been established, the 
existence of an employer’s right may be presumed; McKeen v. Jerdone, 34 
App. D.C. 163, 6 (1909) (the employer has the burden of showing both that it 
was aware of and communicated to the employee a specific means of 
accomplishing the desired result, and that the employee's work consisted of 
mere improvement that could have been carried out by any skilled 
technician); Burton v. Burton Stock-Car Co., 171 Mass. 437, 50 N.E. 1029 
(1898); Deane v. Hodge, 35 Minn. 146, 27 N.W. 917 (1886) (the employer has 
the burden of proving that the employee intended to permit the employer to 
make gratuitous use of the employee's invention). But see Pedersen v. Akona, 
429 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1143 (D. Minn. 2006) (finding implied-in-fact contract 
and ‘shop right by estoppel’ of employer to use employee’s invention). 
180. Jackson & Khin-Maung-Gyi, supra note 71, at 23. 
181. Leland Stanford Univ., 131 S. Ct. at 2190 (citing University and 
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majority: 
 
Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the 
premise that rights in an invention belong to the 
inventor. [See, e.g,. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 
493 (10 How. 1850).] The question here is 
whether the University and Small Business 
Patent Procedures Act of 1980-commonly 
referred to as the Bayh-Dole Act-displaces that 
norm and automatically vests title to federally 
funded inventions in federal contractors. We hold 
it does not.182 . . . [U]nless there is an agreement 
to the contrary, an employer does not have rights 
in an invention “which is the original conception 
of the employee alone.”183 
 
The Chief Justice further stated that: 
 
Although much in intellectual property has 
changed in the 220 years since the first Patent 
Act, the basic idea that inventors have the right 
to patent their inventions has not.184 . . . We have 
rejected the idea that mere employment is 
sufficient to vest title to an employee’s invention 
in the employer.185 
 
In Stanford, the Supreme Court strongly affirmed (7:2) 
that, absent clear contractual waiver to the contrary, research 
scientists both own and control research science they creatively 
bring into being.186 It is too soon to anticipate what impact 
 
Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980 (Bayh-Doyle Act of 1980), Pub. 
L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006)) (Bayh-
Dole controls allocation of rights to inventions made by employees of small 
business firms and domestic nonprofit organizations, including universities, 
in federally assisted programs)) (quotation is found in the syllabus of the 
opinion). 
182. Id. at 2192 (emphasis added). 
183. Id. at 2195 (citation omitted). 
184. Id. at 2194. 
185. Id. at 2196 (emphasis added). 
186. Id. 
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Stanford will have on United States research science. However, 
it seems clear that many federal agencies’ policies and practice, 
prior reviewed herein, may require substantive revision in light 
of the Stanford holding. 
 
III. Why Is Absence of Moral Rights for Scientists a Problem: 
Adverse Impact on Scientific Progress and Achievement 
 
A. U.S. Agencies’ Policies Legal Deficiencies in General 
 
In 2005, it was estimated there were at least fourteen (14) 
U.S. federal agencies or departments that fund scientific 
research.187 Some of these have established policies 
implementing the Federal Policy on Research Misconduct 
mandated by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (a 
part of the executive branch of the U.S. government).”188 The 
latter office, Office of Science and Technology Policy, of the 
President established a “Uniform Policy for Research 
Misconduct” with which individual agencies are to comply.189 
Less than forty percent of U.S. federal agencies have drafted 
science misconduct policies. Most existing science misconduct 
policies provide very broad, general requirements in brief 
statutory form. “The remainder [of the relevant federal 
agencies] are either drafting policies or are in the process of 
establishing policies through formal channels.”190 Agencies 
having science misconduct guidelines include: Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS);191 Department of Defense 
(DoD);192 Department of Energy (DoE);193 National Aeronautics 
 
187. MACRINA, supra note 89, at 14-15. 
188. Id. 
189. Uniform Policy on Research Misconduct, Notification of Final 
Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. No. 235, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,260 (Dec. 6, 2000). 
190. MACRINA, supra note 89, at 14. 
191. Public Health Services Policies on Research Misconduct, 42 C.F.R. 
pts. 50, 93 (2011). 
192. Research Integrity and Misconduct, DEP’T OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 
3210.7, at 1, 5 (2004), available at 
www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/321007p.pdf: 
 
(a)DoD Directive 3216.2, “Protection of Human Subjects and 
Adherence to Ethical Standards in DoD-Supported 
56http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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and Space Administration (NASA).194 In 1995, the Department 
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) published a sixty eight 
page booklet of guidelines and recommendations entitled, 
“Integrity and Misconduct in Research.”195 In contrast to the 
comparable ABA’s LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY is 1697 pages excluding 
additional Index Tables.196 Scientific professional journals 
occasionally publish review articles on science misconduct, 
most highlighting the devastation to scientific careers and 
reputation of both the scientists and their institution-
employers.197 One may reasonably conclude that professional 
 
Research,” March 25, 2002 
(b)Federal Register, Volume 65, page 76262, December 6, 
2000, “Federal Policy on Research Misconduct” current 
edition 
(c)Title 32, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 22, “DoD 
Grant and Agreement Regulations (DoDGARS),” current 
edition 
(d)Title 48, Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 2, 
“Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS),” current edition 
(e)Section 2409 of title 10, United States Code, “Contractor 
Employees: Protection from Reprisal for Disclosure of 
Certain Information” 
(f)Section 552 of title 5, United States Code, “Freedom of 
Information Act” 
(g)Section 552a of title 5, United States Code, “Privacy Act” 
 
Id. 
193. Interim Final Rule & Opportunity for Comments, Department of 
Energy Policy on Research Misconduct, 70 Fed. Reg. 123 (proposed July 28, 
2005) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 600, 733, 48 C.F.R. pts. 935, 952, 970). 
194. Grant and Cooperative Agreement Handbook—Research 
Misconduct, 70 Fed. Reg. 96 (May 19, 2005) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 
1260, 1273, 1274). 
195. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, COMM’N ON RESEARCH 
INTEGRITY REPORT, INTEGRITY AND MISCONDUCT IN RESEARCH (1995) 
[hereinafter RYAN REPORT], available at 
http://ori.hhs.gov/documents/report_commission.pdf. 
196. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS, 
THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2012). 
197. Rennie Drummond, Dealing with Research Misconduct in the 
United Kingdom and An American Perspective of Research Integrity, 316 
BRIT. MED. J. 1726-33 (1998); see also Herbert N. Nigg & Gabriela Radescu, 
Science Misconduct in Environmental Science and Toxicology, 272 J. OF THE 
AM. MED. ASS’N 168-70 (1994). 
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ethical guidance for research scientists is fragmented between 
governmental agencies, guidelines drawn using very broad 
strokes; for the most part, lacking objective procedural process 
and enforcement authority, comparable to the American 
Medical Association or American Bar Association.198 
Macrina aptly notes another common issue, that is, science 
misconduct often does not occur in a vacuum.199 Science 
misconduct is frequently accompanied by charges under 
various civil and criminal laws.200 Scientific experts, specific to 
the accused’s research specialty and without conflict of interest, 
should be recruited to fully adjudicate offenses perpetrated by 
the individual or group.201 The latter is rare given the ORI’s 
mandate for institutions to “self-investigate” alleged science 
misconduct of their own (to include institution administrators), 
particularly if misconduct involves economic or commercial 
matters of science germane to the institution’s functions.202 
 
198. The “Ryan Report” recommendations for research misconduct are 
not unchallenged in the scientific community. RYAN REPORT, supra note 195; 
see, e.g., Debate, Should the Department of Health and Human Services Adopt 
the Ryan Commission’s Recommendations? Pro and Con, CQ RESEARCHER 
(Jan. 10, 1997), available at 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre199701100
0#Sidebar1REF[1]; Jennifer Kulynych, Intent to Deceive: Mental State and 
Scienter in the New Uniform Federal Definition of Scientific Misconduct, 1998 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/kulynych-
intent-to-deceive.pdf (“The legal principle of ‘innocent until proven guilty,’ 
which might be rephrased, ‘assume correct until proven wrong,’ does not 
apply to scientific work; the burden of proof remains with those claiming new 
findings.”) (internal citation omitted); Jesse A. Goldner, The Unending Saga 
of Legal Controls Over Scientific Misconduct: A Clash of Cultures Needing 
Resolution 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 293 (1998). 
199. See MACRINA, supra note 89, at 15. 
200. Id.; see infra Section III.B. Criminal penalties for scientific research 
disclosure or “export” of sensitive but unclassified research science, absent a 
license to disclose, may include both incarceration and/or substantial fines. 
201. Kulynych, supra note 198, at ¶¶ 48-49. 
202. See, e.g.,United States v. Butler, 429 F.3d 140, 144-45 (5th Cir. 
2005); see also Barbara E. Murray, Karl E. Andersen, Keith Arnold, John G. 
Bartlett, Charles C. Carpenter, Stanley Falkow, J. Ted Hartman, Tom 
Lehman, Ted W. Reid, Frank M. Ryburn, Jr., R. Bradley Sack, Marc J. 
Struelens, Lowell S. Young & William B. Greenough III, Destroying the Life 
and Career of a Valued Physician-Scientist Who Tried to Protect Us from 
Plague: Was It Really Necessary?, 40 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1644-48, 
1646 (2005), available at 
http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/content/40/11/1644.full.pdf+html. 
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Both the National Institutes of Health (NIH, United States 
Public Health Service, USPHS) and National Science 
Foundation (NSF) require all grantee institutions to have 
infrastructure in place for dealing with scientific misconduct.203 
When the economic or political stakes are sufficient, such legal 
delegation for intramural misconduct investigation functions 
tantamount to placing the “fox in charge of oversight of the 
chicken coup” for the majority of grantee institution scientists 
in both academic and government institutions.204 Appellate 
process to the NIH, Office of Research Integrity (ORI), results 
in formal extramural investigations less than ten percent of the 
time despite apparent statutory mandate for federal funds 
scientist recipients.205 The end result of this flawed system for 
research science public disclosure is often: (i) frequent and 
admitted denial of due process; (ii) forced retraction or 
government denial of public disclosure against public interest; 
(iii) arguable denial of First Amendment free speech; and, (iv) 
given PHS policy for grantee institution ownership, lack of 
standing for any impartial court challenge by the research 
scientist. 
Summarizing modern government conflation of economic 
and security issues, the Association of American Universities 
notes: “Export control laws, long a mechanism to control 
transfer of goods having military applications, became [after 
9/11 also] a means to limit export of goods or technologies 
having commercial value. This dual focus contributes to some 
of the difficulties experienced in university research 
administration today.”206 
 
 
 
 
 
203. MACRINA, supra note 89, at 15. 
204. See, e.g., SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 60; CREWDSON, supra note 98, 
at 294-95. 
205. Annual Report, OFFICE OF RESEARCH INTEGRITY, http://ori.hhs.gov 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2012). 
206. Alice P. Gast, The Impact of Restricting Information Access on 
Science and Technology 3 (2003) (emphasis in original), available at 
http://www.aau.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=1602. 
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B. Delayed or Denied Public Disclosure of Research Findings
 Against Public Benefit 
 
In a survey from 2001-2006, AAAS found that intellectual 
property concerns significantly delayed, or precluded both 
research advancement and research disclosure to the public 
from government, nonprofit, healthcare, academic, industry 
and business organizations.207 Research science disclosures, to 
include intellectual property, perceived as implicating U.S. 
national security are generally handled via “a complex 
combination of statutes, regulations, and procedures that 
govern control of classified information, public access to 
governmental information, and maintenance of government 
records.”208 Post-9/11, President George W. Bush “extended 
classification authority to several departments and agencies 
that had not previously been involved . . . e.g. the Department 
of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the 
Department of Health and Human Services.”209 
Post-9/11 security restrictions on disclosure of federally 
funded research were instituted under three new legal 
doctrines: export restrictions, a term of art broadly including 
any “sensitive” [research science] disclosure to any non-U.S. 
citizen [latter, “deemed export”]; “unclassified but sensitive” 
federal agencies’ policies determinations; “dual use” research 
findings disclosure which may apply when basic life science 
 
207. STEPHEN A. HANSEN, AMANDA BREWSTER, JANA ASHER & MICHAEL 
KISIELEWSKI, THE EFFECTS OF PATENTING IN THE AAAS SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY 
8-9 (2d ed. 2006), available at 
http://sippi.aaas.org/survey/AAAS_IP_Survey_Report.pdf. 
208. GATHERING STORM, supra note 21, at 475-78, 475 n.1: 
 
With two exceptions, the government has no authority to 
designate information produced outside this legal 
framework as classified. The first exception is through the 
Atomic Energy Act; information related to nuclear weapons 
may be “born classified” without any prior involvement of 
the government in its generation. The second exception, 
under the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, permits 
information received as part of the patent-application 
process to be classified. 
 
Id. 
209. Id. at 475. 
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research findings may have alternative applied use; and 
arguable self-censorship chilling by the scientific community 
(e.g. peer-reviewed research science journal editors) for any 
science deemed to have potential national security 
implications.210 
Detailed review of security issues is beyond the scope of 
this review except as these may impact research science 
intellectual rights of attribution, integrity, disclosure and 
retraction. Research science security issues reflect the present 
the national security environment, currently in flux in 
response to rapidly changing global situations and executive 
policy.211 
 
210. FINK REPORT, supra note 83, at 96: 
 
Until recently, there were very few cases of problems 
related to the publication of research results in the life 
sciences that attracted significant public attention. Some 
specialists in bioterrorism, however, had warned that, given 
continuing advances in biotechnology, open publication 
could provide information of use to terrorists…The public 
perception led to calls for scientific journals to refrain from 
publishing “dangerous” research or to delete some data from 
published research results in order to preclude others from 
replicating the results . . . . In addition to the results of 
fundamental research, the compilation, synthesis, and 
assessment of already published results in review articles 
may provide an understanding of a field that could guide or 
assist terrorists. Even more difficult are the concerns raised 
by reports that result when scientists are assembled to 
render their judgment as experts about particular problems. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). See generally NEW GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP, supra note 2; 
James B. Petro, Intelligence Support to the Life Science Community: 
Mitigating Threats from Bioterrorism, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (June 26, 
2008, 3:02 PM), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no3/article06.html. 
211. See, e.g., Research Compliance, supra note 16: 
 
The U.S.A. Patriot Act and related legislation have altered 
the landscape for research at U.S. universities. Driven by a 
concern that research-generated information and materials 
used in research experiments could be used by terrorists to 
attack the American population, the Federal government 
has extended its regulation of research activities at 
universities and private laboratories. The effects of this new 
regulatory regime will be felt especially by the biological 
sciences, and some branches of chemistry, computer science, 
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1.    “Export Restrictions”: Publication, Peer-to-Peer
Communication, and Patent Secrecy Orders 
 
Federal export restrictions may affect intellectual property 
rights of U.S. scientists’ research disclosure, to include: peer-
reviewed journal publication; peer-review by U.S. scientists of 
research by scientists in certain foreign countries; scientific 
communication with research science colleagues in the U.S. 
and overseas; collaborative research science with “foreign” 
scientists to include naturalized U.S. university faculty and 
students (under the “deemed exports” policy restriction);212 and 
patent secrecy orders.213 
 
a.    Export Controls 
 
Export Controls control the flow of both information and 
materials.214 Most, but not all, information subject to export 
control is of United States origin, in whole or in part, and 
proprietary.215 The Department of Commerce implements the 
export information and materials licenses under the Export 
Administration (Regulations) Act of 1979 (EAR).216 Information 
 
and physics . . . . The regulatory atmosphere since 9/11 
remains volatile and subject to change. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
212. JULIE NORRIS, ASS’N OF AM. UNIVS./COUNCIL ON GOV’T RELATIONS, 
RESTRICTIONS ON RESEARCH AWARDS: TROUBLESOME CLAUSES, available at 
www.aau.edu/WorkArea/showcontent.aspx?id=1634 (citing the text of the 
laws, regulations and policies). 
213. The Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (2006) 
(implemented by 37 C.F.R. § 5.1 (2011)). 
214. See GENEVIEVE J. KNEZO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31845, 
“SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED” AND OTHER FEDERAL SECURITY CONTROLS ON 
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION: HISTORY AND CURRENT CONTROVERSY 
3-6 (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL31845.pdf. 
215. FINK REPORT, supra note 83, at 105 n.41. 
216. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. Law 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. app.) (amended by 
International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 
110-96, 121 Stat. 1011 (2007)). The Act lapsed on August 20, 2001 and the 
President (George W. Bush), through Executive Order 13,222 of August 17, 
2001 (66 Fed. Reg. 44,025 (Aug. 22, 2001)), has continued the Regulations in 
effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. 50 U.S.C. § 
35 (2006). See also IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31832, 
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and technical data export is also controlled by the Department 
of State, under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITAR).217 The EAR defines “technical data” as: 
 
Technology. (General Technology Note)—
Specific information necessary for the 
“development”, “production”, or “use” of a 
product. The information takes the form of 
“technical data” or “technical assistance”. 
Controlled “technology” is defined in the General 
Technology Note and in the Commerce Control 
List (Supplement No. [One] to part 774 of the 
EAR). 
N.B.: Technical assistance—May take forms 
such as instruction, skills training, working 
knowledge, consulting services. 
Note: “Technical assistance” may involve 
transfer of “technical data”. 
Technical data —May take forms such as 
blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, 
tables, engineering designs and specifications, 
manuals and instructions written or recorded on 
other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-
only memories.218 
 
In contrast to EAR,219 the 2011 ITAR definition of 
“technical data” explicitly excludes “general scientific, 
 
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT: EVOLUTION, PROVISIONS, AND DEBATE (2009), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL31832.pdf. 
217. International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 
(2011). 
218. 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2012) (emphasis added). The Commerce Control 
List is part of the EAR, 15 C.F.R. § 774, Supplement No. 1-15, and is 
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/cfr/index.html and 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/ear_data.html. See generally IAN F. 
FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31832, THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION 
ACT: EVOLUTION, PROVISIONS, AND DEBATE (2009), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL31832.pdf. 
219. FINK REPORT, supra note 83, at 105 n.41 (“Unlike the EAR [under 
the ITAR], however, ‘publicly available scientific and technical information 
and academic exchanges and information presented at scientific meetings are 
not treated as controlled technical data.”). 
63
JACKSONMACRO 99 PAGES 11/13/2012  9:03 AM 
2012] “BEYOND THE SCOPE” 739 
mathematical or engineering principles,”220 and information 
within the “public domain,” (including newspapers, 
subscriptions, library materials, patents, conferences, meetings 
or seminars, released by government agency), or products of 
“fundamental research. . .ordinarily published and shared 
broadly in the scientific community.”221 The 2011 ITAR, 
however, provides an exception to “fundamental research” 
disclosure if: “(i) The University or its researchers accept other 
restrictions on publication of scientific or technical information 
resulting from the project or activity, or (ii) The research is 
funded by the U.S. Government and specific access and 
dissemination controls protecting information resulting from 
the research are applicable.”222 Another exception to the 
fundamental research “export exception” is fundamental 
proprietary research, even if sponsored by private commercial 
interests and conducted at public and private universities.223 
Since fundamental research may not, at its onset, envision any 
 
220. Technical Data, 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(1)-(5) (2011). 
 
(a) Technical data means, for purposes of this subchapter: 
Technical data means, for purposes of this subchapter: 
(1) Information, other than software as defined in § 
120.10(a)(4), which is required for the design, development, 
production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, 
testing, maintenance or modification of defense articles. 
This includes information in the form of blueprints, 
drawings, photographs, plans, instructions or 
documentation. 
(2) Classified information relating to defense articles and 
defense services; 
(3) Information covered by an invention secrecy order; 
(4) Software as defined in § 121.8(f) of this subchapter 
directly related to defense articles; 
(5) This definition does not include information concerning 
general scientific, mathematical or engineering principles 
commonly taught in schools, colleges and universities or 
information in the public domain as defined in § 120.11. It 
also does not include basic marketing information on 
function or purpose or general system descriptions of 
defense articles. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
221. 22 C.F.R. § 120.11(a)(1)-(8) (2011). 
222. Id. at § 120.11(a)(8) (emphasis added). 
223. FINK REPORT, supra note 83. 
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proprietary outcome, this exception is indeed problematic for 
academic institutions’ export compliance. Exports, defined in 
the ITAR, expressly includes any form of disclosure, “oral or 
visual or transfer.”224 
 
b.    “Deemed Exports” 
 
Deemed exports are generally intangibles, broadly defined 
as delivering information or allowing access or use of export-
controlled components by non-U.S. persons within the U.S.,225 
or abroad.226 Sensitive information subject to non-disclosure or 
license to disclose includes information non-U.S. persons: 
 
might be expected to take . . . with them in their 
heads or personal notes when they leave the 
United States at some future time, providing the 
information or access to them was “deemed” to be 
an export for regulatory purposes. In this way, 
the reach of the [various federal agencies’ export 
control] lists was extended to many activities 
conducted entirely within the United States, and 
not just to activities of exporting goods and 
services.227 
 
Deemed exports have their origin in The National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,228 authorized by the 
Inspectors General of the Departments of Commerce, Defense, 
Energy, and State, in consultation with Directors of the CIA 
(Central Intelligence Agency) and FBI (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation), to conduct a multiyear assessment of the 
 
224. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a) (2011). 
225. COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY ET AL, BEYOND FORTRESS 
AMERICA: NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN A 
GLOBALIZED WORLD 22 nn.11, 32-33, Appendices F, H (2009). 
226. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(4) (2011) (“(a) Export means: (4) Disclosing 
(including oral or visual disclosure) or transferring technical data to a foreign 
person, whether in the United States or abroad.”). 
227. COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY ET AL., supra note 225, at 33-
34. 
228. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. 
106-65, 113 Stat. 512 (1999). 
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adequacy of current controls and counterintelligence measures 
to prevent acquisition of sensitive U.S. technology and 
technical information by countries and entities.229 Many of 
these agencies’ reports remain either classified or publicly 
unavailable.230 
In 2006, Arthur Bienenstock, Past-President of the 
American Physical Society, Director of the Wallenburg 
Research Link and professor at the Stanford Synchrotron 
Radiation Laboratory [among his numerous titles], reviewed 
the impact of the “deemed export” Policy on Stanford to the 
Deemed Export Advisory Committee (DEAC), of the 
Association of American Universities (AAU), concluding: 
“negative consequences [of deemed export policies] for the 
nation [are] far greater than positive.”231 
 
229. Memorandum from Michael C. Kane, Assoc. Adm’r for Mgmt. and 
Admin., to Alfred K. Walter, Acting Assistant Inspector Gen. for Inspections 
and Special Inquiries, (Mar. 31, 2004), in OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS AND SPECIAL 
INQUIRIES, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, INSPECTION REPORT: CONTRACTOR 
COMPLIANCE WITH DEEMED EXPORT CONTROLS 10-11 (2004), available at 
http://energy.gov/ig/downloads/inspection-report-contractor-compliance-
deemed-export-controls-doeig-0645: 
 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2000 requires that between 2000 and 2007[,] the President 
shall submit to Congress and annual report to include a 
review that examines export control issues by the Offices of 
Inspector General (OIGs) of the Departments of Energy, 
Commerce, State, and Defense. For 2004, the OIGs for these 
agencies and the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Central Intelligence Agency reviewed compliance by 
contractors and universities with deemed export controls for 
access to unclassified technologies. Release to a foreign 
national of technology or software that is subject to the 
Export Administration Regulations is "deemed to be an 
export" to the home country of the foreign national. Release 
includes visual access by foreign nationals to United States-
origin equipment and facilities and oral exchange of 
information. 
 
Id.; COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY ET AL., supra note 225, at 22 n.11. 
230. COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY ET AL., supra note 225, at 22 
n.11. 
231. Arthur Bienenstock (Profile), STANFORD UNIV., 
http://fsi.stanford.edu/people/arthurbienenstock (last visited Apr. 12, 2012); 
Arthur Bienenstock, Stanford Univ., Presentation to the Deemed Export 
Advisory Committee: Deemed Exports: An Academic’s View (Jan. 22, 2006), 
66http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
JACKSONMACRO 99 PAGES 11/13/2012  9:03 AM 
742 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
In assessing the negative impact of “deemed exports,” 
Professor Bienenstock noted that thirty three percent of 
Stanford’s graduate students are non-U.S. from ninety four 
foreign countries; that Stanford’s contracts and grants cannot 
restrict publication nor limit participants in research based on 
nationality, religion, gender, etc.; both faculty advisors and 
students working on integrated research projects must have 
access to confidential data to participate fully in the research; 
and Department of Commerce must provide an accurate and 
readily available list of technical manuals “not publicly 
 
available at www.aau.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=1536 (follow 
“Bienenstock Presentation at DEAC Meeting,” dated January 22, 2006). 
Among the negative consequences of “deemed export controls” Bienenstock 
listed are: foreign students treated as second-class on campus: readily 
identifiable (badges, etc.), limited access to controlled instruments; will 
discourage students from US universities; will discourage faculty with 
controlled equipment from supervising foreign students; U.S. is dependent on 
foreign students for its S & T (science and technology) workforce; students on 
temporary visas earned about one-third (32%) of all S & E (science and 
engineering) doctorates awarded in the U.S. in 2003; more than half (55%) of 
engineering doctorates were awarded to students on temporary visas; 
historically, half or more of students on temporary visas have stayed in the 
United States immediately after degree conferral, with this percentage 
increasing in recent years. See also Jacob N. Shapiro & David A. Siegel, Is 
This Paper Dangerous? Balancing Secrecy and Openness in Counterterrorism, 
19 SECURITY STUD. 66, 94, 98 (2010) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~jns/publications/Is%20This%20Paper%20Dangero
us.pdf: 
 
[Federal] officials do not generally believe changes in the 
level of security have increased security. Sixty-seven 
percent of our respondents report secrecy has increased 
since 2000, and [thirty] percent report it has remained the 
same. At the same time, [sixty] percent of our respondents 
report that the changes in information control have had no 
effect or a negative effect on the safety of society from 
terrorism. This perception is not consistent with the 
hypothesis that changes have been driven by a well-
reasoned effort to increase security. . . . One federal official 
neatly summarized a more nuanced approach: “Secrecy does 
not necessarily increase security. Although it may deny 
information to our adversaries, it also denies information to 
those who need access; perhaps decreasing our ability to 
protect ourselves; perhaps decreasing the level of trust our 
citizens have in government.” 
 
Id.(emphasis added). 
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available,” subject to deemed export restriction [over 30,000 
instruments at Stanford would need to be examined as possibly 
deemed export-restricted].232 
Deemed exports have been broadly defined to include 
disclosure of materials and methods in peer-reviewed scientific 
journal research articles; peer review of scientific research 
manuscripts for peer-reviewed journal publication (to include 
mere correction of faulty English grammar); peer review by 
U.S. scientists of research by scientists in certain foreign 
countries; scientific communication with research science peers 
in the U.S. and overseas (for example, at seminars or scientific 
meetings); collaborative scientific research with “foreign” 
scientists to include naturalized U.S. university faculty and 
students (under the “deemed exports” policy restriction).233 In 
short, most activities intrinsic to scientific research, to include 
all the most common forms of scientific disclosure, may be 
deemed by one of several federal agencies’ various policies to 
violate certain export restrictions.234 
 
232. Presentation to the Deemed Export Advisory Committee: Deemed 
Exports: An Academic’s View, supra 231; see also COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND 
PROSPERITY ET AL., supra note 225, at 32-37. The sharply rising Export 
Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs, numbering close to 500 in 2008) are 
taken from the annual editions of the Code of Federal Regulations: 15 C.F.R. 
774 Supplement 1 (2011). 
 
The relationship between the number of ECCNs and 
number of controlled goods is neither direct nor proportional 
and is influenced by several variables, including the breadth 
of products and goods controlled and the list of destination 
countries defined for each ECCN. The [Department of 
Commerce] Control List (CCL) is not in fact an explicit list 
of commercial items to be controlled and is instead a list of 
technology descriptions that may qualify a product for 
export [restriction]. A cross-reference between the ECCN 
and common product types is included with the current 
CCL, but it clearly states it is not an exhaustive list. 
 
COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY ET AL., supra note 225, at 33 (emphasis 
added). 
233. NORRIS, supra note 212 (this AAU/COGR report cites the text of the 
laws, regulations and policies). 
234. COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY, supra note 225, at 32-37. 
 
Our former unilateral strategy of containment and isolation 
of our adversaries is, under current conditions, a self-
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c.     Patent Secrecy Orders: The Invention Secrecy 
Act of 1951235 
 
The Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 permits the federal 
government to place “secrecy orders” on a patent application.236 
The latter results in both restricted disclosure of the invention 
and withholding the grant of the patent.237 There are several 
types of secrecy orders, ranging lowest to highest, from 
prohibitions on export (but allowing other “business purposes” 
disclosure), to classification or prohibition of all disclosure.238 
Since the Invention Secrecy Act’s effective date, invention 
secrecy orders have steadily increased to a high of 5241 in 
effect in FY (fiscal year) 2011.239 The Invention Secrecy Act is 
not restricted to public interests in government inventions but 
applies broadly also to private inventions which “might in the 
opinion of the Commissioner of Patents, be detrimental to the 
 
destructive strategy of obsolescence and declining economic 
competitiveness. A strategy of international engagement is 
a path to prosperity that can be coupled with a smart 
approach to security using an adaptive system of 
government regulation and incentives. 
 
Id. at 81. 
235. The Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-256, 66 Stat. 3 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (2006)). 
236. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2006) provides that: 
 
Whenever publication or disclosure by the publication of an 
application or by the grant of a patent on an invention in 
which the Government has a property interest might, in the 
opinion of the head of the interested Government agency, be 
detrimental to the national security, the Commissioner of 
Patents upon being so notified shall order that the invention 
be kept secret and shall withhold the publication of the 
application or the grant of a patent therefore under the 
conditions set forth hereinafter. 
 
Id. 
237. Id. 
238. See generally STEVEN AFTERGOOD, FED. OF AM. SCIENTISTS, 
INVENTION SECRECY (2011), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/invention/index.html (contains cross-links to 
official government documents’ references). 
239. Id. 
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national security.”240 
The Invention Secrecy Act limits a secrecy order time 
period to a period of one year, but provides for additional 
renewal of secrecy status “for additional periods of one year 
upon notification by the head of the department or the chief 
officer of the agency who caused the order to be issued.”241 
There are substantial penalties for the inventor who discloses 
by publication or by filing overseas in violation of a secrecy 
order, including the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office holding 
the patent “abandoned”; “a forfeiture by the applicant, his 
successors, assigns, or legal representatives, or anyone in 
privity with him or them of all claims”;242 and possible criminal 
penalties.243 
 
2.     “Sensitive but Unclassified” (“Controlled Unclassified 
Information”): Executive Agency and/or Academic 
Institution Publication Preclusion 
 
Albeit not defined in statutory law,244 “Sensitive But 
Unclassified” information, or SBU, was technically defined in 
2009 “to refer collectively to [the approximately 117] 
designations used within the Federal Government for 
documents and information that are sufficiently sensitive to 
warrant some level of protection, but do not meet the standards 
for National Security Classification.”245 “Controlled But 
Unclassified Information,” or CUI, was defined as: 
 
A category designation that refers to unclassified 
information that does not meet the standards for 
National Security Classification under Executive 
Order 12,958, as amended, but is (i) pertinent to 
 
240. 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (2006). 
241. Id. at § 181. 
242. Id. at § 182. 
243. See id. at § 186. 
244. KNEZO, supra note 214, at 2. 
245. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFO., 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 n.2, 33-34 (2009) (SBU definition given on 
first page and“SBU Markings Currently in Use” in Appendix), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/cui_task_force_rpt.pdf (last visited July 12, 2012). 
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the national interests of the United States or to 
the important interests of entities outside the 
Federal Government, and (ii) under law or policy 
requires protection from unauthorized disclosure, 
special handling safeguards, or prescribed limits 
on exchange or dissemination.246 
 
Publication restrictions precluding research science 
disclosure based on increasing government classification and 
non-classified denial of disclosure predate 9/11.247 While 
detailed information security history is beyond the scope of this 
review, a brief security history overview is material to the 
current status of attribution, integrity, retraction, and 
disclosure intellectual rights restrictions pertaining to U.S. 
scientific research.248 
President Ronald Reagan’s Executive Order 12,356, signed 
by the President on April 2, 1982, greatly broadened authority 
to classify information.249 As previously discussed, however, 
President Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive 189, 
National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and 
Engineering Information, ostensibly remains in force post-
9/11:250 
 
246. Id. at1 n.2 
247. See Austin Harris, Square Information, Round Characterization: 
Executive Order 13,556 and Its Implementation Challenges, 1 UNIV. MIAMI 
NAT’L. SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. 150, 158-61 (2010-2011); see also 
KNEZO, supra note 214. 
248. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 245, at 6-7 n.12; see KEVIN R. 
KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 97-771, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION POLICY 
AND PROCEDURE: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED (2009), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/97-771.pdf. 
249. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874, 14,875 (1982): 
 
If there is reasonable doubt about the need to classify 
information, it shall be safeguarded as if it were classified 
pending a determination by an original classification 
authority . . . . If there is reasonable doubt about the 
appropriate level of classification, it shall be safeguarded at 
the higher level of classification . . . . 
 
Id.; see also National Security Information, 47 Fed Reg. 27,836 (June 25, 
1982) (to be codified at 32 CFR pt. 2001). 
250. GATHERING STORM, supra note 21, at 104-06 (“The NSDD-189 policy 
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It is the policy of this Administration that, to the 
maximum extent possible, the products of 
fundamental research remain unrestricted. It is 
also the policy of this Administration that, where 
the national security requires control, the 
mechanism for control of information generated 
during federally-funded fundamental research in 
science, technology and engineering at colleges, 
universities and laboratories is classification. 
Each federal government agency is responsible 
for: a) determining whether classification is 
appropriate prior to the award of a research 
grant, contract, or cooperative agreement and, if 
so, controlling the research results through 
standard classification procedures; b) periodically 
reviewing all research grants, contracts, or 
cooperative agreements for potential 
classification. No restrictions may be placed upon 
the conduct or reporting of federally-funded 
fundamental research that has not received 
national security classification, except as 
provided in applicable U.S. Statutes.251 
 
Post-9/11, the freedom to publish scientific research often 
seems to turn on each agency’s interpretation of whether 
science research is “fundamental research,”252 rather than on 
 
remains in force and has been reaffirmed by senior officials [Condoleeza Rice] 
of the [then] current [George W. Bush] administration, but it appears to be at 
odds with other policy developments and some recent practices.”). 
251. National Security Decision Directive 189 (Sep. 21, 1985), available 
at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-189.htm (emphasis added). 
252. See, e.g., Letter from John J. Young, Dir., Def. Contract Audit 
Agency, to Sec’ys of the Military Dep’t (June 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.ogrd.wsu.edu/documents/DOD.pdf. This letter defines 
“fundamental research” as follows: 
 
“Fundamental research” means basic and applied research 
in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily 
are published and shared broadly within the scientific 
community, as distinguished from proprietary research and 
from industrial development, design, production, and 
product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are 
restricted for proprietary or national security reasons . . . . 
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whether “research that has not received a national security 
classification.”253 
 
The definition of "contracted fundamental research" in a 
DoD grant or contractual context is established by 
References (a) and (b) and is defined as follows: 
"'Contracted Fundamental Research' includes research 
performed under grants and contracts that are (a) funded by 
budget Category 6.1 ("Research"), whether performed by 
universities or industry or (b) funded by budget Category 
6.2 ("Exploratory Development") and performed on-campus 
at a university. The research shall not be considered 
fundamental in those rare and exceptional circumstances 
where the 6.2 funded effort presents a high likelihood of 
disclosing performance characteristics of military systems 
or manufacturing technologies that are unique and critical 
to defense, and where agreement on restrictions have been 
recorded in the contract or grant." 
The terms "budget category 6.1" ("Research") and "budget 
category 6.2" ("Exploratory Development") have been 
replaced by Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
Budget Activity 1 (Basic Research) and 2 (Applied 
Research). With this clarification, these references continue 
to define national and DoD policy on the transfer [including 
publication] of the products of contracted fundamental 
research. 
 
Id. See generally KNEZO, supra note 214 (There appears to be lack of 
consensus whether SBU should be classified; and whether SBU controls 
adversely affect scientific communication.). 
253. KNEZO, supra note 214, at 1; see also Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Supplement, DFARS Procedures, Guidance and Information, PGI 
204(3)(ii), available at 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfars/changenotice/2008/20080721/pgi-
changes-07212008.pdf: 
 
(i) NSDD 189 establishes a national policy that, to the 
maximum extent possible, the products of fundamental 
research shall remain unrestricted. NSDD 189 provides that 
no restrictions may be placed upon the conduct or reporting 
of federally funded fundamental research that has not 
received national security classification, except as provided 
in applicable U.S. statutes. As a result, contracts confined to 
the performance of unclassified fundamental research 
generally do not involve any export-controlled items, 
information, or technology. 
(ii) NSDD 189 does not take precedence over statutes. 
NSDD 189 does not exempt any research, whether basic, 
fundamental, or applied, from statutes that apply to export 
controls such as the Arms Export Control Act, the Export 
Administration Act of 1979, as amended, or the U.S. 
73
JACKSONMACRO 99 PAGES 11/13/2012  9:03 AM 
2012] “BEYOND THE SCOPE” 749 
Restriction on disclosure, to include research science, may 
be divided into two broad categories: classified, denoted by the 
government with specific markings; and unclassified, which 
includes about 117 “ad hoc, agency-specific” subtypes, defined 
by individual agencies’ policies.254 It is the latter, most often 
restricting modern U.S. research science disclosure, i.e. the 
broad category designated either as: “unclassified but 
sensitive” (“UBS”), or “Controlled Unclassified Information” 
(“CUI”).255 Modern CUI/UBS may include, but is not limited to, 
such executive agency “inefficient, confusing patchwork”256 as: 
“attorney client, IT [Information Technology] security-related, 
trade secret [and other intellectual research science property], 
bomb tech sensitive, controlled nuclear information, chemical-
terrorism vulnerability information, and protected 
infrastructure information.”257 It is the ad hoc agency-specific 
denial of research science disclosure invoking UBS or CUI 
restriction blamed for harm to U.S. research innovation, 
particularly post-9/11.258 
In Executive Order 13,526, dated December 29, 2009, 
 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or the 
regulations that implement those statutes (the ITAR and 
the EAR). Thus, if export-controlled items, information, or 
technology is used to conduct research, the export control 
laws and regulations apply to the controlled items, 
information, or technology. 
 
Id. 
254. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 245, at app. 2, 33-34; see also 
Harris, supra note 247, at 157. 
255. Harris, supra note 247, at 158-61. Federal employee job 
performance rating for conformance with CUI Framework policies may be a 
material factor promoting research science disclosure self-censorship or 
“chilling” factor; see also PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 245, at 23-24. 
256. Exec. Order No. 13,556, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,675 (Nov. 4, 2010). 
257. Harris, supra note 247, at 158 (internal citations omitted); see also 
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 245. 
258. Exec. Order No. 13,556, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,675, § 1 (Nov. 4, 2010) 
(“This inefficient, confusing patchwork has resulted in inconsistent markings 
and safeguarding of documents, led to unclear or unnecessarily restrictive 
dissemination policies, and created impediments to authorized information 
sharing. The fact that these agency-specific policies are often hidden from 
public view only aggravated these issues.”) (emphasis added). See generally 
GATHERING STORM, supra note 21, at 70, 83-84, 104-05, 186-92; REVISITED 
STORM, supra note 21. 
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President Barack Obama revoked prior more restrictive 
executive orders regarding national security information.259 
Executive Order 13,526 does not specifically address 
“unclassified but sensitive” scientific research. In Executive 
Order 13,556 of November 4, 2010, President Obama recently 
addressed the research science publication problem of the non-
classified publication preclusion, i.e. “Controlled Unclassified 
Information.”260 It is too soon after the 2009-2010 executive 
policy changes to evaluate the impact on U.S. scientific 
research innovation, the latter severely harmed by post-9/11 
disclosure restrictions.261 
 
 
 
 
 
259. Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009): 
 
Section 1.1 Classification Standards 
(b) If there is significant doubt about the need to classify 
information, it shall not be classified . . . . 
Sec. 1.5 Duration of Classification 
(d) No information may remain classified indefinitely . . . . 
Sec. 1.7 Classification Prohibitions and Limitations 
(b) Basic scientific research information not clearly related 
to the national security shall not be classified . . . . 
Sec. 1.8 Classification Changes 
(c) Documents required to be submitted for prepublication 
review or other administrative process pursuant to an 
approved nondisclosure agreement are not covered by this 
section [Classification Challenges]. 
 
Id. 
260. Exec. Order No. 13,556, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,675, § 1 (Nov. 4, 2010); see 
also Harris, supra note 247. 
261. EXEC. AGENCY, CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION (CUI) 
OFFICE NOTICE 2011-01: INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE FOR EXECUTIVE 
ORDER 13,556 (2011), available at www.archives.gov/cui/.../2011-cuio-notice-
2011-01-initial-guidance.pdf; see also CUI Chronology, CONTROLLED 
UNCLASSIFIED INFO., http:/www.archives.gov/cui/chronology.html (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2012) (“[I]n May 2008, the Archivist of the United States established 
the CUI Office within NARA [National Archives and Records] to act as the 
CUI Executive Agent (EA).”). See generally GATHERING STORM, supra note 21, 
at 70, 83-84, 104-105, 186-192; REVISITED STORM, supra note 21; COMM. ON 
SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY, supra note 225; PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra 
note 245. 
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3.     “Dual Use”: When Basic Life Sciences Research May 
Have Applied Use 
 
“Dual use” has been defined as scientific research that has 
both civil and military applications and is subject to one or 
more agencies’ policy control regimes.262 The Bureau of 
Industry and Security (BIS) within the Department of 
Commerce is charged with regulating dual use exports.263 The 
BIS licensing is accomplished in consultation with, e.g. review 
by Defense Technology Security Agency in the Department of 
Defense, and referral by Depart of State.264 For research 
scientists, “dual use” is a broad and ill-defined research 
category,265 admittedly failing to reflect advances in technology, 
and failing to reflect foreign availability of dual use items.266 
Shared responsibility for dual use determination further 
creates uncertainty as to which agency controls licensing 
determination.267 Finally, research scientists and research 
organizations may not appeal denial, because there is no 
judicial review of licensing decisions.268 
 
 
262. FINK REPORT, supra note 83, at 105; see also NAT’L INSTS. OF 
HEALTH, OFFICE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY ACTIVITIES, NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR 
BIOSECURITY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS No. 14 [hereinafter NSABB], 
available at 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/ibc/FAQs/FAQs%20about%20the%20National%20Sc
ience%20Advisory%20Board%20for%20Biosecurity.pdf: 
 
The NSABB has proposed defining “dual use research of 
concern” as research that, based on current understanding, 
can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, 
products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by 
others to pose a threat to public health, agriculture, plants, 
animals, the environment or materiel. The NSABB has also 
proposed a series of experimental outcomes that should be 
given special consideration for their dual use potential. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
263. FERGUSSON, supra note 216, at 26. 
264. Id. 
265. NSABB, supra note 262, at No. 14. 
266. FERGUSSON, supra note 216, at 26. 
267. Id. 
268. Id. 
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4.     “Self Censorship Chilling” by Peer Reviewed Journal 
Editors of Scientific Findings Deemed to Pose 
Potential Security Risk by Disclosure 
 
Self-regulation of “sensitive” research science disclosure 
post-9/11 was initially based on the 1970s 3-prong model for 
self-regulation of recombinant DNA research: 
 
(1) personal responsibility and accountability 
of the researcher to conduct his or her research 
safely; 
(2) deliberations by a nationally convened 
advisory group to provide recommendations 
regarding biosafety with recombinant DNA 
research; and 
(3) local oversight by the institution through 
a committee of peer researchers and biosafety 
professionals to assure that appropriate 
facilities, practices, personnel, and training were 
in place.269 Post-9/11, the National Academies of 
Sciences published findings and 
recommendations of the 2003 “Fink Report,” 
after the committee chairman, Gerald Fink.270 
 
The 2004 Fink Report advocated “expanded self-
governance by researchers toward issues of biosecurity, as well 
as the formation of a national advisory board to help guide both 
the government and research community in addressing issues 
involving dual use.” 271 The National Science Advisory Board on 
Biosecurity, NSABB, was chartered by the Executive Office of 
the President [George W. Bush] and became fully operational 
in 2005.272 Currently, the mandate of the NSABB, located 
 
269. NEW GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP, supra note 2, at 59-60 (“Although all these 
[3-prong model] components of self-governance and local assurance were 
recommended for all U.S. researchers regardless of affiliation, the practical 
outcome of this system is that only institutions accepting federal funding for 
DNA research are obligated to use this model of oversight.”). 
270. FINK REPORT, supra note 83, at 115. 
271. NEW GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP, supra note 2, at 60. 
272. Id. at 60-61. 
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within the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Office of the 
Director NIH, Office of Biotechnology Activities, has been 
restricted to “oversight of dual use biological research,”273 and a 
limited renewable charter of two-year intervals.274 The NSABB 
mandate has been increasingly narrowed in scope from that 
initially proposed in the “Fink Report” of 2004.275 
The Fink Report also recommended peer-reviewed science 
journals “refrain from publishing ‘dangerous’ research or delete 
some data [to include materials and methods] from published 
research results in order to preclude others from replicating 
the results.” 276 The Fink Report further broadly recommended 
virtually every aspect of research science disclosure be 
subjected to restriction: 
 
In addition to the results of fundamental 
research, the compilation, synthesis, and 
assessment of already published results in review 
articles may provide an understanding of a field 
that could guide or assist terrorists. Even more 
difficult are concerns raised by reports that 
result when scientists are assembled [e.g. at 
professional scientific society meetings] to render 
their judgment as experts about particular 
problems, even when they rely completely on 
 
273. NSABB, supra note 262, at No. 14. 
 
The NSABB has proposed defining “dual use research of 
concern” as research that, based on current understanding, 
can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, 
products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied 
by others to pose a threat to public health, agriculture, 
plants, animals, the environment or materiel. The NSABB 
has also proposed a series of experimental outcomes that 
should be given special consideration for their dual use 
potential. 
 
Id. 
274. Id. 
275. Id.; see also FINK REPORT, supra note 83, at 95 (The NSABB 
meeting pertains to “insider threats at facilities that conduct research with 
highly pathogenic agents”). 
276. FINK REPORT, supra note 83, at 96. 
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open sources of information.277 
 
Professional peer-reviewed journals’ responses to the Fink 
Report recommendations appear guardedly negative. For the 
eleven journals it publishes, the American Society for 
Microbiology (ASM) rejected restriction on material and 
methods information section of peer reviewed research 
articles.278 The ASM did institute formal procedures as part of 
the peer-review process to allow reviewers to “address potential 
risks of the research results to national security.” 279 Other 
science peer-reviewed journals have also “moved to develop [a 
security] review procedure of their own.” 280 
An executive agency, Department of Defense (hereinafter, 
DoD), proposed in 2002 “that researchers be required ‘to obtain 
DoD approval to discuss or publish findings of all military-
sponsored unclassified research.’”281 The scientific research 
community response severely criticized the latter DoD proposal 
prompting DoD withdrawal.282 Department of Defense 5230.27 
and 5230.29, affirmed on May 2010 and January 2009, 
respectively, reflect ostensible intent to adhere to the principle 
of public access to unclassified government research, while 
apparently retaining [by reference] prior agency policies and/or 
processes, restricting unclassified science disclosure.283 The 
 
277. Id. at 96-97 (emphasis added). 
278. Id. at 97. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. 
281. Id. at 101 n.1. 
282. Id. 
283. Presentation of DoD-Related Scientific and Technical Papers at 
Meetings, Instruction 5230.27 (Dep’t of Def. Oct. 6, 1987) (affirmed May 24, 
2010), available at http://www.ogrd.wsu.edu/documents/DOD.pdf; Security 
and Policy Review of DoD Information for Public Release, Instruction 5230.29 
(Dep’t of Def. Jan. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/523029p.pdf; see also NORRIS, 
supra note 212; KNEZO, supra note 214, at 47: 
 
[T]he Depart of Defense reportedly plans to reissue its 
guidelines relating to pre-publication review of extramural 
research it funds outside of its own laboratories. Recently 
several university groups wrote a letter to the Director of 
the Office of Science and Technology Policy complaining 
that more agency program officials are inserting pre-
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federal agencies push for—with unquestionable push back-
resistance of the research community–to allow “voluntary” or 
federal research support “contract clauses” to limit open and 
full scientific disclosure continue post-9/11 and to the profound 
detriment of U.S. research innovation.284 
Continually-shifting policies regarding science disclosure 
post 9/11, coupled with the vague broad definitions of 
“fundamental” and “unclassified sensitive” research science, 
have served to profoundly “chill” science innovation and to 
discourage scientists from the pursuit of research affected by 
U.S. government nondisclosure policies mandated 
nondisclosure .285 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
publication review clauses into contracts, including 
fundamental research, without explanation as to their 
justification. This has “pernicious effects,” they said, “not 
only with regard to the freedom to publish but also with 
regard to employment of foreign-born students and 
researchers on the federally funded research projects.” 
 
Id. 
284. Instruction 5230.27, supra note 283; Instruction 5230.29, supra 
note 283; NORRIS, supra note 212; KNEZO, supra note 214, at 47; see also 
REVISITED STORM, supra note 21; COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY ET AL., 
supra note 225; PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 245; Simoncelli & 
Stanley, supra note 82, at 33 (“[N]o administration should use its power to 
censor, obstruct, tamper with of distort the findings of scientists to fit its 
political agenda. Federal science-based agencies must retain the capacity to 
carry out independent scientific research and should not be subjected to 
political influence in establishing peer-review standards.”). See generally 
GATHERING STORM, supra note 21, at 70, 83-84, 104-05, 186-92. 
285. DoD 5230.27 , supra note 283; DoD Instruction 5230.29, supra note 
283; NORRIS, supra note 212; KNEZO, supra note 214, at 47; SIMONCELLI & 
STANLEY, supra note 82, at 33. 
80http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
JACKSONMACRO 99 PAGES 11/13/2012  9:03 AM 
756 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
C. Constitutional and Federal Law: U.S. Moral Rights Denial
 Creates Legal Anomalies and Apparent Conflict of Law
 Regarding Intellectual Property Created by Research
 Scientists 
 
1.     U.S. Government and Industry Practice Appears to 
Violate Scientists’ First Amendment Rights and 
Article I, § 8, cl. 8, and May Place Scientists in 
Potential Catch-22 Situation: Either to Violate 
Professional Ethical Standards or to Abruptly 
Foreclose Employment 
 
There is no copyright in works of the United States.286 
“[C]opyright law prohibits any copyright in works of the U.S. 
government.”287 One reason given for the prohibiton is the 
concern for government censorship of information in violation 
of the First Amendment.288 Professor Pollack argues that the 
founding fathers intended the Constitution’s art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8, 
copyright and patent provisions to be read in pari materia with 
the First Amendment.289 The copyright clause when so read, 
would equate “progress” with “dissemination” and could have 
no potential to support censorship because “Congress was 
empowered only to enact copyright statutes that disseminated 
knowledge.” 290 Restriction on research a scientist’s First 
Amendment disclosure for the public benefit may also be 
limited by commercial sources providing scientific research 
support.291 
 
286. 17 U.S.C. § 101(iii)(C) (2006). 
287. 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:54 (2009) (“Current 
copyright law prohibits any copyright in works of the U.S. government (a 
defined term). The origin of this prohibition may be traced back to the 19th 
century, when both statutory and judicial opinions began to shape the area.”); 
see also 17 U.S.C. § 101(iii)(C). 
288. Malla Pollack, The Democratic Public Domain: Reconnecting the 
Modern First Amendment and the Original Progress Clause (A.K.A. Copyright 
and Patent Clause) 45 JURIMETRICS J. 24, 45 (2004). 
289. Id. 
290. Id. at 30. 
291. Melese, supra note 5, at 15 (“[T]he high costs and risks associated 
with discovering and bringing a new drug to market and the potential 
financial rewards for doing so encourage pharmaceutical companies to retain, 
sequester, and control enabling intellectual property.”). 
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One familiar challenge for federal scientists occurs when 
the scientist’s research findings contradict a strongly held 
position of senior supervisors, who may include political 
appointees.292 Professional ethical standards expressly require 
the scientist to “give the decision-maker a frank, 
understandable description of the science.”293 However, such 
situations often in fact place the government researcher in the 
position of acquiescing in clear professional breach of research 
integrity (e.g. knowing fraudulent distortion of research record 
in acquiescence to a superior’s order).294 Any knowing 
distortion of the research record (even to placate a supervisor) 
if/when revealed would terminate the scientist’s career in 
disgrace or, depending on source of research support, could 
subject him to devastating “science misconduct” action.295 The 
alternative, is the scientist immediately quits his/her job to 
foreclose the scientist’s supervisor-coerced participation in 
knowing scientific fraud.296 
Modern research networks linking federal government and 
 
292. SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 41-43: 
 
In recent years, the federal national laboratories have been 
subject to reviews which have recommended reduction in 
size, narrowing scope, and, in some cases, closing. These 
pressures, not common in academia, lead to implicit and 
sometimes explicit demands of loyalty to the organization. 
One pressure can be less-than-objective regarding results 
which may go against the desires of the leaders or funders 
of the organization….A more difficult challenge comes when 
a scientist’s position, based on his or her research, 
contradicts a strongly held position of senior political 
appointees. These situations, while perhaps rare, can place 
the government researcher in a dilemma: acquiesce or leave. 
 
Id.; see, e.g., MARK BOWEN, CENSORING SCIENCE, INSIDE THE POLITICAL ATTACK 
ON DR. JAMES HANSEN AND THE TRUTH OF GLOBAL WARMING (2008) (detailing 
the James Hansen case). 
293. SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 41-43. 
294. Id. at 42-43. 
295. See SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 10 
(Applying any or all of the DHHS, NAS, NSF, Commission on Research 
Integrity, and Medical Res. Council-England definitions of “misconduct in 
science,” a scientist‘s distortion of the research record, even under 
supervisor’s order, could render the scientist subject to misconduct charges.) 
296. SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 41-46; 
see BOWEN, supra note 292. 
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industry with academic science research have brought 
restrictions on publication that are arguably 
unconstitutional.297 Corporate and/or agency support may 
similarly come with implicit or mandated restriction that only 
scientific research findings furthering private or executive 
agency interest be disclosed.298 This latter restriction directly 
impacts research science quality and integrity via corporate or 
government agency preclusion against disclosure limited to 
research findings favorable to corporate-, or business- with 
agency collaborative interest, a process arguably risking First 
Amendment challenge as a prior restraint299 against the public 
interest. 
The Commission on Research Integrity proposed definition 
of research misconduct would preclude any  
 
significant behavior that improperly 
appropriates the intellectual property or 
contributions of others, that intentionally 
 
297. SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24 , at 50; see 
also Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Whistle-blowers’ Experiences in Fraud 
Litigation Against Pharmaceutical Companies with Supplemental Appendix, 
NEW ENG. J. MED., May 13, 2010,at 1832, 1839 (a study of “relators” in qui 
tam suits filed under the Federal False Claims Act). 
298. SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 50: 
 
The increasing involvement of industry, through grants and 
other support, has been encouraged by universities. While 
financially advantageous, and bringing faculty into contact 
with practical problems, these industrial links have brought 
restrictions on publication and other challenges to academic 
freedom. An early proponent has cautioned that “the price of 
corporate support is eternal vigilance.” 
 
Id. 
299. See generally IOANNIS G. DIMITRAKOPOULOS, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND 
LIBERTIES UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: THE CASE LAW OF THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT 531-32 (2007) (citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 
(1993)) ([“The term prior restraint is used] . . .’ to describe administrative and 
judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of 
the time that such communications are to occur.’”); see also Freedman v. 
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (“[A non-criminal prior restraint upon 
expression] . . .’avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under 
procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship 
system.’”). 
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impedes the progress of research, or risks 
corrupting the research record or compromising 
the integrity of research practices. Such 
behaviors are unethical and unacceptable in 
proposing, conducting, or reporting research, or 
in [peer] reviewing the proposals and research 
reports of others.300 
 
However, the PHS policy of asserting institutional control 
over intellectual property of research scientists working under 
federal grants as property of the grantee institution, and not 
the research scientist creator-inventor, arguably facilitates the 
sort of detrimental restrictive disclosure that the policy was 
supposed to prevent. 
The latter DHHS research misconduct definition in accord 
with 42 C.F.R. §§ 50 and 93 appears to preclude both the latter 
government and commercial industry practices, posing 
material risk to distort or preclude science disclosure. While 
distortion of and preclusion of research science disclosure, 
violate scientific research professional ethical standards, 
published policy of DHHS, and international law’s droit moral 
doctrine re science authors, arguably against public benefit, 
currently there exists no direct or explicit private cause of 
action for such science misconduct in the United States.301 
David Nimmer, citing St. Onge’s definition of plagiarism,302 
sums this situation as follows: 
 
Plagiarism is an intentional fraud committed by 
the psychologically competent that consists of 
copying significant and substantial uncredited 
written materials for unearned advantages with 
no significant enhancement of materials copied. 
That definition does not purport to set forth the 
elements for a tort at law. Rather, it expresses 
 
300. SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 10 
(quoting RYAN REPORT, supra note 195). 
301. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 76-77 n.453. 
302. ONGE, supra note 22, at 39 (“[A]cademic plagiarism is a capital 
offense, punishable by academic death for student or faculty. With or without 
warnings.”). 
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“house rules” that certain guilds –notably 
academics [to include research scientists]-but 
other domains as well. . .have accepted upon 
themselves. Those who cross the line risk not 
liability in court to the general public, but rather 
being defrocked from the particular priesthood 
which maintains its special rules. . ..even there, 
it is only the extreme case. . .that will lose her 
job (although one who habitually cribs from 
other’s writings may, over time, develop a 
deserved reputation for academic shoddiness).303 
 
The message from Nimmer is clear: absent inalienable 
moral rights to attribution, integrity, and first disclosure 
(which confer standing), there exists no recognized cause of 
action in fact under law for research science misconduct 
plagiarism, or right to attribution for actual authors. 304 
 
2.     U.S. Work Made for Hire (Copyright) 
 
In the U.S.A., under the “work made for hire doctrine” of 
the 1976 Act, the employer is considered the author of an 
employee’s creative work.305 The latter doctrine distinguishes 
 
303. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 69-70 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
304. Id. 
305. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(a)-(b) (2006). Section 101 states: 
 
A “work of the United States Government” is a work 
prepared by an officer or employee of the United States 
Government as part of that person’s official duties. A “work 
made for hire” is (1) a work prepared by an employee within 
the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially 
ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a 
collective work,…if the parties expressly agree in a written 
instrument signed by them that the work shall be 
considered a work made for hire. 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(a)-(b) 
provide: (a) Initial Ownership. Copyright in a work 
protected under this title vests initially in the author or 
authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are 
coowners of copyright in the work. (b) Works Made for Hire. 
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other 
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the 
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the U.S.A., from every other nation, because the U.S.A.’s “work 
for hire” doctrine effectively grants the “whole bundle of sticks” 
of intellectual property rights (all moral and all economic 
rights) of an employee’s creation to the employer.306 The 
Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104(c) expressly precludes 
expansion or reduction of either Title 17 or common law rights 
in reliance on the provisions of the Berne Convention. 
However, the 1976 Copyright Act significantly modified the 
definition of “work made for hire” to modify or eliminate the 
presumption of the 1909 Act favoring rights in the employers. 
The changes, however, will not be applied retroactively.307 
Whether a person is an employee for purposes of 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 of the 1976 U.S. Act is determined by principles of the 
common law of agency.308 
 
A work made for hire is defined in 17 
U.S.C. § 101 of the 1976 U.S. Act as: 
 
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the 
scope of his or her employment; or 
 
 
author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have 
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed 
by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright. 
(emphasis added). 
 
Id. 
306. STERLING, supra note 26, at 1209; Dennis Angel & Samuel W. 
Tannenbaum, Works Made for Hire Under S. 22, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 209, 
210-11 (“An established principle of both common law and statutory 
copyright in the United States is the presumption that the copyright in the 
work produced by an employee in the course of his employment vests in his 
employer. By securing copyright in a work, the employer acquires all rights 
under the Copyright Act.”) (citations omitted). 
307. See Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 961 (1983) (retroactive application of the 1976 Act’s “work made for 
hire” to pre-1978 transactions would raise a due process violation and be a 
taking of property [from the employer] without just compensation); see also 1 
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.11 (2012) (Retroactive application 
of the 1976 Act, effective January 1, 1978, would be a violation of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments and a violation of the Fifth Amendment 
limitation on the federal government’s right to take private property for 
public use absent just compensation). 
308. See 18 C.J.S. Copyrights § 23 (2011). 
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(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for 
use as; 
 
(i) a contribution to a collective work; 
 
(ii) part of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work; 
 
(iii) a translation; 
 
(iv) a supplementary work (i.e. a work for 
publication as a secondary adjunct to a 
work by another author, the term being 
fully defined in the Act); 
 
(v) a compilation; 
 
(vi) an instructional text (term defined in 
the section); 
 
(vii) a test; 
 
(viii) answer material for a test; or 
 
(ix) an atlas, 
 
if the parties expressly agree in a written 
instrument signed by them that the work shall 
be considered a work made for hire.309 
 
The 17 U.S.C. §102(2) is silent on the issue of whether 
there must be a pre-creation writing for assignment of 
copyright. Consequently, courts are split.310 Once a work is 
 
309. STERLING, supra note 26, at 1253. 
310. Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 412 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (holding that the writing must precede the creation of the work); 
see also Armento v. Laser Image, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 719, 750 (W.D.N.C. 1996) 
(requiring the explicit words, “work made for hire”), aff’d, 134 F.3d 362 (4th 
Cir. 1998). But see Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 560 (2d Cir. 
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presumed “made for hire,” the burden shifts so that only a 
written agreement signed by both parties will rebut the 
assignment of rights to the employer, and even then only the 
rights are reassigned; the employer is still considered “the 
author.” 311 
In contrast to the United States of America, if assignment 
of employee rights to an employer is permitted, most civil law 
nations both limit the category of employer (e.g. broadcasters, 
motion picture producers, computer programs) to those 
specifically involved in commercial works involving collective 
endeavors, and also narrowly define rights granted such 
employers to less than all property rights.312 
The USA “work for hire doctrine” is arguably inherently in 
conflict with: (i) the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ 
preclusion of government takings of private property for public 
use without just compensation;313 (ii) 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) which 
forbids “involuntary transfer;” 314 (iii) international treaties 
 
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1010 (1995) (post-creation writing acceptable 
when confirms prior agreement oral or implied). 
311. Mark L. Meyer, To Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful 
Arts: The Protection of and Rights in Scientific Research, 39 IDEA 1, 5 n.24 
(1998) (citing Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 306, at 209, 210 n.5 (1976)). 
312. STERLING, supra note 26, at 1209. 
313. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall…be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 
1: 
 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Id. 
314. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2006) states: 
 
When an individual author’s ownership of copyright, or of 
any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not been 
previously transferred voluntarily by that individual 
author, no action by any governmental body or other official 
or organization purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or 
exercise rights of ownership with respect to the copyright, or 
88http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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binding the U.S.A. as federal law;315 (iv) research science 
professional and regulatory “science misconduct” ethical 
restrictions on authorship to natural authors;316 and (v) 
subsequent patent prerequisites for proof of patent inventor 
and priority in written works.317 
Such plain language conflicts of intellectual property law 
as applied to research science and research scientists would not 
exist but for U.S.A.’s exclusion of research scientists from 
moral rights of attribution and integrity, accorded visual and 
 
any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given 
effect under this title, except as provided under title 11. 
[Title 11 of the United States Code is entitled 
“Bankruptcy.”] 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
315. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, UN. 
Doc. A/RES/810 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2: 
 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which 
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges 
of every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the 
Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). The U.N. Charter, a self-executing treaty, would 
preempt state laws by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, which gives treaties 
the same status as federal law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
if viewed as an extension of the U.N. Charter, would grant individuals 
progressive economic, cultural and social rights (e.g. potential for U.S. 
economic liability under federal law). See also MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD 
MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 172, 174 (2001). 
316. SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 10 
(citing RYAN REPORT, supra note 195, at 15). 
317. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall…be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV : 
 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
 
Id. 
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phonographic artists.318 Professor Kwall summed the U.S. 
current position in refusal to recognize moral rights: 
 
The existence of more substantive moral rights 
protections in both civil and common law 
jurisdictions not only creates a disparity between 
the law in the United States and other countries, 
but also results in situations in which American 
authors find substantially more protection for 
violations of their moral rights abroad than at 
home.319 
 
The latter situation, United States research science lack of 
moral rights recognition in law for research scientists, is 
deemed one, if not the, fundamental factor for current 
American innovation decline, i.e. lack of talent in the U.S.A., 
and not merely lower operating cost outside the U.S.320 
 
 
318. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 24-25. 
319. KWALL, supra note 30, at 37 (emphasis added) (internal citations 
omitted). 
320. See STORM REVISITED, supra note 21, at 46: 
 
Turning to research and development [R&D]-where the 
United States ranks eighth among nations on a per-GDP 
[gross domestic product] basis-government investment has 
declined from two-thirds of the nation’s total expenditure to 
less than one-third. Over half of the United States federal R 
& D spending is defense-related. China has a relatively low 
R&D to GDP ratio-but has more than doubled the figure 
over the past decade, even while growing its GDP 
substantially. Viewing such trends United States research 
universities are increasingly creating ties to what they view 
as the more highly regarded overseas universities. . . . 
United States industrial firms are increasingly adopting 
much the same strategy, building new research facilities 
outside the country. Although this was initially driven by 
the lower cost of operations abroad, it now is often motivated 
by the relative availability of talent. The National Science 
Foundation reports that U.S.-based companies now have 
[twenty-three] percent of their R&D employment located 
abroad. 
 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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3.    Intrinsic Conflict of Law Between Title 17 and Title 35 
for Scientific Research Progressing from Unpublished-
to-Patent 
 
In research science creative sequence, copyright normally 
precedes a patent filing on the subject matter of an invention. 
Unlike copyright in the U.S.A., however, irrespective of 
ownership assignment, a patent by law must be filed and issue 
only in the actual inventor’s name, and not the name of a 
potential assignee of patent rights, e.g. an employer.321 
The patent attribution standard, 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and 
102(f), limit to the natural person inventor, is a higher 
standard than that allowed under copyright to authors under 
title 17 (17 U.S.C.), particularly that given in the “work for 
hire” doctrine. Assuming initial copyright authorship were 
assigned to an employer under “work for hire,” the required 
priority evidentiary proof of first conception and reduction to 
practice, then, is unlikely to reflect the natural person 
inventor. Such a scenario via work for hire would break a 
scientist’s attribution to his creation during the research 
sequence from unpublished labnotes-to-patent-to-manuscript-
publication legally would preclude patent protection. Patent 
 
321. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (essential to prove “known or used” actual 
inventor’s patent priority); 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2006) (patent may be filed only 
in name of actual inventor.); see also Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., 
Inc., 40 F. 3d 1223, 1230-31 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“That is not to say, however, 
that the NIH scientists [defendant-employer] merely acted ’as a pair of hands’ 
[testing the new anti-HIV/AIDS drug, azidothymidine (AZT)] for the 
Burroughs Welcome inventors…[E]nabling disclosure does suffice in this case 
to confirm the inventors [BW] had concluded the mental part of the inventive 
process-that they had arrived at the final, definite idea of their inventions 
[before committing to NIH investigators’ AZT efficacy testing], leaving only 
the task of reduction to practice to bring the inventions to fruition…the NIH 
scientists were not joint inventors of these inventions.”). The recent patent 
reform act, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, passed by the 
Senate on September 8, 2011, signed into law by President Obama on 
September 16, 2011, broadens filing to allow filing by the employer or 
assignee of the actual inventor. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). Various changes in patent law implemented 
by provisions of the America Invents Act, will take effect on differing dates. 
America Invents Act: Effective Dates, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF. (Oct. 5, 
2011), http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/aia-effective-dates.pdf. The 
details for implementation of the America Invents Act are being formulated, 
so are outside the time scope of this review. 
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priority in the U.S.A. is determined by “first to conceive.” 322 
First conceptions, typically unpublished but copyrighted by 
fixation in a tangible medium of expression, logically precede 
“reduction to practice of the operative invention.”323 
Were in arguendo the conception and reduction to practice 
research sequence steps assigned via work for hire authorship 
to an employer, any resultant inventive product or process 
should be legally precluded patent protection by 35 U.S.C. § 
102(a) & (f), requiring the actual inventor-creator be named 
inventor on the patent. In contrast, given accord with Berne 
art. 6 bis, UDHR art. 27, International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) art. 15, intellectual 
property rights granted to the scientist continuously remain 
attributed to the actual scientist creator-inventor during the 
entire research-to-product or research to–process sequence so 
no conflict of title 17 and title 35 would exist.324 
 
4.     Patent “Shop Right,” Employer Paid-Up Use License 
vs. Patent Work Made for Hire, Employer Ownership 
 
Under common law, absent agreement to the contrary, the 
inventor-employee owns the right to an invention even if 
conceived during the course of employment.325 
Work for hire theory provides at least three exceptions to 
the latter rule: 
(1)  an express agreement assigning employee inventions 
to the employer exists; 
(2)  an implied agreement is found because: 
 
322. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (f) (2006); see 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Among its 
many new provisions, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
29, § 3(b), passed by the Senate on September 8, 2011, signed into law by 
President Barak Obama on September 16, 2011, changes U.S. patent law 
from a “first to invent” to a “first to file,” thereby harmonizing U.S. patent 
law with the global majority. See also Glenn Hess, Senate to Revisit Patent 
Reform, CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, Sept. 5, 2011, at 44, 44-46 (2011). 
323. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (f) (2006). 
324. STERLING, supra note 26, at 1248, 1267. 
325. KATHLEEN L. DAERR-BANNON, CAUSE OF ACTION TO ENFORCE 
PREINVENTION ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENTS, CAUSES OF ACTION 2d § 269 (2010) 
(citing Univ. Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 762 F. Supp. 1212, 1219 (E.D. Pa. 
1991)). 
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(a)  employee was “hired to invent;”326 
(b)  employee was tasked to solve a specific problem;327 
(c)  employee served in a fiduciary capacity to the 
employer.328 
 
326. See, e.g., Pedersen v. Akona, LLC, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1141 (D. 
Minn. 2006) (discussing the test to determine whether an employee is “hired 
to invent”): 
 
Although there is a presumption that an inventor owns his 
invention, “employers may still claim employee’s inventive 
work where the employer specifically hires or directs the 
employee to exercise inventive faculties.” . . . “When the 
purpose for employment thus focuses on invention, the 
employee has received full compensation for his or her 
inventive work.” . . . To apply the hired-to-invent doctrine, a 
court must “examine the employment relationship at the 
time of the inventive work to determine if the parties 
entered into an implied-in-fact contract to assign patent 
rights.” . . . “[S]tate contract principles provide the rules for 
identifying and enforcing implied-in-fact contracts.”… “The 
implied-in-fact contract to assign inventive rights is a 
question of fact.” 
 
Id. 
327. See, e.g., McKeen v. Jerdone, 34 App. D.C. 163, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1909) 
(citing Robinson v. McCormick, 29 App. D.C. 98, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1907)) 
(provides the test (“beyond the scope of ordinary training and knowledge”) for 
distinguishing when an employee or his employer is entitled to patent 
claim(s) as inventor based on alleged input from the employer): 
 
It is a well-established principle of the patent law that 
where an inventor [employer] employs another to embody 
his conception in a drawing or in a practical form, he is 
entitled to any improvement thereon due to the mechanical 
skill of the employee….But while an employer is to be 
protected from bad faith of his employee, the employee is 
equally entitled to protection from his employer. If, 
therefore, he goes further than mechanical skill enables him 
to do and makes an actual invention, he is entitled to its 
benefit. “To claim the benefit of the employee’s skill and 
achievement, it is not sufficient that the employer had in 
mind a desired result, and employed one to devise means for 
its accomplishment. He must show that he had an idea of 
the means to accomplish the particular result, which he 
communicated to the employee in such detail as to enable 
the latter to embody the same in practical form.” 
 
McKeen, 34 App. D.C. at 172 (quoting Robinson, 29 App. D.C. at 109). 
328. B. Jean Weidemier, Ownership of University Inventions: Practical 
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Where no contractual agreement, express or implied exists, 
shop right may operate to grant an employer a royalty-free 
license to use the employee’s patent, when the invention was 
made with the employer’s resources or facilities.329 
 
a.     Patent “Shop Right,” Employer Paid-Up Use 
License 
 
Unlike copyright work for hire doctrine, the patent “shop 
right” grants the employer only limited rights in an employee’s 
invention. Shop right was defined as the non-exclusive right to 
practice any invention made by an employee; patent title still 
remains with the employee.330 
Shop right is not a statutory right, but rather a form of 
implied license, a common law right, determined by the court 
factual analysis of equitable principles, an employer may to 
freely use the subject of a patent if an employee uses his 
 
Considerations, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL 
INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES, ch. 5.4, 495-505, 495 (Anatole 
Krattiger, Richard T. Mahoney, Lita Nelsen, Jennifer A. Thomson, Alan B. 
Bennett, Kanikaram Satyanarayana, Gregory D. Graff, Carlos Fernandez & 
Stanley P. Kowalski eds. 2006). 
329. Id. at 495. 
330. C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Application and Effect of “Shop Right 
Rule” or License Giving Employer Limited Rights in Employees’ Inventions 
and Discoveries, 61 A.L.R. 2d 356, § 6[b] (2010) (citing Consol. Vultee Aircraft 
Corp. v. Maurice A. Garbell, Inc., 204 F.2d 946, 950 n.1 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. 
denied 346 U.S. 873 (1953)); see also Stanley P. Kowalski, Making the Most of 
Intellectual Property: Developing and Institutional Policy, in 1 INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST 
PRACTICES, ch. 5.3, 485-94, supra note 328: 
 
A shop right is an “implied-in-law nonexclusive license of a 
patent from an employee to an employer. A shop right is 
generally implied when an employee who is not specifically 
hired to invent uses the employer’s facilities to invent, 
usually while on the job. The shop right rule grants to such 
an employer the royalty-free right to use the invention of 
the employee. It is based on the employer’s presumed 
contribution to the invention through materials, time, and 
equipment.” 
 
Id. (emphasis added). See generally C.C. BJORKLUND, EMPLOYEE’S RIGHT TO 
COMPENSATION FOR EMPLOYER’S USE OF EMPLOYEE’S INVENTIVE IDEA, 23 AM. 
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d § 203 (2010). 
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employer’s time, money, tools and materials to produce a useful 
result.331 Shop right is distinct from an express license, the 
latter given by consent of the parties, whereas a shop right is 
created by operation of law.332 
 
b.     Patent Work Made for Hire, Employer 
Ownership 
 
In contrast to shop right, work for hire operates to divest 
the employee-inventor of patent title, based on the three 
common law exceptions prior noted.333 Albeit no state has yet 
adopted a similar position, federal law mandates that the 
federal employee-inventor divested of his patent rights under 
work for hire be afforded a minimum 15% of any royalties or 
income received by the U.S. government.334 The current state 
[non-federal]335 majority view is given in the Utah statute 
 
331. Drechsler, supra note 330, at § 18. 
332. Id. 
333. Weidemier, supra note 328, at 495. 
334. The Uniform Patent Policy for Rights in Inventions Made by 
Government Employees, 37 C.F.R. §§ 501.1-501.10 (2011), is applied in 
tandem with the Technology Transfer Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 3710 (2006), 
which established a minimum compensation scheme, fifteen percent of any 
royalties or income received, for inventors employed by the U.S. government. 
15 U.S.C.A. § 3710(d) (2006) further “requires a government agency to allow 
the inventor to retain title to any covered invention when the agency does not 
intend to file a patent application or otherwise promote commercialization.” 
See also DAERR-BANNON, supra note 325, at subsec. 5. 
335. W.W. Allen, Annotation, Comment Note.-Rights and Remedies 
(Independently of Patent Laws) of One who Makes an Invention or Discovery, 
or Conceives an Idea or Plan, as Against One who Utilizes It Commercially, or 
Discloses It, or Threatens to Do So, 170 A.L.R. 449 (2011) (citing Becher v. 
Contoure Laboratories, 29 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1928), aff’d 279 U.S. 388, 390, 391 
(1929)): 
 
A suit in respect of wrongful manufacture, use, or disclosure 
of a secret invention, discovery, process, etc., being founded 
in the common law, or the ordinary equity jurisdiction, and 
not on the patent laws, may of course be maintained in a 
state court. Such a suit is not affected by the collateral 
circumstance that plaintiff has filed an application for a 
patent, nor by the granting of a patent to plaintiff 
subsequently to the matter complained of. 
 
Allen, supra note 335, at § II. 
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regarding employer’s rights to employee-inventor’s patents.336 
The Utah statute “clearly states the employer’s right to require 
preinvention agreements as a condition of employment or the 
continuation of employment, making it clear that adequate 
consideration from employment-based inventions is 
employment or continuation of employment in the at will 
situation.” 337 Thus state court majority, in upholding employer 
preinvention patent assignment agreement on a take-it-or-
leave-it-basis allows the employer to avoid difficult contract 
questions re “adhesion and unconscionability, adequacy of 
consideration, freedom of contract, and structural difficulties 
implicit in ex ante bargaining for speculative rights.” 338 
A recent case DDB Technologies v. MLB Advanced Media 
L.P, has further defined “work for hire.” 339 On appeal, the 
 
336. DAERR-BANNON, supra note 325, at subsec. 5. 
337. Id. 
338. Id. at subsec. 7. 
339. DDB Tech., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media L.P., 517 F.3d 1284 
(Fed. Cir. 2008), remanded to 676 F. Supp. 2d 519 (W.D. Tex 2009), denying 
leave to appeal, Misc. No. 925, 2010 WL 675689 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 24, 2010) 
(employer’s legal title to employee’s invention depends on whether 
employment agreement states that employee assigned future inventions or 
merely agreed to assign future inventions); see also Bd. of Trs. of the Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2192 
(2011) (holding: “The patent law has operated on the premise that rights in 
an invention belong to the inventor.” The Bayh-Dole Act does not 
automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in federal contractors 
or authorize contractors to unilaterally take title to such inventions.) 
 
At that time [1988], patent law appears to have long 
specified that a patent assignment of future inventions . . . 
conveyed equitable, but not, legal title. See, e.g., CURTIS, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS §§ 
170, 155 (3d ed. 1867) (“A contract to convey a future 
invention… cannot alone authorize a patent to be taken by 
the party in whose favor such a contract was intended to 
operate”); Comment, Contract Rights as Commercial 
Security: Present and Future Intangibles, 67 YALE L.J. 847, 
854 n.27 (1958) (“The rule generally applicable grants 
equitable enforcement to an assignment of an expectancy 
but demands a further act, either reduction to possession or 
further assignment of the right when it comes into 
existence”). (Breyer, J. and Ginsburg, J. dissenting) 
 
Id. at 2203. See also Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[o]nce the invention is made and [the] application for [a] 
96http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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Federal Circuit addressed two issues: (1) whether the patent 
assignment clause created an automatic assignment or merely 
an obligation to assign; and (ii) whether the patents fell within 
the scope of employee’s employment agreement. As to the first 
issue the Court held federal (not state contract) law applied.340 
Under federal law, a patent assignment is automatic by 
operation of law when it expressly grants rights in future 
inventions and requires no further act on the part of the 
assignee to complete the transfer.341 Alternatively, contracts 
merely obligating an inventor to grant rights in the future may 
vest equitable rights to the employer, but do not by themselves 
vest legal title to the patents on those inventions.342 Therefore, 
despite the assignment language, the employee would still need 
to transfer legal title to his employer in an invention developed 
after a general assignment of “future rights.”343 
 
 
 
 
 
 
patent is filed,…legal title to the rights accruing thereunder would be in the 
assignee [words: “do hereby [post-invention] assign”]…, and the assignor-
inventor would have nothing remaining to assign.”); Ipventure, Inc. v. Prostar 
Computer, Inc., 503 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that an agreement to 
assign future patent rights is not a present assignment, as would be 
indicated by present assignment language, “hereby conveys, transfers, 
assigns.”). 
340. DDB Tech., 517 F.3d at 1296; see also DAERR-BANNON, supra note 
325, at subsec. 3: 
 
Federal law determines how a patent is transferred, but 
state law governs the agreements to assign patents and 
state law governs preinvention agreements. With their 
origins in equity and in common law, such contracts: 
(i)  usually are, but need not be, in writing; 
(ii) may be express, or within reasonable limitations, may be 
implied in fact. 
 
DAERR-BANNON, supra note 325, at subsec. 3. 
341. DDB Tech., 517 F.3d at 1290. 
342. Id. 
343. See Brian Brunsvold & John C. Paul, Recent U.S. Decisions and 
Developments Affecting Licensing, 43 LES NOUVELLES: J. OF THE LICENSING 
EXECUTIVE SOC’Y INT’L 144, 145-46 (2008). 
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5.     Lanham Act Sec. 43(a) Reverse Passing Off Cause of 
Action Reasonably Foreclosed After Dastar 
 
In the United States, a common law country, copyright 
protects economic rights in a creator’s work, and on its face the 
Act is silent regarding the actual author’s attribution or other 
moral rights.344 The United States became a party to the Berne 
International Copyright Convention, effective 1989, absent 
acceptance of its Art. 6bis moral rights, which would have 
given U.S. authors attribution rights under federal law under 
the Berne Implementation Act of 1988.345 Hence, although with 
widely varying measures of success, numerous cases by actual 
authors to vindicate attribution in their works have been 
brought under Lanham Trademark Act’s sec. 43(a) “proscribing 
 
344. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United 
States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and [Lanham] Section 
43(a), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 997 (2002). But see Chloe v. Fordham Univ. Sch. 
of Law, 920 F. Supp. 44 (1995) (holding that the Berne Convention is not self-
executing, and cannot be used to support a separate copyright claim [author’s 
claim of “mutilation” of his writing] outside of the rights accorded by domestic 
U.S. copyright law.) 
345. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 22-23 n.119 (2004): 
 
[P]rotection of moral rights in the United States was 
significantly at odds with moral rights enforced in countries 
that incorporate Article 6bis into their domestic laws in 
haec verba. At the outset, all U.S. creators working in an 
employment relationship will, on account of that 
employment status, be most challenged to vindicate, under 
copyright law, any of the quasi moral rights [of attribution, 
integrity, retraction, and disclosure]…Ineligibility for 
employees to assert moral rights in their creations “ is 
doubtless a legal position which is incompatible with the 
protection provided for under Article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention.” …American law as of 1989 recognized the 
artist’s right to object to “derogatory action in relation to” 
his work. Moreover, the fact that the United States 
subsequently implemented moral rights legislation-
expressly limited to the very narrow category of works of 
visual art, and subject to innumerable exceptions even in 
that field-merely highlights the contrast between our system 
and that of other Berne states [nation states], whose moral 
rights apply across almost all categories of copyrightable 
works. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
98http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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‘false designations of origin’” and “false descriptions or 
representations in connection with any goods or services.”346 
The 2003 landmark case of Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp is widely believed to have proscribed 
further reverse passing off cause of action for actual authors’ 
attribution rights under Lanham 43(a).347 In Dastar, the Court 
 
346. Kwall, supra note 344, at 988 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006)). As 
amended via the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, § 1125(a) provides: 
 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or 
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any 
word, term, name or symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or 
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading 
representation of fact, which- 
(A)     is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of 
such person with another person, or as to the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person, or 
(B)    in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents 
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of 
his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial 
activities, 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes 
that he or she is likely to be damaged by such act. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
347. 539 U.S. 23 (2003) stating: 
 
In sum, reading the phrase “origin of goods” in the Lanham 
Act in accordance with the Act’s common-law foundations 
(which were not designed to protect originality or 
creativity), and in light of the copyright and patent laws 
(which were), we conclude that the phrase refers to the 
producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and 
not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication 
embodied in those goods. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 202(distinguishing 
between a copyrighted work and “any material object in 
which the work is embodied”). To hold otherwise would be 
akin to finding that § 43(a) created a species of perpetual 
patent and copyright, which Congress may not do. See 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003). 
 
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37. (emphasis in original). See Graeme W. Austin, The 
Berne Convention as a Canon of Construction: Moral Rights After Dastar, 61 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 111 (2005), available at 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv3/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__journals
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noted that Dastar copied film in the public domain, then 
manufactured and sold the video set as its own product with no 
mention of the original television series edited to comprise 
Dastar’s video set.348 The Supreme Court held that “as used in 
the Lanham Act, the phrase ‘origin of goods’ is in our view 
incapable of connecting the person or entity that originated the 
ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain.” 349 
Pre-Dastar, Lanham § 43(a) was touted as a legal option to 
address lack of attribution or plagiarism, now considered 
practically foreclosed.350 
 
IV. Research Science Moral Rights: What Should Be Done 
 
A. Federal Law Should Recognize Research Scientists’ Moral
 Rights of Attribution, Integrity, Retraction and Disclosure
 as Inalienable and Distinct from Associated Economic
 Rights 
 
1.    U.S. Obligations to Research Scientists Under 
Treaties: Enforceable Under Article VI, cl. 2 of the 
U.S. Constitution as Federal Law 
 
The authority for both copyright and patent law in the 
United States arises under the U.S. Constitution: “[The 
Congress shall have the power] [t]o promote the [p]rogress of 
[s]cience and the [u]seful arts, by securing for limited times to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries.”351 Read literally, and in accord with 
 
__annual_survey_of_american_law/documents/documents/ecm_pro_064627.p
df (arguing in favor of U.S. adherence to Berne Art. 6bis under Murray v. 
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804), requiring courts to interpret 
statutes consistently with both customary international law and treaties). 
348. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 38-40. 
349. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-32. 
350. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 30-44. 
351. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added); see also DUTFIELD & 
SUTHERSANEN, supra note 25, at 100-01 nn.41-42 (2008) (emphasis added) 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 271-72 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed. 1961)): 
 
The utility of [the copyright] power will scarcely be 
100http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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the framers’ intent and historic application to early U.S. 
research science authors and inventors, the Constitution 
appears to grant intellectual property rights to natural 
persons, the actual creators of scientific intellectual property.352 
The classic constitutional definition of an author is “he to 
whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who 
completes a work of science or literature.”353 
Increasingly relevant for modern global research 
endeavors, Article VI, cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution accords 
treaties of which the U.S. is party the status of federal law—
”the supreme law of the land.” 354 Modern research science 
intellectual property is, by the very nature of global 
investigative teams, often outside the sole jurisdiction of any 
one nation state and requires coordination of national courts.355 
 
 
questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly 
adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The 
right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong 
to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases 
with the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately 
make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of 
them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws 
passed at the instance of Congress. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE 59-77, 78-
151 (2002) (Review of intellectual property law history, reflecting England’s 
influence on early U.S. law to accord the actual author(s) and –inventor(s) 
legal rights to their work); Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and 
Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109 (1929). 
352. U.S. CONST.. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 
351, at 271-72. 
353. 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 4:2 (2011) (citing 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884)). In Burrow-
Giles, the Court defined an author as one who “involves originating, making, 
producing, as the inventive master mind, the thing to be protected . . . the 
author is the man who really represents, creates, or gives effect to the idea, 
fancy, or imagination.” Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 61. 
354. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”) 
355. See, e.g., ALI, supra note 1, at 6 (“The internationalist perspective 
also requires the Principles to envision a future in which coordination among 
[nation states’] courts evolves from the exceptional to the expected”). 
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a.      Authorship Attribution to Natural Person 
Creator: An Implicit Human Moral Right 
 
International treaties and declarations to which the 
United States is a party, when read in pari materia to the U.S. 
Constitution and federal law, appear in accord with the 
interpretation that natural person creators are the primary 
focus of legal intellectual property rights.356 Professor Davies 
summarizes the purpose of copyright as follows: 
 
The copyright system guarantees the personal 
interests of the author in his work. It is also 
what Macaulay described as the “least 
objectionable” way of remunerating men of 
letters by providing mechanisms for authors and 
other rights owners to obtain economic rewards 
for their efforts. By securing such financial 
rewards, it stimulates creativity, thereby in the 
words of the Statute of Anne encouraging 
“learned men to compose and write useful books,” 
and in the modern world. . .promoting the widest 
possible availability of copyright protected 
material to the public, thereby encouraging both 
learning and the progress of science.357 
 
These treaties appear to imply moral rights, droit moral; 
namely that an actual author who invests time in creating the 
work also grants certain rights unique to creators.358 Berne 
does not specifically define “author;” however, the Convention’s 
text and historic context suggest “author” and “authorship” 
were meant to be defined as the “natural person who created 
the work.”359 The rule that the natural person who created the 
 
356. DAVIES, supra note 29, at 235. 
357. Id. 
358. DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra note 25, at 90-91. 
359. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: 
PRINCIPLES, LAW, & PRACTICE 245 (2010) ((quoting S. Ricketson, The 1992 
Horace S. Manges Lecture — People or Machines: The Berne Convention and 
the Changing Concept of Authorship, 16 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 
21(1991)). 
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work is the original owner is known as the “creator doctrine.”360 
The creator doctrine is the doctrine followed by the global 
majority, including most civil law countries.361 In marked 
contrast to civil law countries, common law countries (e.g. the 
U.S.A. and U.K.) broaden the definition of author to include not 
only the individual, but also a legal person such as a corporate 
body.362 
Moral rights theories may be broadly divided into three 
categories: monist, dualist and reverse dualist (based on how 
the rights are enforced).363 Germany represents a monist 
theory, in which the personal element of a work, as an 
extension of the creator’s personality, may not usually (unless 
specifically waived) allow alienability of either moral or 
economic rights to a work.364 In contrast, the French dualist 
law considers moral and economic rights theoretically separate, 
and moral rights are considered to protect personal interests in 
a work apart from the work’s value.365 Distinguished markedly 
from monists and dualists, common law countries’ (e.g. U.K. 
and U.S.A.) reverse monist theory views works only in 
economic terms, enabling full alienability to deem non-natural 
creators the “authors” (e.g. employers, businesses, etc.) and 
granting only limited time monopoly.366 Default authorship, by 
virtue of the mere act of hiring the actual author-creator, is 
directly contrary to the research science requirement to 
attribute works only to the true authors.367 Attribution to the 
natural person author ensures proper attribution and personal 
accountability, positive or negative depending on science 
findings’ merit, to the actual creator, both taken together to 
promote scientific integrity.368 
Professor Belanger argues that U.S. federal copyright law 
“fails to meet the Berne Convention standards” for protection of 
 
360. Id. at 245. 
361. STERLING, supra note 26, at 1209. 
362. Id. 
363. Thierry Joffrain, Note, Deriving a (Moral) Right for Creators, 36 
TEX. INT’L L. J. 735, 756-57 (2001). 
364. Id. at 756. 
365. Id. 
366. Id. at 757. 
367. Id. at 768-70. 
368. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 22, at 74. 
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moral rights in: (i) Section 106(A) applies only to works of 
visual art, as opposed to all literary [including scientific] and 
artistic works; (ii) Section 106(A) only provides the rights of 
attribution and integrity, as opposed to full rights of respect 
[faithful reproduction, rights of pseudonymity and anonymity], 
and Section 106(A) allows for waiver of moral rights, a concept 
outside of Berne.369 
 
b.     Absence of Clear Legal Cause of Action or 
Adequate Remedies for Research Science 
Plagiarism 
 
Moral rights are distinct from and broader than 
copyright.370 Rights norms and professional research science 
ethical mandates of research scientists and professional science 
research associations absolutely require attribution.371 In the 
United States, research science attribution and integrity 
violations are rarely prosecuted or enforced, except as applied 
to research misconduct actions.372 Federal government funding 
agencies often enforce research misconduct primarily to recoup 
federal research grant funds from an awardee committing 
fraud.373 While most research scientists feel very strongly that 
federal law should allow courts to review science misconduct 
plagiarism and fraud,374 some judges and federal grant agency 
 
369. William Belanger, U.S. Compliance With the Berne Convention, 3 
GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 373, 399 (1995); see also Natalie C. Suhl, Moral 
Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne Convention: A 
Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203 (2002). 
370. KWALL, supra note 30, at 55-57. 
371. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. pts. 50, 93 (2011) (detailing U.S. federal grant 
funded research attribution requirements); see also SIGMA XI, HONOR IN 
SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 39 (in illustrating the research scientists’ 
professional ethical requirements, the authors state that “[t]ruthfulness may 
or may not be the cement that holds together society as a whole, but certainly 
it is essential to science.”) (emphasis added); SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE 
RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 55 (“Experimental results are property that 
someone owns. The ownership of ideas is important; it has a bearing on 
promotion, and ideas [patents] sometimes can be sold for profit. Conflicts of 
interest exist.”). 
372. See, e.g., SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 60-62; CREWDSON, supra note, 
98, at 294-95. 
373. 42 C.F.R. pts. 50, 93 (2011). 
374. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 76-77 n.453 (citing Roberta Kwall, Moral 
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officials embrace David Nimmer’s opinion that: “rather than 
altering the laws passed by Congress or state legislatures, the 
answer should be internal to the academic setting by the 
adoption of appropriate university policies, ratified by their 
respective academic senates, for application to professors and 
students alike.” 375 Disadvantage of the latter court deference 
to internal agency- or internal institution self-investigation for 
the plaintiff research scientist, whose research has been 
misappropriated, or otherwise subjected to integrity trespass or 
disclosure denial outside science merit, is the practical problem 
of conflict of interest of self-investigation, e.g. “the [agency] fox 
guarding the henhouse” denial of due process or any impartial 
investigative process.376 The current legal situation in the 
United States for research science places the U.S. in the 
unenviable position of a dwindling minority of developed 
countries regarding its research science attribution and 
integrity policies and practice.377 As will be discussed in greater 
 
Rights for University Employees and Students: Can Educational Institutions 
Do Better Than The U.S. Copyright Law?, 27 J.C. & U.L. 53,55 (2000)). 
375. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 76-77 n.453. 
376. See, e.g., Jackson v. McHugh, 131 S. Ct. 280 (2010), cert. denied, 
Jackson v. Geren, 325 Fed. Appx. 213 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’g No. AW-07-851, 
2008 WL 7728654 (D. Md. Nov. 14, 2008); see Robert A. Gorman, Copyright 
Conflicts on the University Campus: The First Annual Christopher A. Meyer 
Memorial Lecture, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 291, 303 (2000) (“Were the 
university to own the copyright in faculty-created works, the university can 
block publication, can decide where and when to place the professor’s work 
for publication, and can abridge, revise and delete as it chooses.”). 
377. KWALL, supra note 30, at 37 (citing Nimmer, supra note 22, at 19-
20) (raising the question whether countries like England “have augmented 
their moral rights protection” since the United States joined the Berne 
Convention in 1988 “in a way that leaves the United States isolated”): 
 
As the close of the First decade of the twenty-first century, 
the United States appears to be rather isolated in its failure 
to recognize explicitly adequate moral rights. The existence 
of more substantive moral rights protections in both civil 
and common law jurisdictions not only creates a disparity 
between law in the United States and many other countries, 
but also results in the situation in which American authors 
find substantially more protection for violations of their 
moral rights abroad than at home. ). 
 
Id.; see also Cyrill Rigamonte, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L. 
L.J. 353, 354 (2006) (“the adoption of civil-law style moral rights legislation is 
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detail in subsequent sections, the result of the United States’ 
current failure to recognize in law the natural person research 
scientist’s basic attribution, disclosure, retraction, and 
integrity moral rights to his work is arguably unconstitutional 
and against public interest.378 
 
c.     Authorship Under the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) Art. 27 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Art. 15 Binds the 
U.S. via the UN Charter 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of which 
Eleanor Roosevelt was a key proponent, provides in Article 27: 
 
(1)  Everyone has the right freely to participate 
in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the 
arts and to share in scientific advancement and 
its benefits. 
(2)  Everyone has the right to protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which 
he is the author.379 
 
The ICESCR imposes three obligations on member States: 
 
a major shift in terms of copyright theory, because it eliminates the key 
features that distinguished common law from civil law copyright systems”). 
378. KWALL, supra note 30, at 37; U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The 
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”); U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 
U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
379. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 
27, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 
2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . 
.”) (emphasis added). The U.N. Charter, a self-executing treaty, would 
preempt state laws by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, which gives treaties 
the same status as federal law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
if viewed as an extension of the U.N. Charter, would grant individuals 
progressive economic, cultural and social rights (e.g. potential for U.S. 
economic liability under federal law); GLENDON, supra note 315, at 172, 174. 
106http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3
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to respect, to protect and to fulfill. 380 Although the U.S. signed 
the ICESCR in 1979, it has not been ratified.381 However, the 
ICESCR Article 15 simply reiterates UDHR Article 27, so the 
U.S. may be bound via the U.N. Charter as previously noted.382 
Under the U.N. Charter incorporating the UDHR and ICESCR 
principles, the United States is bound to enforce human rights 
for research scientists implicitly, if not directly, mandating 
certain fundamental moral rights.383 
 
380. MAREE SAINSBURY, MORAL RIGHTS AND THEIR APPLICATION IN 
AUSTRALIA 16 n.75 (2003) (internal citations omitted) (“The objective of this 
meeting was to elaborate on the Limburg Principles as regards the nature 
and scope of violations of economic, social and cultural rights and appropriate 
responses and remedies.”). 
381. KWALL, supra note 30, at 134 n.15. 
382. International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
art. 15, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3: 
 
  1.   The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize 
the right of everyone 
     (a)  To take part in cultural life; 
      (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications; 
      (c)  To benefit from the protection of moral and material 
interest resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is an author. 
  2.   The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the 
present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right 
shall include those necessary for the conservation, the 
development and diffusion of science and culture. 
  3.  The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake 
to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research 
and creative activity. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
383. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES, Introductory Note (1987): 
 
Virtually all states are members of the United Nations and 
parties to its charter. . . . In Articles 55 and 56 of the 
Charter, all member “pledge themselves to take joint and 
separate action in cooperation with [United Nations] 
Organization for the achievement of, inter alia, “universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language or religion.” . . . Increasingly, the Charter 
provisions have been linked to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights . . . almost all states would agree that some 
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d.    What Is A “Scientific Work” Protected Under 
Law? 
 
The U.S.A. is bound as a party to The Berne Copyright 
Convention (absent Article 6 bis moral rights), the Uniform 
Copyright Convention (UCC), the World Trade Organization 
(WTO, and thereby of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights or TRIPS), and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) Performance and Phonograms Treaty 
(WPPT).384 
 
[T]he Berne Convention refers to “every 
production in the . . . scientific domain” and 
“works relative to . . .science” (Article 2(1)). The 
UCC refers in its preamble and Article I to 
“protection of . . . scientific . . . works”. In these 
contexts the term scientific refers to works in the 
field of science (e.g. the physical or mathematical 
sciences) to make it clear that works that do not 
have a purely artistic appeal can be covered.385 
 
Berne copyright extends protection to: “all countries of the 
Union. This protection shall operate for the benefit of the 
author and his successors in title.” 386 
 
infringements of human rights enumerated in the 
Declaration are violations of the Charter or of customary 
international law . . . . The United Nations Charter and 
Charter of the Organization of American States, both of 
which include human rights provisions are treaties of the 
United States. 
 
Id. (alteration in original). 
384. STERLING, supra note 26, at 1267. 
385. Id. at 1248, 1267 (the Unites States is a member of the following 
international treaties: Berne 1989 (Paris); Universal Copyright Convention 
(UCC) 1955 (Paris 1972); World Trade Organization (WTO, and, thus, of 
TRIPS) 1995; WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) 2002). 
386. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
art. 2, para. 6, Sept. 9, 1886, S. Treaty doc. no. 99-27 (1986) (as last revised in 
Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended Sept. 28, 1979). The U.S. signed and 
enacted into U.S. law via the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (Oct. 31, 1988) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 
101 note); see also ALI, supra note 1, at 4 (“Under the Berne Convention, 
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B. Remedy: U.S. Accords Non-Waivable Moral Rights: 
Attribution, Integrity, Retraction, and Disclosure to 
Research Scientists, with Economic Rights Shared 
Equitably with Employers 
 
1.     Is Constitutional: Promotes Rights Guaranteed 
Scientists for the Public Benefit 
 
Were the United States to adopt dualist or French theory 
of droit moral, this would cause minimal disruption of existing 
copyright and associated law.387 The United States already 
recognizes separation of economic rights from the actual 
author-creator.388 Therefore, to separately recognize in federal 
law non-economic rights: attribution, integrity, retraction, and 
disclosure, for research scientists, would merely serve to 
harmonize these same rights operating de facto at the 
institutional and professional association level.389 As discussed, 
there appears to be no Constitutional bar, but rather on its face 
and by evidence from the Founding Fathers, supported by 
recent Supreme Court decisions, remains consistent with 
copyright and patent law.390 
 
2.     Harmonizes U.S. Policy with Global IP Policies to 
Facilitate U.S. Scientists’ Unfettered Research 
Collaboration in Modern Virtual Global Scientific 
Research Ventures in the Public Interest 
 
As discussed herein, research scientists today face 
monumental challenges, challenges that are administrative 
and legal rather than primarily scientific.391 Policies and 
procedures governing intellectual property and professional 
 
copyrights arise simultaneously in all 163 (as of December 2007) member 
States [nation-states]. Furthermore, trademark and patent rights holder are 
increasingly relying on central prosecution of their applications through the 
Madrid Protocol, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), and the European 
Patent Convention (EPC).”). 
387. See supra Part IV A.1.a. 
388. Id. 
389. See supra Part II. 
390. See supra Part IV; see also Fisk, supra note 33, at 1128. 
391. See, e.g., ALI, supra note 1; Phillips & Ryan, supra note 1. 
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ethics standards, historically uniform among research science 
institutions today vary dramatically, causing uncertainty 
absent uniform federal law.392 The adoption of Berne’s 6bis 
droit moral, particularly the French dualist theory, would fix in 
law professional ethics standards on which research relies in 
fact to maintain research quality and ensure procedural 
integrity.393 The adoption of droit moral would also serve to 
harmonize United States intellectual property law of more 
than 157 countries worldwide, facilitating U.S.-global science 
research collaboration.394 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Modern research science faces new challenges with the 
shift from national to global research efforts, funding, and legal 
jurisdiction problems inherent to scientific work products 
developed multi-nationally.395 Current United States law and 
policy, which denies fundamental non-economic moral rights to 
research scientists—rights recognized in 157 nations 
overseas—has become an overwhelming disincentive to engage 
in scientific research in the U.S. Historic research science 
ethics standards, promulgated and enforced to ensure scientific 
research quality and professional accountability, of both 
research practice and reporting by the local institution or 
professional societies, have decreasing control of global 
research networks.396 As the American Law Institute aptly 
describes for new world intellectual property, relevant 
principles of law must be harmonized among jurisdictions, 
between and among nation-states, for the scientific research 
benefits to accrue efficiently to the public’s benefit.397 To that 
end, it is urged that the United States adopt intellectual 
property moral rights recognition for research science. The 
rejection, thereof, is increasingly isolating our nation, and 
hence our scientific professional community, from the 
 
392. See, e.g., supra Part II.A-B. 
393. See supra Part IV. 
394. Id. 
395. See ALI, supra note 1, at 3-7, §§ 101-103. 
396. See supra Part II.A-B. 
397. See ALI, supra note 1, at 3-7, §§ 101-103. 
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mainstream global research community and to America’s 
innovative- and economic profound detriment.398 
 
398. See, e.g., KWALL, supra note 30, at 37. 
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